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The appearance of the last product of Dr. Cheyne's pen[1] offers occasion to review briefly his work, and to estimate it as far as is now possible, bearing in mind that the significance of a scholar's work is not always clearly visible till some time after he has ceased to be active.

Cheyne was born in London, Sept. 18, 1841, and died in Oxford, Feb. 16, 1915. He was educated at Merchant Taylor's School and at Worcester College, Oxford, was ordained in 1864, became Oriel Professor of Interpretation of Scripture at Oxford with Canonry of Rochester attached in 1886, and Fellow of Balliol College in 1868. His life was devoted mainly to the critical study of the Old Testament, though he did not neglect the New Testament, and sometimes passed into the larger field of general religious history. His width of interests and the fertility of his mind are illustrated by the large number of articles that he contributed to the Encyclopædia Britannica and to the Encyclopædia Biblica, of which latter work he became general editor on Robertson Smith's death in 1894.

His Old Testament study seems to have had a very intimate relation to his literary and religious life. I was

[1] The Reconciliation of Races and Religion. Thomas Kelly Cheyne. A. & C. Black, London. Pp. x, 214. 6*s*.

told by Professor Robertson Smith that at an early period in his career Cheyne fell into a state of perplexity and doubt, and seemed at one time to be on the point of giving up all interest in religion. From this depressing state he emerged through his critical studies, probably because these led him to separate the kernel from the shell, and to rest in the spiritual conceptions of the Bible. However this may be, his devotion to the Old Testament remained throughout his life, and he became one of the most influential English expounders of the new critical views.

He entered on his life-work at a favorable moment. For two hundred years eminent English thinkers had favored and to some extent practised a certain freedom in dealing with Biblical material, especially by laying stress on its higher side; there had been, however, no definite conflict of opinions on this subject before the nineteenth century. The theory of Astruc and the works of certain Continental scholars (especially De Wette, Ewald, Kuenen, Wellhausen, and Renan) had become known in England,[2] and gave an impetus to research. The result was a conflict in the ecclesiastical world. The first clash occurred in a Nonconformist body. Professor Samuel Davidson, of the Lancashire Independent College, had undertaken to edit a new edition of Horne's *Introduction* and was asked to rewrite the volume dealing with the Old Testament. His treatment of the Old Testament, which was freely critical, was pronounced dangerous by the Committee of the College with such emphasis that he resigned his position (1856). In the Church of England, while the Tractarian movement concerned itself little with Biblical criticism, its anxiety being to maintain what it held to be the purity

[2] In America also they were not unknown. It will be remembered that the translation of De Wette's *Introduction* by Theodore Parker and Frederick Frothingham appeared in Boston in 1843–48.

and authority of the Church, a storm was raised by the publication of *Essays and Reviews* (1860); one of the contributors was condemned in the Court of Arches but sustained by the Privy Council. Finally came on the Colenso case. Bishop Colenso was declared deposed by the Bishop of Capetown for his volume on the Pentateuch, and was reinstated by the Privy Council. This put an end to ecclesiastical prosecution in England for what was called critical heresy; liberty of Biblical research was established (1865). A few years later in Scotland Robertson Smith was removed from his chair in the Free Church College at Aberdeen for articles in the Encyclopædia Britannica; but this action proved ineffective—freedom came to be recognized generally in Scotland.

Such was the atmosphere in which Cheyne began his Old Testament work. It was his commentary on Isaiah, the third edition of which appeared in 1884, that first established him as a scholar of importance. The variety of his learning, the vital character of his style, and his frankness and courage in the expression of opinion, gradually commended the work to a wide circle of readers, and his ideas, though they called forth opposition, were accepted by a considerable body of students in England and elsewhere. In later years he modified some of the critical views expressed in the commentary, but continued to hold his main conception of the constitution of the Book of Isaiah; so, for example, in his edition of the revised Hebrew text which was published in 1899 in the *Sacred Books of the Old Testament.* Some other prophetic writings (Hosea, Micah, Jeremiah) he treated in a similar critical manner. In 1888 his volume on the Psalter appeared under the title *The Book of Psalms or The Praises of Israel,* and secured immediate recognition by its fine religious spirit, the incisiveness and directness of its style, and its freedom of thought. Other works which

revealed his geniality were *The Hallowing of Criticism* (1888), *Aids to the Devout Study of Criticism* (1892), and *Founders of Old Testament Criticism* (1893). His little volume, *Jewish Religious Life after the Exile* (in the series *American Lectures on the History of Religions*, 1898), though popular in style is helpful to other than general readers. He was one of the first to bring out clearly the value of the Book of Chronicles for the history of Jewish religious ideas in the period in which it was written (the third century B.C., according to Cheyne).

His helpful Old Testament criticism was brought prematurely to a close by his adoption of the theory (due largely to Winckler) that the main part of the records concerning the early history of Israel refer to a district in southern Judah called in Hebrew by a name (*misr*) which usually means Egypt. This district is connected with the Kenites, from whom, it is widely held, the Hebrews derived their initial cult of Yahweh; and the name of one of the clans of the region, Jerahmeel, by its similarity in form to Israel and other Old Testament names, suggested to Cheyne that it gives us the central point of the Israelite development. Thereupon in a series of volumes (*Critica Biblica*, etc.) he proceeded to rewrite the early history, substituting the name Jerahmeel for a great number of the names in the Hebrew text, undeterred by difficulties confronting such substitution. Though this procedure was generally condemned by scholars, Cheyne held on to it to the last. This unfortunate surrender to a baseless hypothesis was and is deplored by his friends as a mere waste of fine critical power. But it is generally felt that this lacuna in his critical work must not blind us to the value of the contributions he has made to Biblical science.

His latest literary output (in the volume mentioned at the head of this notice) is probably to be regarded not as a quite new departure, but rather as the formulation

of ideas that had been long held by him more or less consciously. Though he had surmounted his early doubt, he seems never to have been in full sympathy with the Church creeds. His various writings show an increasing divergence from prevailing opinions; he was seeking what he thought or hoped to prove a larger scope and a purer atmosphere, and he fell in readily with certain Oriental conceptions and systems that had been making their way gradually in the Western world. He became a member of a Brahmanist Society, and was in intimate relations with the founder of the Bahaist Movement and with his son. He held that peace among nations could be secured only through religious union. Each of the great religions of the present day, he thought, might learn from the others, and a common faith would make all men brothers. Though he affirmed the superiority of the founder of Christianity to all other religious teachers, he seems to have been especially attracted by Bahau'llah and his formulation of religious truth—"one God, and he a God of love." This is by no means a new idea, but it seemed to Cheyne to acquire a new vital energy as preached by the Bahaists, and in his latest volume he supports it with enthusiasm. He does not discuss the details of the hoped-for movement towards universal peace; he does not, for example, consider whether history shows that social fusion and religious unification have always gone hand-in-hand. But whatever the difficulties in his theory and the obstacles to the fulfilment of his hope, the reader cannot fail to be impressed by his religious breadth and the nobility of his purpose.

In considering Cheyne's work as a scholar we must bear in mind the variety of his interests and his diverse intellectual tendencies. He was an omnivorous reader in his own special subjects without losing his hold on general literature—he was, for example, a student of

Dante. He seized on new discoveries in ancient history and used them with effect for the illustration of his own researches. He was attracted by new theories, especially when they attached themselves to generally accepted facts; and his vivid imagination sometimes so clothed these theories with life that they seduced him into precarious generalizations and into unfortunate special pleading. His sympathy with broad ideas was strong, yet it sometimes led him to hasty conclusions which easily became a hindrance rather than a help to progress. He was a simple-minded man, holding to his own views with naïve tenacity, aware of the existence of other views, but seemingly not looking on them as things that claimed his serious consideration. Opposing opinions he treated with kindness, never, so far as I have observed, speaking of their authors with bitterness or even sarcastically. His prevailing tone toward his literary opponents was one of gentle wonder and regret that they could fail to see data and inferences as he saw them.

In Cheyne's long career we have to recognize valuable contributions to Biblical criticism and exegesis made in his earlier books, and to honor him for his devotion to all that he believed to make for the discovery of truth and the well-being of men.

CONFUCIANISM, AN APPRECIATION

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From the time when I began to make a study of Confucianism, it has been my growing conviction that no antagonism should exist between Confucianism and Christianity. The two religions, like two persons, should be friends; and as two persons, who are friends, differ in mien, physique, temperament, thought, manner, and occupation, so these two religions, while differing in many characteristics, ceremonies, and the consciousness as to what is right and what is wrong, should be friendly to each other and helpful to each other, through agreement in those spiritual ideas which are essential and fundamental, through the reverential realization of the common source of all truth and goodness, and through aspirations after higher things, an enlarged vision, and future perfection, which these religions, along with the best in all lands, expect ere long to see fulfilled.

Even where these two religions differ, they may still dwell together in the spirit of concord. We may not look for uniformity or complete agreement; we may look for harmony and mutual regard. Confucius, in one of his terse sayings, has said, "The Princely Man is harmonious but does not agree with others; the Mean Man tries to be like others, but is not harmonious." It is a misconception to think that Confucianism and Christianity are the same; it is an equal misconception to think that the two are antagonistic. The least that we should pray for is that the two, while differing from each other, shall be tolerant of each other. The most we can pray for is that the two shall at last unite in the unity of God and in personal determination to do, as Christ enjoined, the will of God.

The first reason for expressing appreciation of Confucianism is because it lays emphasis on the duties of right living, which are of essential and universal application. The moral nature of man, the rule of conscience, the moral virtues as developed from justice and benevolence, are the foundation principles on which rises the sublime structure of Confucian teaching. The virtues taught under various terms and in manifold forms of expression relate so directly and clearly to the present life, to human obligation, and to actual deeds, that many have assumed that Confucianism is only a system of ethics. If so, we must acknowledge that it is high ethics, and that no people have been so saturated with ethical ideas as have the Chinese. It is the moral element that makes significant the ancient civilization of China.

The soil from which spring forth all virtues is the moral nature of man. The orthodox theory of Confucianism, entirely compatible with the orthodox theory of Christianity, is that all men are thus endowed with this moral nature, a law written in the heart, a conscience to discern between right and wrong, a heavenly rule, the voice of God within. If the orthodox Confucianist and the orthodox Christian differ in their interpretation, it is as to the other theory of what is called "original sin" and "total depravity." That men have an aptitude to sin, and that it is hard to get them to do right, will be acknowledged by both Confucianist and Christian, but they separate when they begin to theorize as to whether or not all men are born *in* sin and *with* sin, and whether sin is hereditary, to be traced back to the first man.

Mencius has spoken most clearly on this particular doctrine, differing from other theories which prevailed in his day. He said:

"The feeling of commiseration belongs to all men; so does that of shame and dislike, and that of reverence and respect, and that of approving and disapproving. The feeling of commiseration

implies the principle of benevolence; that of shame and dislike, the principle of righteousness; that of reverence and respect, the principle of propriety; and that of approving and disapproving, the principle of knowledge. Benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and knowledge, are not infused into us from without. We are certainly furnished with them; and a different view is simply from want of reflection. Hence it is said, 'Seek and you will find them. Neglect and you will lose them.' Men differ from one another in regard to them—some as much again as others, some five times as much, and some to an incalculable amount. It is because they cannot carry out fully their natural powers. It is said in the *Book of Poetry*, 'Heaven in producing mankind, gave them their various faculties and relations with their specific laws. These are the invariable rules of nature for all to hold, and all love this admirable virtue.'

"Confucius said, 'The maker of this ode knew indeed the principle of our nature!' We may thus see that every faculty and relation must have its law, and since there are invariable rules for all to hold, they consequently love this admirable virtue."

From the quotation which Mencius makes from the *Book of Poetry*, we learn that Confucian teachings are not only ethical but religious. We are taught that the moral nature of man is the production of Heaven or God. This is the very first sentence in the *Doctrine of the Mean:* "What Heaven has conferred or ordained is called (moral) nature; to comply with this nature is called the path (of duty); to cultivate or put in order this path is called instruction (a system of teaching, a religion)." So the Sung philosopher and commentator, Chu-fu-tsze, has declared in this connection that "men and the world of matter have each received from Heaven an endowment of supreme law."

Possessed of this moral inheritance from God, all the duties of men are summed up in the one comprehensive word, called Virtue. China's ancient teachers ring the changes on this word; over and over again men are exhorted to cultivate virtue. Sometimes, as in the *Great Learning*, the injunction is cultivation of one's

personality, or what is commonly called the training of character. One of Confucius' maxims is, "The Princely Man cherishes virtue; the Mean Man cherishes comfort." Again he says, "When virtue is not cultivated; when learning is not discussed; when righteousness is learned but not practised; and when that which is not good cannot be changed; this is my solicitude." The first sentence in the *Great Learning* says that "the way of the Great Learning may be summed up in three things: cultivating illustrious virtue, renovating the people, and resting in the highest goodness."

Virtue, by which the moral nature of man is denominated, has many characteristics, but is summed up in the five cardinal virtues—humanity, righteousness, propriety, knowledge, and fidelity. The first two are used the most by both Confucius and Mencius. The first, as a Chinese character, means love as between man and man, and may be called charity or brotherly love. This too is characterized in many ways as is charity in the Christian Scriptures. Thus when Confucius was asked by one of his disciples what it was, he replied, "To be able to practise five things under the heavens constitutes charity." And being asked what they were, he added: "Respect, large-heartedness, fidelity, earnestness, and kindness. If you are respectful, you will not be insulted; if you are large-hearted, you will win all; if you are faithful, men will repose trust in you; if you are earnest, you will accomplish much; if you are kind, you will be able to employ the services of others." This is much like the teaching of the Apostle Paul, where he says, "Put on charity, which is the bond, the girdle, of perfectness."

And as with the great Apostle righteousness is taught equally with brotherly love, so with Confucius and Mencius. The latter says: "Brotherly love is the heart of man; righteousness is the path for man to follow. How lamentable, if men neglect the path and do not

pursue it; if they lose their heart and do not know how to find it again." Confucius says, "The Princely Man in the world does not set his mind either for or against anything, but what is right, that he will follow."

The Chinese Classics are in fact saturated with these teachings, exhortations, commands, for living an upright life and performing all the duties which Heaven prescribes, as revealed in an enlightened conscience and as applicable to all the conditions of life. The Chinese people too have been thus saturated with these high and worthy sentiments, and from childhood, in the school or out of the school, have been impressed with human obligation, as directed in deep reverence to God and in fidelity to man.

A second reason for appreciating Confucianism is because its great principles, while applicable to all life, apply in particular to the social, the political, and the educational departments of life. The five cardinal virtues relate to what is called the five social or human relations—ruler and his ministers, husband and wife, parent and child, brother and brother, friend and friend. These relations are in our Christian phraseology spiritualized, or widened to far beyond the limits of one's own family-circle. Thus the spirit that should exist between parent and child is that which should exist between public officers or rulers and the people.

Similarly, all moral teachings are made to apply to all who exercise authority. The moral science of Confucianism is in the first place social science or sociology, and in the second place political science or national well-being. The political science of Confucianism gives us light less on forms of government than on the duties to virtue, which rest on officers of the government from the highest to the lowest. In the Confucian sense, political reform means, first of all, moral reform, the reformation of the individual. Numberless citations could be

made but only a few are needed, and these, I may remark, are known even to the illiterate of China as well as to the learned *literati*.

The Classic of the *Great Learning* may be called a handbook on the science of morals and politics linked together. It deals with the supreme obligations of the Supreme Ruler of a nation, but it is a treatise which each child, rich or poor, all over the land, has, in past years at least, been required to memorize. It shows the duty of rulers to train their individual characters, and it shows how closely the prosperity of a nation is linked with the righteous character and conduct of the ruler and officials.

This teaching of the *Great Learning* by one of the disciples of Confucius corroborates the earlier teachings of the *Book of Odes* and the *Book of History*, three to four thousand years ago. In one of the Odes by the Duke of Chou to the Ministers of the Chou dynasty in praise of King Wen and in lamentation for the downfall of the dynasty of Shang or Yin, we have these words:

"Ever think of your ancestor,
Cultivating your virtue,
Always striving to accord with the will (of Heaven).
So shall you be seeking for much happiness.
Before Yin lost the multitudes,
(Its kings) were the assessors of God.
Look to Yin as a beacon;
The great appointment is not easily (preserved).

"The appointment is not easily (preserved).
Do not cause your own extinction.
Display and make bright your righteousness and name,
And look at (the fate of) Yin in the light of Heaven.
The doings of High Heaven,
Have neither sound nor smell.
Take your pattern from king Wen,
And the myriad regions will repose confidence in you."

In another Ode occur these words:

> "God said to king Wen,
> 'I am pleased with your intelligent virtue,
> Not loudly proclaimed nor portrayed,
> Without extravagance or changeableness,
> Without consciousness of effort on your part,
> In accordance with the pattern of God.'"

The whole history beginning with the ancient rulers, Yao and Shun, down to Yü the Great, founder of the Hsia dynasty in 2205 B.C., on to T'ang, founder of the Shang, in 1766 B.C., on to King Wu, founder of the Chou dynasty in 1122 B.C., is a history full of warning, admonition, and exhortation, with examples of upright reformers and statesmen to follow and cherish, and with the example of bad rulers to shun and abhor. The story is told in the *Book of Odes* and the *Book of History*. In *Spring and Autumn* Confucius tells of later events, a sad record of disorder, confusion, lawlessness, and wickedness, one kingdom quarreling with another, and one ruler overthrown by another. Everywhere and through all these centuries confirmation is given to the declaration of Solomon, "Righteousness exalteth a nation, but sin is a reproach to any people."

The *Analects*, the *Great Learning*, and Mencius carry on the same teaching—that righteousness and benevolence are the essentials of government. These are the questions which concern the Sages of Confucianism as they expound the science of politics, and not the multitude of questions with which Western political science loves to enlighten the world.

Ancient learning as distinct from the new learning is also inseparably bound up in the moral and religious principles of Confucianism. Ethics and the substratum of religion enter into a knowledge of history, sociology, finance, political science, *belles-lettres*, poetry, etiquette, and music; while modern and Western learning has little

to say of God, and overlooks the common duties of human relations. I appreciate for this reason what Confucianism has wrought in the past, and dread the effects of the new learning on the student class of today.

A third ground of appreciation is the remarkable fact that Confucianism makes supreme and all-important the root or origin of things. In looking at Confucianism from the superficial point of view, in its aspects of ceremonialism, rules of etiquette, methods of governing, land taxation, the worship of spirits, and even in its moral maxims, there is good chance for criticism as well as for admiration. When we search for its inner worth, for the kernel of eternal truth, for basic principles, all criticism vanishes and admiration alone remains. This search for first causes, this delving down to the root of the tree of knowledge and the tree of righteousness, is the most vital of all the teachings which Confucianism offers to China and also to religious thinkers throughout the world.

Early in the *Analects* of Confucius occur these words: "The Princely Man gives attention to the root of things; when the root is secure, there spring up all kinds of truth; filial piety and fraternal regard, these are the root of benevolent action." In the *Great Learning* we have the simple statement: "All things have a root, and they have branches; all deeds have a beginning and an end." The writer then traces back the process of pacifying the Empire to the good order of the State, to the regulation of the family, to the cultivation of the individual, to the rectifying of the heart, to the sincerity of the thoughts, and finally to the highest attainment of knowledge, and this extreme knowledge is found in investigating all things, in the spirit of research. He then throws in the sentence that "from the Emperor down to the mass of the people, all should make the cultivation of individual character the root."

Later on, in the same book, when dealing with the great problem of making the nation rich and prosperous, the writer traces the following stages in the development back to the original cause:

"On this account the ruler will first take pains about his own virtue. Possessing virtue will give him the people. Possessing the people will give him the territory. Possessing the territory will give him its wealth. Possessing the wealth, he will have resources for expenditure. Virtue is the root; wealth is the result."

Similarly, the very first sentence in the *Doctrine of the Mean*, as we have said, shows how all religion or instruction is preceded by the path of duty or doctrine, and this by Heaven's law in the soul, or man's moral nature, and this by Heaven or God, from whom every law, principle, and religion have come. In all the Classics we are taught again and again that God is the great First Cause, and on Him we are all dependent. The philosophers of the Sung period revelled in such discussions, but always reverentially, and the *Book of Changes* with the notes of Confucius form the basis of their philosophy.

The philosopher, Chu-fu-tsze, gives an elaborate explanation of the origin of the universe, which is more that of gradual evolution than of distinct creation. Man, the material world, heaven and earth, are all preceded by a formless, chaotic condition, and this in turn is preceded by two principles, the one termed Ruling Principle (li), and the other a Vivifying Principle (ch'i). They are two, and yet so joined that the one cannot exist without the other. The one is lifeless; the other full of life. The Ruling Principle needs the Vivifying Principle to secure results, while the Vivifying Principle in turn depends on the Ruling Principle for the way its power shall be exerted and exhibited.

"Being asked whether the Ruling Principle really existed before heaven and earth, he said before heaven and earth there was most certainly just this Ruling Principle. The Principle existing, heaven and earth existed. If this Principle did not exist, there would have been no heaven or earth, no man or things. The Ruling Principle existing, then the Vivifying Principle exists, flows forth, pervades, and germinates all the material world. Being asked if it was the Ruling Principle which germinated all things, he replied that when the Ruling Principle exists, the Vivifying Principle exists, flows forth, pervades, and germinates. The Ruling Principle as such is without form or body."

The next problem is the origin of these two Principles. In some respects it looks as if there were nothing beyond or before, but that the two Principles were the First Cause. This is not, however, the real teaching of this Chinese thinker. He traces them, as well as heaven and earth, to the Absolute, the Great Extreme, called *T'ai Chi*. He says:

"Being asked whether the Absolute is the chaotic mass before heaven and earth came into being, or the general name for the Ruling Principle of heaven and earth and all the material world, he replied that the Absolute is the Ruling Principle of heaven and earth and all things. As to that which is within heaven and earth, the Absolute is in the midst of heaven and earth. As to that which is within all things, the Absolute is inherent in all."

Chu-fu-tsze in his abstract speculation advances to another great thought, and that is that first of all there was the Infinite, called the *Wu Chi*, but that the Infinite was the Absolute, and the Absolute the Infinite, just like a circle in the ancient diagram. The one side is the incomprehensible, the mysterious, the invisible; the other side represents through the Ruling and Vivifying Principles a vast manifestation, unfolded in heaven and earth, all matter and man. He says:

"The Absolute, the Great Extreme, derives its name from the idea of the highest pivot. The sages called it the Absolute, meaning

thereby the root of heaven, earth, and all things. Hence it was that Chou-tsze termed it the Infinite, and so expressed the Mysterious without sound or fragrance. . . . The Absolute is just the extreme point, beyond which no one can go—most high, most magnificent, most subtle, most spiritual, surpassing all."

By thus examining the doctrines taught by the Sung philosophers and based on the old, mystical teachings of the *Book of Changes*, one should be convinced that Confucianism is a religion as well as a system of ethics. Confucianism cannot be limited to the sayings of Confucius, still less to his ethical sayings. The Classics which he compiled are saturated with religious ideas. All righteous conduct and a virtuous heart draw their life from above. All are dependent on God.

A fourth ground of appreciation is the fact that the men who gave utterance to all these good teachings lived good lives. They practised righteousness who preached it. They were not only teachers, but good men and holy men. From Yao and Shun down to Confucius, every one who taught wise and good sayings was an earnest and practical reformer. The lives of these men carried more weight than their words. In a turbulent age, Confucius was moved to leave his class-room and go out into society and the life of different kingdoms, exhorting the common people and, still more, kings and officers, to abandon wickedness and establish just laws and right ideas. As James Freeman Clarke has said, "Many beautiful and noble things are related concerning the character of Confucius—of his courage in the midst of danger, of his humility in the highest position of honor. His writings and life have given the law to Chinese thought. He is the patron saint of that great Empire." The seventy-two disciples of Confucius were chosen more for their love of goodness than for mental attainments. Mencius, his chief apostle, is thus reckoned among the Holy Men; his

character was as great as his intellect. So, too, the noted commentators of the T'ang and Sung periods, and those less known in the last dynasty, have given strength to their writings by the sincerity of their lives. Cant, hypocrisy, fine words but bad living, have characterized none of these leaders, but only men of less calibre and especially the *literati* of later years. But as Christianity is not to be judged by the hypocrisies of Christians, so Confucianism should not be condemned for the lack of virtue, truth, and sincerity among mere students of the ancient Classics. For four thousand years the noted teachers of thought found in the Confucian system have been men who practised what they preached, and for this they are worthy of honor.

A fifth reason for appreciating Confucianism is because it is adapted to the common people as well as to the learned. The usual name of Confucianism implies that it is a religion of the learned. To be a Chinese scholar a thorough knowledge of the Classics has been deemed a necessity. Confucianism is thus not only a system of ethics with spiritual truths but a method of learning. Chinese education has meant a training in the literary excellencies of the Classics, whether the moral and religious ideas were always accepted or not. Thus up to the present, the *literati* have been dependent on the Confucian Classics. Many such are inclined to make Confucianism only a learning and not a system of ethics. They even go so far as to declare it is not a religion at all. Confucius has been dethroned from his lofty place as a messenger of Heaven and a preacher of righteousness. He has been made only an essayist, a *littérateur*. When Confucianism is thus narrowed, it will not be long before, in the face of modern science and the new learning, it is rejected altogether.

As a matter of history, the educated men of China in the past, but not in the present, have been close stu-

dents of Confucianism. Its ideas have been acceptable, its rites have been observed. The life of the learned has been moulded by Confucianism, which in common phraseology has been called the Great Religion.

The life of the common people has also been moulded by Confucianism. In fact the mind of the Chinese is Confucian. The great underlying, all-important principles of Confucianism have become known to all, the illiterate as well as the learned. Certain phrases embodying the germ thought of Confucianism are on the lips of ignorant women, the country peasant, and the little child. Confucianism should be called not only a religion of the learned, but the Religion of China. Its vital teachings clearly expressed have permeated the whole nation. They are adapted to high and low, to ruler and people, and therein show their divine inspiration and origin in Heaven.

These five reasons should convince every one that for a Christian to appreciate Confucianism is not senseless or base, but reasonable and sound. The position is both liberal and orthodox. The one great criticism passed today on Confucianism is that it has no vitality, no dynamic power, and, being a human teaching, can have none. It is true that it seems to be decadent, that its good points are being discarded, and that it is fast becoming mere ceremonialism, a worship of Confucius, a cult, and not a life or even a system of religion or ethics. To my mind this is to be regretted. It is equally clear that the criticism contains a fallacy. If Confucianism as a religion has lost its power, it should not be forgotten that many branches of the Christian Church in the past, and also today, have been decadent, retaining the form, but losing the life, of a spiritual religion. The only way for Confucianism or Christianity or any other religion to have life-giving power is to resume connection with the one living and true God, rely more on His spiritual presence

than on systems and forms, rites and creeds, and believe with a new assurance of faith that God is All and in all, and that man, while His offspring, can do no good apart from Him. This truth, as well as the criticism itself, applies equally to Christian and Confucianist.

ETHICS IN MODERN BUSINESS

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BOSTON

[This is the first of a series of articles on the ethical standards prevalent in different occupations.—ED.]

Though the object of business is money-making, its essence is service. Facts in support of this conception face us on every hand. For example, follow through the day the most typical of all citizens, the suburbanite. A cook serves him with breakfast, his town with a sidewalk, an eager boy with a newspaper, an engineer with safe conduct to the city. "Bag carried, sir?" is his welcome there. Thereafter both necessities and luxuries are everywhere thrust upon him—collars, fish, custard pies, vacuum cleaners, pyramids of oranges and of apples vigorously shone on anonymous trousers. A street car takes him to his office-building, an elevator to his office, cleaned for him in the cheerless hours of darkness by a woman on hands and knees. Throughout the day a stenographer and office-boy do his bidding. At lunch a restaurant serves him. When evening comes, superabundant theatres seek to entertain him. No socialist, however ardent, can conceive greater eagerness to serve. The very streets are congested with people bent on serving one another. The activities produced by charitable agencies are in volume as nothing by comparison. There is, however, a stern condition. The recipient of this service must pay for it. With rare exceptions, ability to pay can come only from the recompenses of service. The service of business is reciprocal.

The conception of business as service becomes peculiarly significant when we contrast business with specula-

tion. The essence of speculation is to make money without service. Like the amateur fisherman, the searcher for gold mines, the tramp, and the thief, the speculator seeks wealth without normal sacrifices in the form of effort. All alike, as a rule, get only their deserts. The farmer, the merchant, the manufacturer, and all the commercial parasites of these basic producers and distributers—butchers, bakers, and candlestick-makers—give equivalents for what they get, logically, at least, getting more the more they give. Under this individualistic system of seeking to get through giving, the productive powers of the world have grown prodigiously. The pure speculator's contributions are so slight that his own rewards are mostly dust and ashes and his part in business progress is almost negligible. The wonderful inventions of our age, the new economies in production and distribution, the construction of plant after plant, are the results of efforts to get wealth through giving better or cheaper service. Human progress itself, or what we have long called progress, is bound up in this conception. The familiar phrase, "What is a man worth?" comes somewhere near to meaning, "What has he given to his fellow-men?" The vast and conscious gifts of Rockefeller and Carnegie to colleges, foundations, and causes of recognized public merit, have been far less than their enormously money-making gifts, unintended as gifts, of oil and iron.

The business world is thronged with lenders and borrowers. Of these the lender is by tradition the more highly regarded. He sits in state and has substance; he judges borrowers, and often refuses their applications. Banks, prudent and discriminating, typify lenders. The borrower, because a borrower, admits lack of substance and his need of the substance of others. He often comes dangerously near to being a suppliant, and the contracts to which he binds himself

have tragic possibilities almost unknown to lenders. Yet the borrower is the active force in the community. He conceives and develops enterprises. The lender, because a lender, admits that he is a drone; that, having no enterprises of his own, he is ready to participate, usually without voice in the management, in the enterprises of others. Often too borrowers are far richer than lenders. The great railroad systems of the country owe millions to small investors once called by Dennis Kearney "bloated bondholders." And the banks themselves borrow of their depositors more than their total loans.

The business of giving, getting, borrowing, and lending is a delicate structure. Into it the State has more and more entered by the enactment of new laws, the creation of regulating commissions, and an ominous increase in taxes. Particularly in the case of the railroads, government, both state and national, seems to have endeavored to protect "the plain people" from "the big interests." But whereas railroads were once dominated by men of wealth—Vanderbilt, Gould, Huntington, Forbes, Harriman—only James J. Hill of this type of railroad magnate is still alive and active. Even Messrs. Moore and Reid seem finally to have been ousted from control of the Rock Island Co. Railroad presidents are now hired experts, not large capitalists. Railroad bondholders and stockholders, the latter only technically partners in the business and in spirit as much lenders as bondholders, are the saving classes in the community. Noteworthy attempts are now being made by the Atchison and the Southern railway managers to induce the stockholders in these companies to be less lethargic. As both bondholders and stockholders are in most cases essentially lenders, enterprise does not spring from them and the participation of government in their business tends still further to retard development. Prior to 1893

profits from railroad extensions, largely through graft, were so great that such extensions were overdone. Later, Mr. Hill asserted that a billion dollars a year would be needed for railroad extension. Today such extensions have practically ceased. The prospect of getting in the railroad business has become so slight that money is no longer given for this purpose. Railroad investments were long deemed both safer and more satisfactory than industrial investments. Today the reverse is true.

Responsibility for modern corporations is supposed to reside in boards of directors. It seems axiomatic that it is the duty of directors to direct. If disaster comes, directors are held peculiarly accountable. The popular conception of the shortcomings of directors has been expressed by the broken-backed and now happily defunct Commission on Industrial Relations, as follows: "The typical director of large corporations is not only totally ignorant of the actual operations of such corporations, whose property he seldom, if ever, visits, but feels and exercises no responsibility for anything beyond the financial condition and the selection of executive officials." Yet directors get only $5, $10, or possibly $20 a month. In return for whatever time, thought, and experience they give, they receive less than an office boy. Formerly, when rich men were more largely than now in control of corporations, self-interest tended to make them alert. Now a conscientious director tries to combine altruism with business—a dangerous combination. And while ignorance and absenteeism on his part are to be deplored, it is always a misfortune when he goes beyond general supervision and usurps the executive duties of adequately paid officials.

Two temptations have peculiarly beset directors: first, the opportunity to make clandestine profits through foreknowledge; second, the opportunity to make such profits by dealing as directors with themselves as in-

dividuals. Marketing their own lands through building railroads to them, "consenting" to serve on reorganization committees and charging secretly and excessively for their services, selling themselves the bonds of the companies entrusted to them, participating in profitable underwriting syndicates, have in the past been among the temptations. The fact that in most large corporations stockholders are only investors or in spirit money-lenders and take no real part in the management, increases greatly the liability of directors to fall into the above-mentioned temptations. Conscientious directors are pitifully paid for their services and responsibilities, while the unscrupulous are often much more overpaid than stockholders ever discover.

The end of the last and the beginning of the present century marked the climax in the production of multi-millionaires through the creation of the so-called trusts. Practically a decade earlier the Sherman anti-trust act had been passed. Practically another decade was to pass before this law was to become even measurably effective. The riot of quickly gathered wealth in the years 1899, 1900, 1901, and 1902 might lead a few prudent people to foresee a calamitous day of reckoning, but to the masses a new era had begun in which inordinately rich men seemed destined to be the leaders and standard-bearers of the American people. The following table of big combinations created in these four years shows how extraordinarily the anti-trust laws were then disregarded:

1899	*1900*	*1901*	*1902*
Amalgamated Copper	Armour & Co.	Allis-Chalmers	International Harvester
American Agricultural Chemical	Crucible Steel	American Can	International Mercantile Marine
American Beet Sugar	National Sugar Refinery	American Locomotive	International Nickel
American Car and Foundry	Wagner Co. merged with Pullman Co.	Associated Merchants	Lackawanna Steel
American Pneumatic Service		Eastern Kodak	Mass. Gas
		Pennsylvania Steel	Railway Steel Spring
		Pittsburg Steel	
		U. S. Steel	

1899	*1900*	*1901*	*1902*
American Shipbuilding		U. S. Reduction & Refining	Texas Co.
American Smelting and Refining			Vulcan Detinning
American Woolen			
American Writing Paper			
Borden's Condensed Milk			
International Steam Pump			
National Carbon			
National Enameling and Stamping			
National Fire Proofing			
Pittsburg Coal			
Pressed Steel Car			
Republic Iron & Steel			
Rubber Goods Manufacturing			
Standard Oil			
Union Bag & Paper			
United Fruit			
United States Cast Iron Pipe and Foundry			

The climax of the era of combinations came near the end of McKinley's term of office and the beginning of Roosevelt's. After years of hard times McKinley was elected in 1896 on a "full dinner-pail" platform. The big combinations were a logical outcome. It was not until some time after President Taft had taken office in 1909 that any specific, comprehensive, and effective campaign was waged against combinations in restraint of trade. Various suits then brought are still in the courts.

Moral retribution without government interference had, however, begun much more promptly. The moving spirit in the most nefarious of the flotations—that of the Amalgamated Copper Co.—had been Henry H. Rogers, the masterful head of the Standard Oil group of financiers, after John D. Rockefeller had substituted golf for business. Rogers and his silent associate, William Rocke-

feller, had always had abundant available cash when the straits of others, natural or skilfully enforced, had furnished opportunities to buy securities at bargain prices. To the public, incited to speculation by flaming advertisements of prospective profits and racked by market collapses, Henry H. Rogers appeared a veritable bogey-man. But in 1907, thanks to an overweening conviction that he could, single-handed, build and finance a large railroad, this financial magician had to hold out his own hand, asking the public—the poor, blundering, often pinched public—to contribute to his personal needs. Then in quick succession paralysis and death overmastered him.

Almost as powerful as the awe-inspiring Rogers was the wizard of railroad combinations, Edward H. Harriman. While other men were asserting that all the railroads of the country were about to be merged in a single huge system, he was advancing far toward making this prophecy a reality. Yet long before the government had torn his railroads asunder, cancer took him. Even the overshadowing figure of all the multi-millionaires in their brief careers, the late J. P. Morgan, went, at the zenith of his power, like Napoleon, to Moscow. In the great railroad reorganizations of the 90's his had been the last and best word on conservative financing. The lesson that excessive floating debts should be avoided seemed then, under his guidance, to have been learned forever. As late as 1907 his personality dominated the financial world. But when he died, he left behind him the New York, New Haven, and Hartford and the Boston and Maine railroads nearly swamped by floating debts, and the New York Central railroad so burdened by them that it had to pay 6% for 20 years to refund $100,000,000 of short-term notes. His master-stroke, the creation of the United States Steel Corporation, the so-called "good trust," was the turning-point. The success of this in-

dustrial giant seemed to justify imprudent finance. Though for part of the property acquired he is understood to have paid Mr. Carnegie $100,000,000 more than the latter's asking price a short time before, and though for the rest he took highly-watered stocks, he diluted the combination still further, paid himself and others colossal underwriting commissions, and yet made the corporation prosper. But when the following year he bought English steamship lines without regard to price and created the International Mercantile Marine Co., his imprudence led first to disappointment and then to disaster. And soon afterward the purchase of railroads and trolley companies by the New Haven railroad with his sanction at extravagant prices, cost that company very dearly. So reckless had he become that, following the success of the Steel Corporation, he urged the British Parliament to allow him to build underground railways in London, to compete with other Americans building similarly, though the business has never been sufficient, without his competition, to give these other Americans any income on their investment. Only good luck in this instance saved him from another disaster.

It might be expected that the multi-millionaires who became partly a national institution, partly a national joke, and partly a national menace, would leave behind them spendthrift heirs. Cheering refutations of such an expectation are John D. Rockefeller, Jr., Mrs. E. H. Harriman, Mrs. Russell Sage, Miss Helen Gould, and the present J. P. Morgan.

Another apparent axiom of business is that monopoly is an evil. Yet why should two men do one man's work? If they must share one man's pay a needed job may go undone. A city which seeks two gas companies will probably have none, for capital at reasonable rates cannot be obtained unless monopoly is assured. As a

result, monopoly of local public utilities under government regulation is customary. Once railroads seemed similarly protected by a natural monopoly. They could be duplicated only at prohibitive cost; their terminals seemed to be real estate of incomparable value. They too have been more and more regulated by the State. The communities served, however, assuming that monopoly is an outrage, have encouraged competition. Comparatively cheap trolley competitors have sprung up everywhere, followed now by "jitneys" and other automobiles, for which states, cities, and towns have furnished streets practically free of expense. Railroads and trolley lines, burdened with both regulation and competition, have, especially in the east, suffered miserably. Both have been denied the hope of expecting profit through the growth of the communities served. While they have had repeatedly to face increased wages and exactions for the safety and convenience of the public, low rates and fares have been forced on them. Thousands of saving people, who meant to invest prudently, have as a consequence been bitterly disappointed.

The "unearned increment" is an economic outlaw. Looking back, it seems to have made uninteresting people fat with wealth for which they have given no equivalent. Looking forward, however, faith and hope, approved by scripture, are found to be a necessary attribute of unearned increments. From a business point of view, what can be more stimulating than the development of enterprises through correct and therefore profitable forecasts of the future? Nothing in business is more impressive than the energy to improve through the hope of exceptional rewards. Every year old appliances and standards are becoming obsolete because inventive genius has supplanted them with better devices. New machinery, new methods of communication, even

new accounting systems, have come into existence primarily through the hope of getting much through giving much.

The laws framed to compel business men to be virtuous have too often forced the semblance rather than the reality. They seem, nevertheless, to represent a more sensitive moral consciousness than formerly prevailed. More and more it is realized that trustees and directors cannot represent safely in a transaction themselves both as principals and as men entrusted with the welfare of others, the danger being manifest that they will fail to serve either one master or the other. The disclosures in connection with the Equitable Life Assurance Co. some years ago made plain that directors of a railroad could not properly as such sell to themselves the bonds of that railroad and then turn them over at a profit to an insurance company also under their charge. The time was when they might contend that through their knowledge of the bonds the insurance company was protected from loss, while the railroad company had reason to welcome the money which they paid for its bonds. Nevertheless, the master whom they were liable to serve first was themselves. Their profit might indeed become a determining factor both in the manufacture and distribution of the securities. If the railroad company wanted to sell bonds and the insurance company to buy them, should not the two companies bargain together directly and thus escape a middleman's profit? Often the expectation of such profits must have led railroad directors to vote for bond issues which it would have been safer not to have issued.

In the sale of securities municipalities, notwithstanding suspicions of corruption, perhaps because of such suspicions, have been far in advance of private corporations. Imagine the mayor of any American city forming a syndicate, with himself a participant, to buy, without

advertising for other bids, an issue of that city's bonds! Always bids for municipal bond issues are publicly invited and almost always such bids are forthcoming. There is little doubt that bonds of large and prosperous private corporations might be similarly sold. Yet over and over again favored bankers, whose partners have been directors, have been allotted attractive bond issues at prices almost sure to show a profit and enabling such bankers to give their business friends a chance to participate. Profitable underwritings have been similarly allotted on what seems a system of favoritism.

The justification for such a system lies, if there is any adequate justification, in the comparative certainty of getting money whenever needed. Almost every big railroad of the country had a decade ago some banking firm represented on its board of directors. Such exceptional railroads as the St. Louis and San Francisco, which "shopped about" among bankers, were held to be in a friendless and hence in a vulnerable position. The New York Central, the New York, New Haven, and Hartford, and the Boston and Maine railroads protected themselves by a regular contract for the sale of bonds and notes with J. P. Morgan & Co., which firm was represented on the boards of directors. The Union Pacific and the Pennsylvania railroads similarly depended on Kuhn, Loeb & Co. There have since then been wholesale resignations of such bankers from directorships. Many business men are convinced that thereby various important boards of directors have been unfortunately weakened. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that, quite apart from questions of price and profits, the New York Central, New Haven, and Boston and Maine railroads were led into unsound financial positions through the ease with which they could secure money under their contracts with the Morgan bankers. There also can be no doubt that in earlier days of their

strength they could have secured ample funds for their legitimate needs by asking for public bids.

Difficulties, however, arise in the case of corporations neither particularly strong nor well-known. Then banker friends, represented on boards of directors, may be friends indeed. All the members of a certain banking house resigned as directors of a certain none-too-strong corporation, that no question of their dealing with themselves might arise. They were besought to return. Had they not placed the securities of this corporation with hundreds of investors who needed their watchful care? Were they to leave these dependent investors in the lurch? They returned. The company sorely needed money. None others would supply it. They offered to buy the company's securities on condition that other bankers should be offered a chance to bid on them, and, when their bid—the only bid—was considered, they retired temporarily that the other directors might pass on the bid, without influence from them. They supplied the company with money when they would have much preferred not to do so. In spite of these precautions, they were on dangerous ground. Business is not sounder but less sound when it is not conducted on a business basis, and the descent is easy from these self-imposed standards of virtue to practices once common but now, to a great extent, happily outgrown. Gradually private syndicate profits are being superseded by public bids. The change is not yet far advanced but the tendency is good.

Though the service given by business men has had and should have mostly a selfish origin, rectitude is far more common than the reverse. All investments are based on trust in others, and in a great majority of cases such trust is not misplaced. Contracts are as often made orally as by elaborate written documents. Though law-courts are congested, most controversies are settled pri-

vately. Sharp practices and downright dishonesty are scandalous mostly because they are so rare. Persons not in business often shock business men by their disregard for obligations which business traditions have made sacred.

In the business world of getting income through service the stock-broker may not deserve to rank high. Too often he serves vice, as truly as the saloon-keeper. He often lives, perhaps fattens, on speculation the very essence of which is that it is not service. Brokers themselves have tried to distinguish between the legitimate and the illegitimate in their business, and years ago thought that they had found the distinction in the delivery or the non-delivery of actual securities. The "bucket-shop," *i.e.* the office where stock gambling was reduced to its lowest terms, the customer betting against the keeper of the shop as to fluctuations, was classed by members of the stock exchanges as illegitimate. But their own services, in so far as they serve speculators, may possess only attenuated usefulness. Yet stock exchange members, though much of their business may be notoriously useless and even dangerous, are singularly scrupulous, within the limits of their own game, both to their customers and to each other. They may deceive each other, within the rules. They may pretend that they want to buy when they really want to sell and *vice versa*. They may conceal the size of their orders. Such deception is like that of the tennis player who does not declare to his opponent just where he intends to return the ball. But no stock exchange broker would consciously cheat nor would he fail to live up to his oral contracts, no matter how large may be the sums at stake. He would no more do so than he would cheat at cards or call his opponent's tennis ball "out" when in fact it was "in."

It must, however, be admitted that this scrupulousness, within the rules, results from its being necessary. Other-

wise the stock exchanges could not perform their functions. And the conscientious governors of the exchanges have had great difficulty in precluding "washed sales," "matched orders," and other deceptive tactics. In other words, the rules of the game and the standards prevailing at any particular time are in brokerage more effective deterrents than philosophical analyses as to the inherent nature of transactions.

More impressive than the sportsmanlike business ethics of brokers and persons well known socially is the almost universal determination of small business men to preserve their good names. Even though a thousand John Smiths exist in a community, each indifferent to the others, each will protect his fraction of the name as if it were a priceless treasure. The investor is not alone in trusting. All lenders, all merchants selling on credit, trust. To be trusted and not to repay, to acknowledge bankruptcy, is so abhorrent to business men that some of them to escape this ignominy fall into worse predicaments. Complacent onlookers, who have been spared the searching temptations of impending insolvency, can hardly understand the financial nightmares which have preceded criminal expedients not always recognized as such by those guilty of them. Business crimes may be akin to heroism—unsound, it is true, illogical, and usually disastrous, but at times strangely resembling virtue.

The virtues which are real are those which are treasured in the hearts of men. The abolition or concealment of external evils and more circumspect habits mark only slight progress. All true progress must be internal and is inevitably slow. The ethics of the business world would be far less interesting if they were obvious or were easy to acquire or to change for the better without long and often severe suffering.

To stimulate industry by justice between giving and getting, borrowing and lending, and not to discourage

it, means not only fairness but patient study and rare wisdom. Even harder is it to measure the progress toward good or evil in the whole vast extension of modern industry. The forces of nature are now utilized as never before, the amount of production is unprecedented, millions of people exist where formerly there were thousands. Yet it is not clear that men and women in factories doing forever the same limited, monotonous tasks or the rich people forever separated from them are happier or more advanced in successful civilization than were the simple, self-reliant, and mostly homogeneous Yankee farmers before they were embattled for freedom and fired the shot heard round the world. Other generations have gone astray through worshipping false gods, and it may be that our worship of Mammon has led to size rather than to true progress. In all the two thousand years since the peaceful night

> Wherein the prince of light
> His reign of peace upon the earth began,

there has never before been so much discontent, dissension, and hatred as now. The Commission on Industrial Relations would have us believe that faulty distribution is at the root of our evils. Such a suggestion in truth hardly scratches the surface of our gigantic business problems of today. We can understand and solve the details far better than we can perceive whither the whole mighty army of industrial workers is in its blindness really marching.

HEBREW PSALMODY[1]

JOHN P. PETERS
New York

Professor Kent has undertaken to provide English-reading students of the Old Testament with a complete library of hand-books for the study of the contents of that great collection of Hebrew writings, which shall be of scientific value; not necessarily presenting new and original research by the author, but representing the best results of modern scholarship. The present volume, the fifth in this series, deals with the lyric poetry of the Old Testament, including songs of lamentation, songs of love and marriage, and a variety of oracles, triumphal odes, and national songs. All of these together, however, constitute but one-fifth of the total sum of Hebrew lyric poetry here dealt with, four-fifths consisting of the Psalms. It is especially Professor Kent's treatment of that collection of hymns, constituting not merely far the greater part of Hebrew lyric poetry quantitatively but also far the greater part of it qualitatively, which I propose to discuss in this article. As Kent says in his preface, the Psalms "are the real heart of the Old Testament. In them the innermost soul of the Jewish race is laid bare." Not only this; they are "the link that binds the Old to the New Testament." They have played as large a part in Christian as in Jewish worship. They have been translated for Christian use in all kinds of forms into almost every tongue, and an enormous literature has grown up about them. From the modern standpoint, however, they "have been to a

[1] The Songs, Hymns, and Prayers of the Old Testament (The Students' Old Testament). Charles Foster Kent, Ph.D., Litt.D., Woolsey Professor of Biblical Literature in Yale University. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1914. Pp. xxii, 305. $2.75.

certain extent neglected." Certainly there has been no approximate consensus of opinion arrived at concerning the origin of the Psalter and its various collections of Psalms, its growth, the purpose, use, date, and place of composition of its hymns collectively and individually, such as has been reached in the case of Hebrew laws and codes of law. "The present generation, however, is beginning to experience the joy of rediscovering them"; a reference to the numerous volumes on the Psalms recently published, especially in English the commentaries of Cheyne and Briggs, and this present work.

What new material have we on which to base this new study of the Psalms? Kent mentions "the recovery of the ancient Egyptian, Sumerian, and Babylonian hymns," which "has broadened our horizon by at least two millenniums"; "the rediscovery of the genius of Hebrew rhythm," which "has placed in the hands of the modern translator a most valuable aid in recovering the original text"; and "the discovery of Hebrew, Greek, and other texts, far older than those followed by the translators of the classic Authorized Version of the Bible," which "has made it possible to substitute in most cases original readings for uncertain conjectures."

This last statement is misleading, if not absolutely false. In Hebrew we still have for all practical purposes but one text, the so-called Masoretic, plus the Samaritan text for the Pentateuch. For the Greek we are a little better off, but there have been no text discoveries of serious importance even here. Numerous text emendations of Old Testament passages have been proposed, as a result, not of the discovery of new manuscripts, but of text-critical study and comparison of the Hebrew and the versions. Some of these emendations, shrewdly made, have met with general acceptance; more are still most "uncertain conjectures." For, unfortunately, text-criticism of the Old Testament has

been, especially on the part of most "modern" scholars, largely a matter of guess-work, the reforming of the text, not on the basis of objective but of subjective evidence: as, that the critic cannot understand what is written, and therefore it is an error; or that what is written does not conform to the critic's conception of what the author should have written, and therefore must be changed. It is this sort of discovery which has given us some of the "original readings" to which Kent refers.

It should be said that this unscientific method of treatment of the text of the Old Testament is a natural reaction against the even more unscientific treatment formerly in vogue of the traditional Hebrew text as sacrosanct; and indeed we are in general in a period of reaction in Old Testament criticism. So long bound by a false tradition, the present tendency is to contradict that tradition at every point. Former opinions are discredited as such. Because formerly Hebrew writings were over-dated, so now they must all be proved late. If formerly they were accounted units, now they must be divided; if ascribed to a given author, his authorship is axiomatically denied. It is a period of unrest and upheaval, where anyone may find and found a new theory, and each newest notion is the best because the last. And all this is especially true of the criticism of the Psalms, because they have been to a certain extent neglected, Cheyne's work being the extreme representative of this method and of these ideas as applied to the Psalter.

"The rediscovery of the genius of Hebrew rhythm," to which Kent refers, goes back to Bishop Lowth's work of 1753. Since that date there have been no real discoveries, but merely the fuller application of Lowth's principles. This has been of some help in the textual criticism of the Psalter, but has been greatly overworked

by recent writers, notably Briggs in his Commentary. As Kent points out (p. 8), Hebrew poetry remained elastic and irregular both in its rhythm and its strophic structure, and those who have sought to reduce it to rule have found themselves forced by their theories "to delete many words and sentences which are clearly original and to disregard the logical connection of the thought and the literary unity of the whole." "The original text" recovered by such methods is too often a most "uncertain conjecture."

So far as textual criticism of the Psalms is concerned, Kent to the contrary, we have really made very little progress in later years. The text from which we must translate the Psalms is substantially the same today as that from which they were translated in "the classic Authorized Version of the Bible." The great improvements in our potential critical apparatus for the translation and interpretation of the Psalms are of other sorts, only one of which is mentioned by Kent—"the recovery of the ancient Egyptian, Sumerian, and Babylonian hymns." (Why not also the Indian Vedas, and the Persian Gâthas?) But having thus emphasized in his preface the importance of these hymns in Psalm-study, he makes no more actual use of them than Cheyne and Briggs had done before him. Disregarding the lesson taught by those and all other collections of ritual and liturgical hymns ancient and modern, he proceeds to treat the Psalms as occasional poems, lyrics composed for this and for that event, the same false method which gave us so many of the headings of our Psalms, and led to their ascription to David.

For an occasional poem an author must be sought, and as tradition ascribed the origin of Temple psalmody to David, so the individual Psalms came to be ascribed to him as their author. But if David wrote them, for what occasion did he write them? So the Bible story

was searched, and the effort made to attach each Psalm to some event of David's life: "when Nathan the prophet came unto him, after he had gone in to Bathsheba" (51); "when Doeg the Edomite came and told Saul, and said unto him, David is come to the house of Ahimelech" (52). Today, very properly, no historical value is attached to these headings as such. Unfortunately, however, while rejecting these particular headings, commentators have made new ones of their own by pursuing precisely the same false method of attributing the individual Psalms to this or that event in the history of the Hebrews, either as contained in the Bible or as reconstructed by them, or to this or that period or individual. So Kent, following this futile method, but reacting against the old traditions and the old dates, assigns to events of the Maccabæan period about as many Psalms as were once ascribed to events in the life of David.

Professor Kemper Fullerton, of Oberlin College, pointed out some years ago, in an admirable little series of studies in the Psalter published in the *Biblical World*, the fallacy of this method of procedure, and laid down a few sane principles, of which I would cite the following:

"As a hymn book, the Psalter is a book of devotional poetry. In such poetry the religious interest is apt to dominate over the artistic interest." Accordingly the Psalter must be studied from the devotional and more specifically the liturgical standpoint.

"Like all other hymn books, it has been subjected to repeated and extensive redaction;" which he illustrates by the history of some of the most popular hymns in our modern hymn books, like "All Hail the Power of Jesus' Name," showing how they have been changed for denominational purposes, to fit new periods or special occasions, or to adapt the special and occasional to

general use, so that out of poems have been formed hymns; and all this in a century and a quarter of use.

"Hymns are usually more concerned with inner experiences than with outward conditions. Their allusions to contemporary history are, with rare exceptions, incidental." To prove which he takes up and analyzes, among others, hymns of Luther, Watts, and Wesley, showing how impracticable it is in most cases to date them, either from general content or individual reference.

Although Kent suggests in his Introduction that the Psalter was intended for ritual use and is a liturgical and devotional song book, he practically ignores this in his treatment of the Psalms themselves. In commenting on the Song of Songs, he very properly disregards the older interpretations of half a century ago, which attempted to make that collection of love songs a sort of episodic drama in which is recorded the love and the virtue of a Shulamite maiden, who rejects the advances of the mighty Solomon in favor of her shepherd lover, recognizing that the references to Solomon are typical merely. The groom and the bride in love songs are the king and the queen, the poorest shepherd maiden queening it for the nonce, with her bridegroom as her mighty king. So the references which were once ascribed to Solomon in the songs of that collection are interpreted as having no reference to a special king or to any king, but as being the common use of love songs, then as now. But when he comes to deal with the forty-fifth Psalm, which is designated by its heading in the Psalter as a love song, he is obsessed with the tradition of the old method and proceeds to describe it as a "Hebrew court song," "evidently written on the occasion of a royal marriage." "The poem is introduced by an elaborate exordium, which is doubtless typical of Hebrew court usages." (Why will certain

writers, when they are stating some presumption or guess of their own, always attempt to buttress it by such words as "evidently" or "doubtless," which they only use because it is not evident and because it is very much in doubt?) Then he proceeds: "The atmosphere of this Psalm is evidently that of the joyous days before the Babylonian exile." (Does he suppose that love songs are normally penitential?) And then, under the obsession alluded to, he attempts to identify it with some particular occasion. "Although this hymn may later have been sung at a royal marriage, there is little doubt that a definite theme and occasion were originally in the poet's mind." Accordingly he adopts Briggs's suggestion that the king was "Jehu the warrior, who unsheathed his sword in behalf of the true worship of Jehovah, who with his own right hand pierced the heart of his foes and by a series of bold acts established himself on the throne of northern Israel." This is precisely the principle of identification of date and author followed by the earliest commentators, whose comments, as noted above, are now discarded by all. Whatever may have been the original occasion of its composition, as it has come down to us this Psalm is a ritual love song, in which the allusions to the king are no more personal than the allusions to Solomon in the Song of Songs.

Can we date the Psalms? A method of dating pursued by commentators in general is the linguistic method. The words used in a given book or writing are tabulated and compared with the words used in other books. This is a valid method in general, but to make it really practical one must have a certain amount of securely dated material from which to start and literature sufficient to give a fairly large vocabulary. These conditions are only partly present in the Old Testament. The literature is small, and it has been so worked over in succeeding periods that it is difficult to assign fixed

dates to any large part of it. In the case of the Psalter these conditions are intensified. The vocabulary is very small and abounds in stock phrases, part of a technical ritual hymn use; and, more than any other book of the Bible, the Psalter has been written and rewritten, adapted and recast over and over again. We use today in our church services chants and hymns of very various periods, some old, some new; but all have been so rewritten, adapted, and modernized that from a mere study of their words it would be impossible to determine their original literary connection. Liturgical and devotional poetry is both the most ancient and the most modern in its form. With all the conservatism of liturgical use, we still adapt our hymns to modern comprehension in their words and phraseology. So it was with the Psalms, and hence here particularly the argument from language must be used with the greatest restraint.

The tendency of later critics has been to use the linguistic argument only for the latest and most modern element in the Psalms, overlooking the quaint old ritual terms and phrases which linger here and there, or deleting or correcting them because they are no longer intelligible. Kent notes that the Sumerian hymns were sung in Babylonian and Assyrian temples for a period of two thousand years. (He might have added that translations of those hymns were made into later Babylonian and Assyrian, and that these also were used for liturgical and devotional purposes.) He points out further that from a comparison of the use of other peoples it is a fair presumption that the Hebrews also, from the earliest days, made use in their temples of ritual Psalms, and that we have in fact in the pre-exilic writings abundant allusions to such ritual psalmody. But, having stated these facts, he then goes on to ascribe Hebrew psalmody, practically entire, to the period after the Exile, and chiefly to the period from 400 to 150 B.C.

It would indeed be strange had the Hebrew people, having an ancient temple psalmody, differed so radically from all other peoples as to throw away after the Exile all that ancient devotional and liturgical material, and make an entirely new psalmody. Now, in point of fact, we find numbers even of the latest Psalms based on or using ritual phraseology which we can identify as such from pre-exilic writings. So the phrase *Hallelujah*, so common in the later Psalms, is one of the most ancient ritual phrases of the Hebrew people, containing the peculiar divine name of the Hebrews in its most ancient form. This was the *tehillah*, or cry uttered at the moment of performance of the sacrifice, and from this cry the Psalms as a whole received their name *tehillim*, a word which suggests at once that the Psalter was primarily a collection of hymns for use in connection with the temple sacrifices. Sometimes we can specify the particular sacrifice for which a Psalm was intended. So Jeremiah has preserved for us the ritual phrase used in his time at the thank-offering sacrifice: "Thanks be to Yahaweh, for He is good and His mercy endureth forever," which is the basis of a number of later Psalms. Some of the Psalms are provided with headings which indicate their ritual use, some of which are early, as shown by their present unintelligibility, while others are later in form but early in principle. Such headings are of great value as suggesting to the commentator how to look in the Psalm itself for indications of the purpose for which it was composed or to which it was adapted in the ritual services of the temple. Here and there rubrics have been preserved, generally in rudiment, which are of even greater value in the same direction.

In point of fact the Psalms ought to be studied in connection with Hebrew ritual as preserved to us in the sacrificial and other codes in the Pentateuch, or in allusions in the other writings of the Old Testament. Kent has

sought to study them in connection with historical events, and thought that he could classify them as of this or that period, according as they are grave or gay, triumphant or despondent. As already stated, he has made no use of the material to be derived from a study of the hymns of other peoples, and especially of the Sumerian-Babylonian hymns. If he has any suggestions to make touching these hymns in any way, it seems to be that in the Captivity the Jews must have been tremendously impressed with the ritual of the Babylonian temples and led to imitate it. A study of the Book of Genesis shows us that this was not the method in which the ancient mythology of the Euphratean basin affected Hebrew thought, and presumably what is true of the relations of Babylonian and Hebrew mythology is true also in principle of the relations of Babylonian and Hebrew psalmody. We find certain ritual phrases in both, not borrowed but common, such as, to cite but one, "*How long?*" and we find certain similar liturgies. The Babylonian penitential psalms are liturgies to be used in connection with the sacrifices to be offered to secure remission of sin for an individual suffering calamity. The calamity is sent by the deity because of sin, although in fact the sufferer may not know what sin he has committed to arouse the divine wrath. The calamity or sickness may be the consequence of a "secret sin," that is, an unwitting sin.

The Babylonians had a sacrificial ritual for this class of sufferers, of which the penitential Psalms were the liturgical accompaniment. Similarly the Hebrews had a ritual for this class of sacrifice, as expounded in Leviticus, Chapters 4–6, which of course had its liturgical accompaniment of psalmody; and as that class of liturgical literature among the Babylonians was both ancient and large, so from the size and contents of the Hebrew sacrificial ritual we should expect the similar Hebrew

liturgical literature to be. In point of fact, one of the largest categories in Hebrew psalmody, if not the largest, is the penitential Psalms. Sometimes these are designated as such by their headings, as in the case of Psalms 88 and 102; generally not. Some of them are in the later books, others are among the earliest hymns of the Psalter. By comparison with the Babylonian liturgy and ritual, of which latter we have abundant representations on seals and tablets, we can trace the liturgical use behind these Hebrew penitential Psalms also, such as the sixth, twenty-second, and fifty-first, which are beautiful specimens of the genus: the priest holding the penitent suppliant by the hand, the alternating lamentations of great woe, declarations of faith or innocence, and earnest supplications for relief put in the suppliant's mouth; the gift and the sacrifice; then the declaration of deliverance and triumph. And here is just what Kent has not done, in which he is not alone or original; he has not studied the Psalms in connection with religious ceremonial, to which study the old Sumerian and Babylonian psalmody offered a key.

Again, it would be a strange thing, in view of the history of Hebrew literature in general, if we found in the Psalter no traces of Israelite practices and Israelite shrines. In Hebrew narrative and Hebrew legislation we have a great amount of material from the northern kingdom, and our earliest prophetic writings come from the same source. The Book of Deuteronomy, and consequently the reforms connected with that book, show marked traces of Israelite influence and even of Israelite origin. So, to instance but one point, the mountains of the Blessing and the Curse are not mountains of Judah, but mountains of Israel, by the shrine of Joseph. Now there is one peculiarity which modern critics have noted as peculiar to the Israelite narrative—the use of Elohim instead of Yahaweh for God. But

there are two books of Psalms, the second (42–72) and the third (73–89), in which similarly Elohim is the regular designation of God instead of Yahaweh. (Kent perversely changes the text in his translations, substituting *Jehovah* for *Elohim*.) Why should we not follow the same rule here which is followed in the analysis of the Pentateuch and ascribe these books to the northern kingdom, or to the influence of the northern kingdom?

But further, as Briggs in his Commentary has pointed out, in the Korah and Asaph collections (42–49, 84–89; 50, 73–83) contained in these two books of Psalms there is a peculiar frequency of reference to Jacob and Joseph; the land is the land of Joseph, or the land of Jacob and Joseph; God is the God of Jacob and Joseph, etc. There are also certain local references in these collections, which can be satisfied only by the supposition of their composition in the territory of the northern kingdom. So in Psalm 89 12 we have this verse,—

> "North and south Thou hast created them;
> Tabor and Hermon rejoice in Thy name,"

where Tabor and Hermon are synonyms for south and north. Manifestly whoever wrote that wrote it at a point from which Tabor and Hermon were visible as the great land marks north and south, that is in northeastern Galilee, on or close to the Jordan. But this is one of the Psalms of the Korah *addenda*, a little collection added at the close of the third book and belonging, according to its headings, with the Korah collection (84–89). Now turning to the Korah collection proper (42–49), we find that the first Psalm of that collection, Psalm 42, was by common consent of the commentators composed at the sources of the Jordan. Strangely, however, the commentators, while perceiving this, have assumed that it was written by some Levite from the temple of Jerusalem, carried captive by Nebuchadrezzar,

who as an exile there, or on his way to Babylon, composed this poem; and so Kent. The same old obsession of commentators, that the Psalms are not hymns but poems written on special occasions! It surely was written at the sources of the Jordan; but it also was certainly a liturgical hymn, intended for use at some ritual festivity. It is at least natural, therefore, to suppose that the original of this Psalm was a temple hymn of the Temple of Dan at the source of the Jordan; the more so as still another Psalm of this collection, Psalm 46, pictures a river sanctuary in a region whose description suggests the same locality. Many commentators, including Kent, assign Psalm 45 also to the northern kingdom. The ascription of this collection to the Sons of Korah points in the same direction, for according to the genealogy of the Priestly Code (Ex. 6 16 ff., Num. 26 57 ff.) Korah was the primitive ancestor of Asaph, who is the patronym of the guild of singers in Ezra and Nehemiah (cf. also 1 Chron. 6). But Korah was further a Levite of the Kohathite gens, to which Moses belonged. It was this gens of the Levites which furnished the priests of the Temple of Dan, according to the account of the founding of that temple in the Book of Judges. The Sons of Korah of the Psalter were apparently, then, Levites of the heretical Temple of Dan, which gives point to the anathema story of the Jerusalem priests against Korah contained in Numbers 16.

And here we come to the method of treating and dating the Psalms which holds out the most hope of real results, namely, by the collections. Kent notices the existence of these collections in the Psalter, and somewhere says that in a general way the collections are arranged according to age, so that the earliest Psalms are in the earliest books, and *vice versa;* but in actual practice, following the bad example of his immediate predecessors in Psalm study, he throws away this

objective evidence and proceeds to date each individual Psalm for itself on subjective grounds, assigning it to any period toward which he fancies the tone of its contents to point. In fact he ascribes only nine Psalms out of the first three books (1–89) to the pre-exilic period, three to the sixth century, twenty-three to the fifth, twenty-eight to the fourth, fourteen to the third, and seventeen to the second century before Christ. In his practical arrangement of the Psalms for study he shows a still greater disregard of the collections, arranging them in groups according to his understanding of their themes (under which grouping he classes, by the way, only twelve Psalms as "Liturgical Hymns"). The result of this treatment is to conceal from the student the evidences of the growth and development of the Psalter, and its true relation to the history, the religion, and the literature of the Jews.

As historical facts the division of the Psalter into five books, and of those five books again into a number of smaller collections, may not be disregarded; indeed they constitute the point of departure for Psalm study. Why is this collection designated as of David, that one as of the Sons of Korah, another as "The Prayers of David son of Jesse", etc.? Why is this group of Psalms (51–63) so systematically provided with headings, taken from the Books of Samuel, ascribing them to events in the life of David, while the other Psalms in the same book have no such headings? Why should this same group of Psalms be so uniformly penitential above all other groups, reminding one of a Sumerian collection of penitential hymns? Why should we have one divine name in two books, and another in the other three? Why does a collection like that of the Sons of Korah have a peculiar stamp of its own, in language and in literary charm, which all commentators note? Why is a collection headed "Songs of Degrees"? Why are some

Psalms divided by *Selahs*, and others not? Why do we have groups and collections of Psalms provided with musical headings, while other groups and collections are without them? and why should the musical notations differ in different collections? Above all, why should we have these musical notations and directions in the first three books and not also in the last two, and why should Chronicles and the Septuagint be ignorant of the meanings of those terms? Why should there be such a divergence as to general form and content between the Psalms of the first three and the last two books of the Psalter? Why should composite Psalms always be formed out of Psalms preceding and never out of Psalms following them in the Psalter? why should Psalms cite only preceding and never succeeding Psalms? and why should composite Psalms and Psalms framed on or citing other Psalms occur only or peculiarly in the last two books of the Psalter (90–150)? These and other questions of a similar sort, the very foundations of a proper understanding of the origin, the growth, and the purpose of the Psalter, are practically ignored in this volume.

Take the musical headings above referred to. They are evidence of long use of certain Psalms, and of growth and change in the treatment of the Psalter as a whole. They were preserved long after their sense was lost, as is the case regularly in liturgical and ritual use. They are relics, puzzling in their exact interpretation, but of immense value for the study of the growth of the Psalter. They are the sort of ear-mark by which we can judge antiquity. That they are used freely in the first three books, disappear in the last two, and are utterly unintelligible by the Greek period, shows not only that the first three books antedate the last two books, but that between the collections of the first three and of the last two books there is a gulf fixed, not merely of years, but also of conditions. The whole musical system had

changed, and the old terminology consequently become unintelligible. When, how, and why? It is in this direction, and not in the subjective direction of attempting to date the individual Psalms at the fancy of the critic, that sane Psalm study must proceed.

Kent has stated that the Psalms, as a whole, cover a very long period of growth. In point of fact, he has assigned four-fifths of them to the relatively brief period of one hundred and fifty years, from 400 to 150 B.C. I think the evidence goes to show that the Psalms of the first book are to be referred to the pre-exilic temple at Jerusalem; the second and third books to the northern kingdom of Israel; the fourth and fifth books to the period beginning with Nehemiah. But here we meet with another factor, which has been the cause of much confusion—the factor of long use, and of growth and adaptation due to that use.

Speaking roughly, we must date the Psalms according to their collections, and not pick out a Psalm from this collection and date it with a Psalm from another collection. But individual Psalms frequently seem to constitute exceptions to the collections in which they stand; or words, phrases, turns of thought, and allusions in individual Psalms seem entirely out of keeping with the dates suggested by the collection headings. These exceptions have seemed to the scholars to whose works I have particularly referred so numerous as to constitute the rule; hence they have proceeded to disregard the collections as such, and to date the individual Psalms according to the latest elements which they found or thought they found in them, by that means bringing together as often as not Psalms from very various collections. But this is very much as though one were to date the *Te Deum* by the form in which it appears in the American Prayer Book. Indeed the *Te Deum* is an admirable example of the method of creation,

development, and adaptation of liturgical hymns. Of course old writers attempted to connect it with individual authors and with a particular event, and so the tradition has come down that it was composed and recited responsively by Ambrose and Augustine at the conversion or baptism of the latter, toward the end of the fourth century. The first certain evidence of its existence, however, is from the fifth century and the Gallican Church. As we have it, it is a composite hymn, consisting of three clearly marked parts—a hymn to God as the Trinity, a hymn to Christ, and a closing penitential Psalm, which belongs in itself neither to the one hymn nor the other. In analyzing this, would you reserve the name *Te Deum* for the entire composite hymn, or use it for the two great pre-existing hymns also? How would you date it? By its completion as a composite, or by the creation of its parts? We have evidence of the existence of more primitive hymns containing words and thoughts now in those two great hymns of the *Te Deum*, going back to the third century. Would you refer the *Te Deum* to that date? That would be to follow the principle of dating the Psalms by the earliest discoverable element; to date the *Te Deum* by the date of the American Prayer Book would be to date it as some scholars wish to date the Psalms.

Again, in dating the *Te Deum*, would you date it by the tone of its contents? Would you suppose the first and second hymns contained in it to have been composed in a time of triumph, and the last stanzas to have been added in a period of humiliation? This does not seem to have been the fact; but the idea seems so plausible that it has been freely applied by Old Testament scholars in dating the Psalms of the Psalter, ascribing them to times of national success or of national disaster according as they are glad or sad. It is true that there are certain periods when, owing to external events or internal

movements, the penitential element is strong, and conversely it is generally legitimate to suppose that when the penitential element is strong, there is some extraordinary exciting cause. If you have large collections of penitential Psalms, and nothing else, as in the case of Lamentations, you may assume a period of catastrophe and oppression. Similarly if you find a collection of Psalms worked over again, changed from gladness to gloom, triumphant Psalms provided with penitential endings, and the like, you may assume that this represents an adaptation of those Psalms in a period of calamity or of puritanism. But this is true in the bulk of groups and collections, not of individual Psalms. We can trace precisely such reworking in some of the collections which I have suggested were originally pre-exilic.

In one Psalm of the first book the limits and methods of this re-working are curiously discernible. The ninth and tenth Psalms originally constituted one Psalm, an alphabetic acrostic. The first half and the end of that acrostic are still preserved in the ninth Psalm and the last few verses of the tenth Psalm. The greater part of the tenth Psalm, however, is not acrostic, and is quite different in tone from what precedes and follows, strongly penitential and woeful. In the forty-fourth Psalm the process and its limits are equally discernible, but the method of revision was different. The first part, verses 1–6, marked by a *Selah* at the close, are quite triumphant; then follows a long penitential addition, a very cry of calamity.

Revisions or adaptations of this character are so numerous that it seems clear the earlier collections as such went through a revision in some period of calamity, and a comparison with Lamentations suggests the Exile as at least the beginning of this period.

We have also unmistakable indications of revision of another sort, to connect the Psalms with a new theology.

So for instance the nineteenth Psalm, originally a hymn to Yahaweh as the sun, has been enlarged by the addition of a hymn of very different metre, the praise of the Law. Elsewhere also in this collection of hymns we find traces of a revision intended to adapt it to the new thought which became dominant with Ezra's reform in the fourth century.

I have said that hymns, and this is true of devotional literature in general, rarely contain references to extraneous events of such a nature as to render it possible to date them by those references. There are, however, notable exceptions to this. For instance, we have in an old Christian litany a petition for deliverance from the Lombards. The litany as litany is older than this particular petition, which shows that this litany was revised and adapted to the peculiar conditions prevailing in northern Italy about the time of the Lombard invasion. In the seventy-fourth Psalm we have a specific phrase which is almost equally dateable: "They have burned up all the synagogues of God in the land." The earliest known mention of synagogues in Hebrew history dates from the year 242 B.C. The first destruction of synagogues of which we know occurred about 168 B.C., under Antiochus Epiphanes. The natural reference of this passage seems to be to the Maccabæan revolt. This does not necessarily mean that the original Psalm belongs to that period, however, and indeed it contains some of the most archaic mythological expressions and references which we find in the whole Psalter. It does suggest that the Psalter had not crystallized into absolute fixity by the Maccabæan period, but was still in living use, so that older hymns might be changed and adapted to then existing needs and conditions. And indeed, while no other Psalm contains so unmistakable a reference to Maccabæan conditions, nevertheless it seems probable that many earlier Psalms were more or less revised to

adapt them to those times and their new exigencies of worship.

I might note other marks of more or less extensive revisions: under the influence of the reverence for the Name, resulting in the substitution of Adonai, Lord, for Yahaweh; to adapt the Psalms to synagogue and personal use, with the increasing development of the synagogal as over against the temple religion. But through all these changes the *cadres* of the older collections remained unchanged, and ritual, liturgical, and musical notations were retained, even though long since unintelligible. We shall not presumably always be able to state the exact limits of changes and revisions, or even discriminate accurately in many cases between the new and the old; but if we are to do it at all and to follow in any fashion the complicated but fascinating story of the growth and development of this great body of Hebrew devotional liturgy, we must do it, I believe, by following the clue of the collections.

Time and space will not permit of further discussion either of the Psalms or of Kent's book. I have reviewed the latter at great length, not so much for itself as because it is symptomatic, the last expression of what I believe to be an entirely erroneous conception of the nature and origin of Hebrew psalmody prevalent among an influential school of Old Testament scholars.

SCEPTICISM AND FAITH IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF PASCAL

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The neglect of Pascal by the English-speaking world today is little short of amazing. Within the last decade France has produced literally scores of studies of his life and thought; but, with the exception of a book by St. Cyres and an essay by Paul Elmer More, there has been scarcely a sign that we were conscious of any special relation between the spirit of our own age and that of this seventeenth-century genius. Yet Pascal is indeed a man of the present, and a study of his multiplex personality has never been more pertinent than it is today. Geometrician, experimental physicist, biting satirist, literary artist, keen-sighted moralist, devout believer, philosophical sceptic, man of the world, ascetic recluse, the problem of the balance and inter-relation of these selves is still waiting a completely satisfactory solution. How was it that the geometrician and experimental physicist could be a pronounced supernaturalist? How was it that the almost cynical man of the world could become the devout recluse? What relation can we find between the sceptical doubt of the possibility of knowledge and the obedient acceptance of the dogmas of the church? With what consistency could the rationalistic critic of Jesuit morality be the challenger of all philosophic creeds? How could all these conflicting interests keep house together in the same frail tenement and present the semblance of a unified life? Perhaps they could not, and his death in his fortieth year was the outcome.

But while these problems are still pressing for solution, the present essay makes no profession of having solved them all. Its problem is to interpret the meaning of Pascal's religious thought in the light of his personal experience and with reference to its significance for ourselves. Even this attempt is ambitious enough to invite failure; yet whether it succeeds or not it may at least serve to call attention to the problem and the man.

Blaise Pascal was born at Clermont-Ferrand in Auvergne, the 19th of June, 1623. His father, Étienne Pascal, was a judge, president of the Cours des Aides, and the descendant of a long line of men prominent in the administration of the country. His mother is said to have been very pious and very clever, but she died when Blaise was only three years old, leaving himself and two sisters, Gilberte, born in 1620, and Jacqueline, born in 1625, the former of whom was to become her brother's biographer and the latter his confidante and counsellor in religious matters.

Étienne Pascal was no ordinary man. He was keenly interested in the new scientific movements of the age and had views on education. These latter determined him to conduct his son's education himself, and accordingly, in order to satisfy his own interests as well as to give his son the best opportunities, he sold his position and moved to Paris in 1631, where he formed one of a distinguished group of mathematicians, whose informal organization later developed into the Académie des Sciences, and which included such men as Roberval, Fermat, and above all, Mersenne. In an atmosphere charged with scientific activity the young Pascal was educated entirely by his father and after his own plan. It seems to have been an extremely informal type of education and to have consisted largely in intellectual stimulus, furnished, perhaps unfortunately, mainly at meal-times and immediately

thereafter. The boy was asked questions on things in general, and encouraged to work out his own answers and make his own experiments. Fearing the all-absorbing fascination of mathematics, the elder Pascal planned to postpone the study of these until his son's fifteenth year, so that he might not be drawn away too early from the study of language and literature. Accordingly he began by giving him some general suggestions as to the function and value of grammar, and then in his twelfth year proposed that he should take up Latin. But genius was too much for him. Blaise had had his interest roused in mathematics and demanded instruction therein, which his father promptly refused, locking up his own books to enforce his decision. Nothing daunted, however, the young inquirer amused himself in his hours of recreation with working out his own conceptions, until one day his surprised father found the walls of his playroom covered with demonstrations which corresponded with the first thirty-two propositions of the first book of Euclid. The boy had devised his own axioms, definitions, and proofs, even though the names of the figures were as yet unknown to him. Upon this his father capitulated, and Blaise was introduced to mathematics in a formal way. Four years afterwards he delights his father's scientific circle by the production of a work on conic sections, in which he carries still further the method recently invented by Desargues for the treatment of that subject—a method as yet incomprehensible to many of the older mathematicians of the day. The work established at once his reputation as a mathematical genius, and he took his place among the older men of the intellectual aristocracy as a recognized equal.

Nor was his interest confined to pure mathematics. From his early boyhood he seems to have had an interest in physics, having written a childish treatise on sound, pronounced by his impartial family a remarkable

production for a boy of his years. And oddly enough, as well as significantly enough, his reliance in his investigations seems to have been upon experiment and observation rather than upon mathematics simply. Recognizing in pure mathematics the ideal of logical reasoning and delighting as he did in playing its fascinating game, for the attainment of real truth he looked to the slower but surer method of experiment. The model for his investigations was not the brilliant rationalistic physics and metaphysics of Descartes, but the more sober and empirical method of Galileo and his like. Geometry was delightfully certain, but by itself it was not adequate for the investigation of nature. This early conviction of his—that the truths of physics are of a less degree of certainty than those of mathematics—we shall see later developed into his recognition of the uncertainty of all human knowledge when tested by the ideal of absolute demonstration.

The effect of this intense intellectual activity upon the constitution of Pascal was bad. He had never been a robust child. When a year old he suffered from some unknown trouble which baffled the physician, until it was traced to the evil influence of an old woman of the neighborhood; whereupon, at her suggestion that life must be given for life, a cat was flung out of the window, some herbs applied, and a cure effected. But all through his life Pascal gave evidence of a nervously disorganized constitution, attributed by his sister to his excessive intellectual labors, and at any rate fostered by them. He seems to have been at all times eager and impatient, quick at retort, apt to offend, yet always by his generosity and penitence retaining the friends he sorely tried. Wit he had in abundance, but the humor which goes with the easier nature and relieves the strain of life he lacked. Life for him was tense and serious even in his ridicule of human folly and false pretension. The gospel of

relaxation had not yet been preached with effect. He seems to me in these early years like a dog, keen and alert, with an ear for every sound, but with as yet no unity of purpose or fixed philosophy of life.

What his religious life was during this period we have scanty means of knowing. We have, however, the very significant statement of his sister that in spite of his intense intellectual curiosity he had always limited it to things natural, regarding the truths of religion as outside the field of human reason. This attitude he told her he had taken from his father, who from his earliest years had impressed upon him the principle that "whatever is the object of faith cannot be the object of reason, much less subordinate to it." There seems not the slightest ground to suspect that he was ever tempted from this position, although some have tried to establish the fact, but that, to use his sister's phrase, throughout life, "in all the things of religion he remained as submissive as a child." Certainly in his earlier years physics and mathematics furnished a sufficient outlet for his intellectual energy, leaving his emotional life to express itself in the traditional pieties of his inherited religion. And even in his later years, when he was forced to busy himself with theological problems, it was the practical significance of these rather than their theoretical value which absorbed him. In all which he was a serious representative of that convenient division of territory common in late scholasticism by which were rendered to the scientific Caesar the things that were Caesar's and to the God of religion the things that were His.

That this ingrained respect for the truths of religion meant anything more for him in his youth than a refusal to make them the subject of critical study, is doubtful. Indeed, the manner in which, after his conversion, he deplores his early absorption in worldly knowledge seems to indicate at that period no divided allegiance, but a

complete absence of the intense emotional life which characterized his later years. The whole of his vital energy was going into his intellectual pursuits and it was in all probability the over-strain of this life that conditioned his later conversion.

In 1640, when Pascal was seventeen, the family moved to Rouen, his father having been given a government position there as intendant. The seven years of his life there are marked by two events—the invention, after many trials, of Pascal's arithmetical machine, and the conversion of the family to Jansenism. The former is significant of the universality of Pascal's genius, which found expression not only in the field of pure theory but in that of practical invention as well. It is true that the machine was not perfect, but it was workable, and was the ancestor, I suppose, of the homely cash register. It is to Pascal also that Paris owes its first public omnibus line, the idea of which arose from his desire that the poor of the city should share in the motor privileges of the rich. His venture was a great success, even women, his sister Gilberte writes, daring to use the coaches.

More significant, however, was the conversion of the entire family to the austere type of religion represented by Jansen and the leaders of Port Royal. Pascal is reported to have been very zealous in the new faith and to have stimulated the devotion of the others, especially that of his younger sister, Jacqueline, who in consequence wished to take the veil. There is some doubt, however, as to the real depth of his conviction, and I am inclined to feel that this first conversion was largely a matter of the head rather than the heart, and that Pascal's interests were still more in right thinking than in Christian living.

At any rate, his scientific work was being pursued with unfailing devotion in spite of increasing physical disorder, which, from his eighteenth year, left him no day without

pain, and in the summer following his conversion resulted in almost complete collapse—a violent and prolonged neuralgia, partial paralysis of the lower limbs, inability to swallow save drop by drop—apparently a case of intense neurasthenia. Yet just before and even during this period Pascal was engaged in the solution of the physical problem which has placed his name high on the list of genuises in physics. This was the mystery of the vacuum and the nature of atmospheric pressure. The problem, and even the suggestion of its probable solution, he inherited from his older contemporaries, Galileo and Torricelli, but it was wholly due to his own picturesque imagination that we have the convincing and spectacular proof of the theory furnished by the measurement of the height of the column of mercury in a vacuum at the base and at the top of the mountain near his home, the Puy de Dôme.

The significance of this experiment, as Pascal recognized, is not to be found merely in the particular truth established by it, but much more in its contribution toward the theory of scientific method. It meant the triumph of the experimental method over authority and superstition.

Though this experiment on the Puy de Dôme was the most spectacular of Pascal's achievements in physics, it was not his only one, nor perhaps even his most important one; but into his later investigations in hydrostatics and his discovery of the principle of the hydraulic press we cannot go.

During the course of these experiments Pascal had come up to Paris, largely on account of his health, and thence, upon the advice of his physician, had given up his studies and gone back to his former home at Clermont for a year. But he was not really at home in the country, so that in 1650 we find him again in Paris, entering upon what is usually known as his worldly life.

Just how worldly these next few years were, we do not know, nor even the motives which led him into the special life of the day. It is probable, however, that in his forced abstention from severe study and in his inability to find amusement in country life, he tried the pleasures of the Paris salons as the most attractive distraction possible to him. And that he found a real distraction in them at first there can be no doubt. It is true that he found in them few intellectual equals, but it is true also that he found in them men and women of intelligence and charm interested in playing the social game upon a high level—interested not merely in amusing themselves but in making of social life a serious profession. For it was the middle of the seventeenth century, the period when society was organizing itself in France, the period of the Hôtel de Rambouillet, of Mlle. de Scudery, of the *Précieuses*, and, while the talk was not profound, it yet involved ideas and implied an atmosphere of refinement which, while perhaps formal, yet made of intercourse a thing of art and beauty. That a brilliant young man of twenty-seven should find the game distracting is not surprising, and we have not to invoke his philosophical interest in experience to account for his four years of social life, though it is true that these years gave him much material for his later thought.

That Pascal did not remain wholly an alien in this society is perhaps indicated by his having been moved during this time to write an *Essay on the Passions of Love*, a rather formal composition, but one whose minuteness of detail seems to argue experience rather than hearsay. "A woman," he writes, "is the highest form of beauty. Endowed with mind, she is its living and marvellous personation. If a beautiful woman wishes to please, she will always succeed. The fascinations of beauty in such a case never fail to captivate, whatever

man may do to resist them. There is a spot in every heart which they reach. . . . The pleasure of loving without daring to say anything of one's love, has its pains but also its sweetness. With what transport do we regulate all our actions with the view of pleasing one whom we infinitely value. The fulness of love sometimes languishes, receiving no succour from the beloved object. Then we fall into misery; and hostile passions, lying in wait for the heart, tear it into a thousand pieces." Who this "marvellous personation" of beauty was we do not know, but that she was a reality and that she may have been Charlotte de Roannez, the sister of his friend the Duke, are guesses which have something in their favor. It may perhaps be also true that a hopeless passion for one above him in rank had something to do with his weariness of the world and his retreat to Port Royal, but the writing of imaginative soul-history is not a profitable occupation.

The turning-point in Pascal's life came in his thirty-second year. Up to this time he had been the eager, unresting thinker and man of the world. Life had stimulated and entertained him. It had offered him endless subjects for his boundless curiosity. Wherever he turned, problems had presented themselves and opportunity had been given for intellectual play. But as yet life had been all play, and play, even scientific play, loses its zest in time, save for those gifted with unbounded energy and unreflective minds. And these latter gifts were not Pascal's. Nervously broken down and worn out with his intellectual activities, life began to pall upon him and to force upon him the fatal question, "To what end?" His reply was his conversion and retreat to Port Royal.

Much legend has gathered about the facts of his conversion, of which this story told by Bossuet is at the root: "One day in the month of October, 1654, when he went

according to his habit to take his drive to the bridge of Neuilly in a carriage and four, the two leading horses became restive at a part of the road where there was a parapet, and precipitated themselves into the Seine. Fortunately, the first strokes of their feet broke the traces which attached them to the pole, and the carriage was stayed on the brink of the precipice. The effect of such a shock on one of Pascal's feeble health may be imagined. He swooned away, and was only restored with difficulty, and his nerves were so shattered that long afterwards, during sleepless nights and during moments of weakness, he seemed to see a precipice at his bedside, over which he was on the the point of falling."

That such an accident as this may have contributed to his conversion is quite probable, but that the change had been long in preparation, his sister's account of his talks with her makes very evident. Of his visit to her in September, 1654, she writes to her sister Gilberte: "At this visit he opened himself to me in such a manner as moved my pity, confessing that in the midst of his exciting occupations and of so many things fitted to make him love the world—to which we had every reason to think him strongly attached—he was yet forcibly moved to quit all; both by an extreme aversion to its follies and amusements and by the continual reproach made by his conscience. I confined myself to watching his mood without attempting unduly to influence him; and gradually I saw him so growing in grace that I should hardly have known him. I believe you will have the same difficulty, if God continues His work; especially in such wonderful humility, submission, diffidence, self-contempt, and desire to be nothing in the esteem and memory of men. Such he is at present. God alone knows what a day will bring forth."

What the day did bring forth was only the persistence of this changed life. He retired from the world, first to

a house in the country, and then to the quiet valley of Port Royal, where he joined himself to the Solitaries and lived their life of ascetic routine. Henceforth the occupations in which he had formerly delighted knew him no more; geometry, physics, society, all intellectual activity —these he put behind him and counted as nothing, so that he might walk the way of humility and self-denial. Nothing more significant of his change of attitude can be found than this passage in a letter to the mathematician Fermat: "To tell you the truth, I think geometry the finest training the human mind can have; but at the same time it seems to me so useless, that I scarcely trouble to distinguish between a geometer who is simply a geometer and a clever artisan. It is the finest trade in the world, and nothing more than a trade—excellent, as I have often said, for us to try our wings on, but not fit to be the object of our flight. For my own part, I would not walk two steps for geometry, and I fancy you are very much of my opinion."[1]

Port Royal des Champs, to which Pascal had retired, had been a convent of Cistercian nuns founded about the middle of the thirteenth century in a wooded and marshy valley eighteen miles west of Paris. Its celebrity dates from the accession to power of Jacqueline Arnauld, appointed abbess at the age of eight and known officially as *La Mère Angélique*. Entering upon her duties at the age of eleven and converted six years later, she came under the powerful influence of St. Cyran, and succeeded in transforming her convent from a home of luxury and dissipation to a centre of the highest religious life. In 1635 the nuns removed to Paris, and there settled in the valley the group of remarkable men known as the Solitaries or hermits of Port Royal, men who had taken no monastic vow, but who had renounced the world and dedicated themselves to the life of piety and

[1] Letter of Aug. 10, 1660.

self-denial. Some, who formed the nucleus of the band, lived wholly in the valley; others, among whom was Pascal, came and went as need dictated. Their names are familiar ones in the history of French literature and philosophy—St. Cyran the leader, three nephews of the Mère Angélique—Lemaistre, de Saci, and Robert Arnauld d'Andilly—Pierre Nicole, and above all, the most celebrated of the Arnauld family, the youngest brother of the abbess, Antoine Arnauld.

Upon the return of the nuns in 1648, the brotherhood retired, some to Paris, and some to the farm on the hillside known as Les Granges. Their mode of life was simple. "They wore no distinctive dress. Their wants were supplied by the barest necessaries in the shape of lodging and furniture. From early morning—three A.M. —to night, they were occupied in works of piety, charity, or industry. They met in the chapel after their private devotions to say matins and lauds, a service which occupied an hour and a half, after which they kissed the earth in token of a common lowliness, and each sought his own room for a time. The Gospel and Epistle were read daily, and sometimes during or after dinner the Lives of the Saints. They dined together; and a walk thereafter formed the sole recreation of the day. Two hours in the morning and two hours in the afternoon were devoted to work in the fields or in the garden by those who were able for such tasks. Confession and Communion were frequent, but no uniform rule was enforced. In this, as in fasting and austerities generally, each recluse was left to his own free will."[2]

But scholarly activities were not neglected by the brothers, and, under the general supervision of Antoine Arnauld, translations, books of devotion and polemics, came in rapid succession from the press. Of these the most famous is the series of letters professedly to a

[2] Tulloch's Pascal, p. 89.

provincial, known as the *Provincial Letters*, of which Pascal was the half-suspected author. Into the familiar story of this controversy, to which the *Letters* were the chief contribution, we do not need to go, for it throws but little light upon the development of his religious life. And yet it is true, none the less, that the battle with the Jesuits which Pascal really won with his *Provincial Letters* was part of the same campaign in which he contributed by his *Pensées* to a drawn battle. For it was against the worldly spirit of compromise, apparently necessary for a world-church, that the *Letters* were directed, and their effect was fatal for the whole system of Jesuit morality and easy accommodation to the desires of both flesh and spirit. And it was against the same spirit of fusion in respect to God and man, nature and grace, reason and faith, that his later and fragmentary work was an unconvincing argument. Jesuit morality never recovered from his biting ridicule, but men still hesitate to accept the "either-or" of his sharp disjunction and make their choice for nature *or* grace.

The *Provincial Letters* appeared in 1656–57, and were his last systematic work. That these, the most brilliant of his writings, appeared only six years before his death, is evidence enough, were any really needed, that Pascal's conversion was not the sign of intellectual senility. Indeed one is tempted to feel that his earlier scientific activity, valuable as we have found it to be, was yet after all merely a preliminary intellectual game, and that his true genius could only come to complete expression under the stimulus of religious passion. It was this that gave the unity of purpose, intensity of faith, sincerity of conviction, that were necessary to unite head and heart and make possible a work that should express the whole man.

But his powers ripened only to decay. Within two years of this controversy and perhaps largely as a result

of it, his old nervous trouble began to return, and all continuous intellectual labor became impossible to him. "But although his malady prevented his being serviceable to the public or his friends," writes his sister in her memoir, "it was not without use to himself; and he underwent it with such tranquillity and patience that there is reason to think that God by this means was pleased to render him just such as He would have him appear at the Last Day. For during all this long illness he always bore in mind these two great maxims: a renunciation of all pleasure and of all superfluity. In the very height of his distemper he kept a perpetual watch over his senses, absolutely refusing them whatever gave them pleasure. And when necessity constrained him to do something that might afford him some sort of satisfaction, he had a wonderful address in disengaging his mind from having a share in it. For example, his continual diseases obliging him to feed upon delicacies, he took the utmost care not to relish what he ate; and at the very beginning of his retreat he laid down stated rules concerning all his future meals." During these last years, he also wore next his flesh an iron girdle with sharp spikes which he pressed whenever he felt a tendency to pride or worldly pleasure.

"His charity towards the poor," his sister continues, "was always very great, but toward the end of his life he redoubled it. He said that it was the universal vocation of all Christians, and that there was no need of any particular mark to know if one had a call to it from above, because this was incontestably the very mark upon which Jesus Christ would judge the world." "About two months before his death he did a very remarkable work of charity. He had in his house a good, honest man, with his wife and family, to whom he gave a room and a supply of firing. . . . This good man's son falling ill of the small-pox, my brother, who needed

my assistance, feared that I should be under some apprehension of coming to the house. But, as he thought that the sick boy could not be moved without danger, he chose to leave the house himself, although he was so very ill. On June 19, 1662, he came to us, and returned home no more." "On August 19, 1662, at one o'clock in the morning, being of the age of thirty-nine years and two months," he died.

It was during the last four years of his life that Pascal jotted down the fragmentary thoughts which constitute his greatest gift to the world. Absolutely without form or finish, mere fragments of a proposed Apology for Christianity, these fragments make the eternal appeal of life to life. "*Les Pensées de Pascal*," says Vinet, "ne sont point un livre . . . elles sont Pascal lui-même, tout Pascal."[3] It is to Pascal himself then, to this book of the *Thoughts* that we now turn, to see if we can discover the secret of the man and of his hold over men.

But when I say that his secret was just Christianity, it may seem as if I were denying his possession of a secret at all, for Christianity may seem too familiar and obvious a thing to be called by that name; but while unto the Jews it may be "a stumbling block and unto the Greeks foolishness, unto them which are called, both Jews and Greeks," it may be the power of God and the wisdom of God, and the mystery of its power and appeal in the case of Pascal is worthy of our examination.

And first, what *was* Christianity for Pascal? To put it in one word, Salvation. Its fundamental beliefs are two: "that there is a God of whom men are capable, and that there is a corruption in their nature which renders them unworthy of him."[4] Sin and God are thus the poles of his thought. "The whole of faith consists in Jesus Christ and Adam."[5] It is the Pauline, Augustinian,

[3] A. Vinet, Études sur Pascal, p. 13.

[4] Pensées, 556. References are to the standard edition of Leon Brunschweig.

[5] Ibid., 523.

Calvinistic concept of Christianity—man created free and innocent, falling into sin through his own choice, his will thereafter wholly corrupt and incapable of choosing good, hopelessly lost, so far as his own powers were concerned, since he could not even will to will the good. This is the Christian doctrine of man. On the other hand, there is the revelation of a personal God, all-powerful, wise, and loving, who has revealed Himself in Jesus Christ and will save all those who put their trust in Him. The Christian message for Pascal is essentially the same as that on the banners of the Salvation Army—"Jesus saves"; it is the message of sin and salvation, of bondage and release.

But the *Thoughts*, as I have said, were part of a proposed Apology for Christianity, and we must ask what evidence then Pascal brings forward for the truth of these traditional doctrines, what was the character of his argument, on what grounds did it appeal to him? In the eighteenth century, Bishop Butler in England published his apology for religion under the ponderous title, *The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature.* Pascal's work might well have borne a similar title, though it would have read, *The Analogy of the Christian Religion to the Constitution and Course of Man*, for his aim is to show by an analysis of human nature that Christianity is just the kind of religion which fits in best with the actual nature and needs of man. In its teachings man finds a mirror of himself; it reveals his desperate condition as no other religion or philosophy does, and at the same time it offers the only remedy possible for his case. His method is psychological and ethical, rather than metaphysical, and in this is partly to be found the explanation of his appeal to the present. His question is direct and personally verifiable—"Is the Christian account of your condition true or not? If it is, is there any other reasonable relief save the

Christian?" Here are no scholastic subtleties or abstruse metaphysical reasonings; the appeal is to the individual's experience of sin and salvation. In this, Pascal's little book represents the prevailing tendency today to rest the argument for Christianity upon the evidence of Christian experience.

But it is not merely in his psychological method that the strength of Pascal lies. It is much more in the passionate earnestness with which he applies his method and in the vividness and incisiveness of his analysis, that we feel his power. Pascal is neither a closet philosopher nor a laboratory psychologist. His picture of human nature is neither telescopic nor microscopic. He does not take his stand outside of experience but speaks from within, with the passion and power of one who has himself felt all that he describes. For the *Thoughts*, though not in form confessions, like those of his master St. Augustine, are in fact transcripts of his inner life. He is himself the hero of his tale—the sinner, fallen, struggling for some good, redeemed by a power not his own. And to this desperate interest in the drama he describes is added a power of incisive as well as picturesque description rarely equalled. He might have failed in larger systematic construction, but in fitness of phrase he has no superior. Every word tells. There is no haziness or blurring of the figure, but we are brought face to face with ourselves, with every feature clear cut and distinct. It may not be all of life that Pascal presents, but it is at least life, and life in its intensity.

And what now does Pascal find man to be? A strange compound of grandeur and misery. A being raised above nature by virtue of his knowledge but rendered miserable by that which he knows. To quote the most familiar passage in the *Thoughts*: "Man is but a reed, the weakest thing in nature, but he is a thinking reed. It is not necessary that the entire universe arm itself to crush

him. A breath of air, a drop of water, suffices to kill him. But were the universe anxious to crush him, man would still be more noble than that which kills him, because he knows that he dies; and the universe knows nothing of the advantage it has over him."[6] Here speaks Pascal the intellectualist, the geometrician, the man of science. Far from contemning reason, he finds in it the peculiar glory and grandeur of man. Pascal may despair of knowledge but he does not despise it.

But when man, endowed with consciousness, turns it upon himself, what does he see? "What is man in the midst of nature?" he asks. "A nothing in comparison with the infinite, an all in comparison with nothingness; a mean between nothing and all."[7] "The greatness of man is great in that he knows himself miserable."[8] "Let us imagine a number of men in chains, all condemned to death, where some are killed each day in the sight of the others, and those who remain see their own fate in that of their fellows, and wait their turn, looking at each other sorrowfully and without hope. It is an image of the condition of men."[9] "The last act is tragic, however happy all the rest of the play is; at the last a little earth is thrown upon our head, and it is all over."[10]

This is the note that recurs again and again throughout the *Thoughts*—the terrifying and paralyzing effect of consciousness. This divine attribute which raises a man above nature seems given only to crush him with the terrors it reveals. As he realizes the weakness of man and the brevity of his life, Pascal cries out, "The eternal silence of these infinite spaces terrifies me."[11] "Between us and heaven or hell there is only life, which is the frailest thing in the world."[12]

It is to escape thought, to turn their attention away from their wretched condition, that men seek amusement

[6] Pensées, 347. [7] Ibid., 72. [8] Ibid., 397. [9] Ibid., 210.
[10] Ibid. [11] Ibid., 206. [12] Ibid., 213.

and distraction. "Those who think men unreasonable for spending a whole day in chasing a hare which they would not have bought, scarce know our nature. The hare in itself would not screen us from the sight of death and calamities; but the chase which turns away our attention from these does screen us."[13]

Such is man, as Pascal sees him, a being of infinite possibilities, yet frittering away his time in a vain attempt to escape the consciousness of his own miseries. World-weary and self-weary he passes from excitement to excitement seeking in vain for an eternal good. But an eternal good is not to be attained by temporal powers. Herein Pascal sees the truth of the doctrines of Montaigne as against the teaching of the Stoics. Our human reason is not sufficient for the discovery of absolute truth nor are our human powers equal to the attainment of a real good. The Stoic ideal of a life in accordance with reason is a noble ideal, but all experience shows it as impossible of realization. We see the better, but we follow the worse. Man, as the Stoic sees him, is man in his original innocence and virtue, man before the fall. Man, as Montaigne paints him, is man in his present condition, ignorant, corrupt, and helpless. Both these views of man Pascal holds to be reconciled in the Christian theory, and in the Christian theory alone. It alone is psychologically sound and shows man his dual nature.

And this brings us to the remedy for human misery. As we have found already, this is Christianity with its doctrine of a loving God able to save all who put their trust in him. In finding God, man finds an eternal good able to satisfy his heart and quiet his restless search for distraction. The Christian God is the very God of peace.

But what ground is there for believing in such a God? What means have we for knowing truth? Here is the

[13] Pensées, 139.

much vexed question of Pascal's scepticism. Does he or does he not believe in the possibility of knowledge? Does he or does he not preach blind faith and submission to authority? Does he or does he not give us a consistent account of truth? If one selects his quotations with care, one can prove almost any thesis about Pascal. It is easy enough to point out the familiar passages in which the impotence of reason is asserted as dogmatically as by a modern agnostic: "What is thought? How foolish it is."[14] "The last attainment of reason is to know that there is an infinity of things that surpass it."[15] "Nothing is so in conformity with reason as this disavowal of reason."[16] Or read the scornful passages in which he ridicules all human laws and institutions as products of absolutely irrational custom. "Truth this side the Pyrenees, error that side."[17] Or this ironical bit on the effect of conditions on judgment: "The mind of the supreme judge of the world [man] is not so independent as not to be liable to be disturbed by the least uproar that is made about him. . . . Do not wonder that he reasons ill just now; a fly is buzzing in his ear; it is easy enough to render him incapable of sound judgment. If you are desirous that he should find the truth, drive away that insect, which suspends his reasoning powers, and frets that mighty mind which governs cities and kingdoms. Here is a pretty god, indeed! *O ridicolosissimo eroe!*"[18]

But over against these gibes at reason we have to set the following: "We know the truth not only by the reason, but also by the heart. It is by the heart that we know first principles, and it is in vain that reasoning, which has no part in it, tries to combat them. The Pyrrhonists, whose only object this is, strive for it in vain. We know that we do not dream, however impotent we may be

[14] Pensées, 365. [15] Ibid., 267. [16] Ibid., 272.
[17] Ibid., 294. [18] Ibid., 366.

to prove it by reason: this impotence proves nothing more than the feebleness of our reason, but not the uncertainty of all our knowledge, as they pretend. For the knowledge of first principles, as of space, time, movement, numbers, is as certain as any of those that our reasoning gives us. And it is on this knowledge of the heart and instinct that reason must support herself, and on this she founds her whole procedure. . . . Principles are felt, propositions are proved, and all with certainty, although in different ways. And it is as ridiculous for the reason to demand of the heart proofs of its first principles in order to consent to them, as it would be for the heart to demand of the reason a feeling of all the propositions that it demonstrates in order to be willing to receive them. This impotence ought to serve then only to humble the reason, that would judge of everything, but not to combat our certainty, as if there were nothing but reason capable of instructing us. Would to God that, on the contrary, we never had need of it, and that we knew all things by instinct and feeling. But nature has refused us this good, and she has given us, on the contrary, but very little knowledge of this kind. All other knowledge can be acquired only by reasoning."[19]

Here then we seem to have a sure foundation in principles which are the basis of all reasoning and which therefore are themselves beyond the demand for proof. The proof of everything else can't itself be proved. These self-evident principles Pascal assigns to the heart rather than to the reason. Their certainty is immediately *felt*, not demonstrated.

But no sooner have we reached this firm ground than it begins to tremble under our feet. Pascal goes on to admit "that we have no certainty of the truth of principles, beyond faith and revelation, except the natural

[19] Pensées, 282.

conviction of them which we feel within us. Now this natural conviction is not a convincing proof of their truth, since, having no certainty except through faith whether man was created by a good God, by an evil demon, or by chance, it is doubtful whether the principles thus given to us are true, false, or uncertain."[20] It may be, as Descartes had suggested before him, that our faculties are not constructed capable of truth and that our most intense conviction is an illusion. We may be the spirit of a maliciously humorous demon.

Does the victory then rest with the sceptic? Yes and no. Rationally we have no logical grounds for our most fundamental truths—they are not reason-compelling—they are at best only convictions or beliefs, which we are powerless intellectually to defend. But, on the other hand, they are so firmly rooted in human nature that they need no defence.

However much the sceptic may point out the feebleness of our intellects and the dependence of our judgments upon custom and prejudice, nature will always prove too strong for him, and though we may assent to his arguments we shall disregard his conclusions. Instinct will triumph over intellect and life will demand faith. This is the essence of Pascal's familiar saying: "Nature confounds the Pyrrhonists, and reason the dogmatists. Our inability to prove anything is such as no dogmatism can overcome, and we have an idea of the truth which no Pyrrhonism can overcome."[21] Not Hume nor James has better expressed the contrast between life and thought and the irresistible dominance of the former. Those whose "lives are sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought" are bound to be replaced in the struggle for existence by those in the full tide of life and faith. Scepticism is but humanity's momentary pause as it takes its breath and looks about preparatory to its new advance.

[20] Pensées, 434. [21] Ibid., 434.

Much has been made of the sharp contrast in Pascal between faith and reason and of the irrationality of his belief in Christianity; but the more one studies his general attitude toward knowledge, the less exceptional seems his attitude toward Christianity. Christian faith may be blind, but it is only to a degree blinder than other faith; Christian doctrine may be incapable of demonstration, but so in last instance is all knowledge. So far is he from admitting the irrationality of religion that he asserts it to be more certain than many of our common-sense beliefs. "If it were necessary to do nothing but for the certain, we should do nothing for religion; for it is not certain. But how many things we do for the uncertain, as sea-voyages, battles. I say, therefore, that it would be necessary to do nothing at all, for nothing is certain, and that there is more certainty in religion than that we shall see to-morrow. . . . Now when we work for to-morrow and for the uncertain, we act with reason."[22] The irrationality of religion, for Pascal, is merely its lack of demonstration and compelling proof, but that it is reasonable in the larger sense of the term he insists again and again. Indeed, his proposed Apology for Christianity would have been an absurdity on any other assumption.

What has given currency to the idea of his irrationalism is the failure to recognize the distinction between logical validity of proof and psychological effectiveness in action. Pascal believes that the evidence for religion, while not amounting to demonstration, is yet stronger than that on the other side, so that probability is for it. But he also believes that this logical credit is not sufficient to induce practical acceptance and action, for it is not an affair of pure reason but of feeling, emotion, and will. The natural man resists religion, not because it is not probable but because he does not *want* to believe

[22] Pensées, 234.

it and to act upon it. It is not enough to convince the reason; we must influence the will. And hence the passage which has outraged the intellectualists: "You would like to attain faith, and do not know the way; you would like to cure yourself of unbelief, and ask the remedy for it. Learn of those who have been bound like you, and who now stake all their possessions. . . . Follow the way by which they began—by acting as if they believed, taking holy water, having masses said, etc. Even this will make you believe and stultify you. . . . It is this which will lessen the passions, which are your stumbling-blocks."[23] Now whatever we may think about the particular efficacy of holy water and masses, Pascal's point here ought to be clear enough, that since religion is a matter of life and action, it is to be induced not merely by evidence but by appeal to will, and that therefore the essential preparation for it is the discipline of the life and the purification of the emotions. It is not against evidence that faith has to struggle but against pride and self-will. It is, in a sense, not so much irrational as involuntary.

And to this same truth, even Pascal's famous figure of the wager bears some witness, though it is usually cited on the other side. He "represents man as playing the game of life against inscrutable nature: heads, God exists; tails, he does not. On which shall we bet? There is compelling reason on neither side, it is an irrational venture. But if we choose heads and win, the rewards are infinite. If we lose, we lose comparatively nothing, for religion even in this life is profitable through its results in character and social success. If we choose tails and win, we gain only the fleeting pleasures of this life, while if we lose, we lose an eternal happiness. It is the part of wisdom therefore to bet boldly upon heads and the existence of God, for the risk is nothing and the gain may be infinite.

[23] Pensées, 233.

"Now one must admit that the idea of this religious gamble is not wholly attractive. And at first thought it seems to support the theory of the pure irrationalism of Pascal, for both moral and intellectual considerations seem ignored and everything put to the hazard of chance."[24] But one must remember both that this wager does not represent his true idea of the situation and that its point is to emphasize the practical considerations involved in religion. His contention is that *even if* the evidence were evenly balanced, as he believes it is not, still there are inducements which may be offered sufficient to incline the will in the direction of faith. Considerations of value may take the place of logical proof.

It is effectiveness, therefore, rather than truth which philosophy lacks. What men need is help, not knowledge. They need to be saved from their own weakness and viciousness, and this can only be done by the power of God renewing the will and enabling it to embrace the true and eternal good.

And this true good is conceived by Pascal wholly in an ascetic sense. It is to be found only in a complete suppression of the natural desires and an absolute submission to the law of the spirit. There can be no compromise with the world. Peace is to be obtained only through discipline, humiliation, fasting—the absolute suppression of the natural longing for happiness. The self must die in order that God may be all in all. Marriage he condemned as the "most perilous and lowest of the conditions of Christianity."[25] Even the delight in intellectual activities is a vanity not to be endured. Sickness is the true and proper state of mankind, since it involves a lowering of all the vital energies and makes pleasure impossible. Life as a whole is but a meditation upon death, as one cannot but feel as one

[24] Wilde, The Pragmatism of Pascal, Phil. Rev. XXIII, p. 546.

[25] Letter to Mme. Perier.

reads Pascal's own *Thoughts*. But it is only as one thus renounces absolutely the unsatisfying pleasures of the world, that one can find an eternal satisfaction in the love of God. To retain but a single natural desire is to have an enemy within the walls who will inevitably destroy this longed-for peace of death.

It is a stern creed for which Pascal stands, yet I cannot but feel that it is the natural expression of his character. Much is said by his sister and repeated by his biographers of the loveliness and lovingness of his disposition, and his charitable deeds are offered in evidence, and yet I doubt. The charity which characterized his later life is not, it seems to me, the charity of a loving heart, but the almsgiving of the penitential sinner. The value of the deed is felt to be in its mortification of the flesh, in its humiliation of the spirit, rather than in its relief of the poor. It is a duty, not an act of love, and its worth is proportionate to its difficulty rather than to its results. And hence Pascal was suspicious of organized charity or institutional endeavor, because it lessened this opportunity for individual self-discipline. The poor were spiritual laboratory material, the supply of which must never be exhausted.

And a careful reading of his *Thoughts* leaves us with the same impression. Of kindly, sympathetic interest in men, there is not a trace. Nowhere is his power greater and his wit sharper than in his analysis of human weakness and folly. He is a Montaigne, minus the human sympathy of that genial cynic. Again and again his personal scorn flashes out. "How I hate those who set up for doubters of miracles." "How I hate these stupidities," e.g. not to believe in the Eucharist. Human negligence "irritates me much more than it excites my pity." It is everywhere the impatient intellectual aristocrat, recognizing spiritually his nothingness before God, yet feeling intellectually his superiority to men.

He is a kind of Christian Socrates, conscious that he is as ignorant as others, but conscious too that his knowledge of his own ignorance puts him in a class by himself. With an over-developed intellect and an under-developed social self, his conversion makes him conscious of his social duty but never results in a generous love of mankind. They are to be cared for and served because it is unnatural, and therefore spiritual, so to do. Pascal's religion, in being non-human, tends to become inhuman, and expresses what I cannot but feel is an inhuman element in him.

But we must not leave Pascal with a criticism which may itself appear inhuman. Three aspects of his thought call for special recognition. Philosophically, Pascal's service consisted in his questioning of the validity of the rationalistic dogmatisms of the day, represented by the mechanical philosophy of Descartes. Such an intellectually necessary system of the universe is impossible. Demonstration has its limits, and above and underneath it lie what Pascal called the truths of the heart, incapable of proof and grounded in the non-rational elements of human nature—instinct, will, and emotion. By contrast with the prevalent ideal of mathematical demonstration such a contention seemed to the men of his time and perhaps even to himself sceptical, but measured by a less stringent standard we should be inclined today to call it empiricism and to invoke the name of William James as pledge of its respectability.

Theologically, this anti-rationalism meant the founding of religion not upon metaphysical arguments but upon faith, upon an act of will that is more than the conclusion of a syllogism. God is not demanded by our curiously inquiring intellects to complete our systematic scheme of the world. He is sought by our restlessly dissatisfied wills to give peace and steadiness to life. Mathematics and science could satisfy Pascal's love of knowledge;

he did not need to betake himself to religion for that. But mathematics and science could not fill his life, and it was to this end that he sought religion, not primarily for its truth but for its practical worth. And here again we may see foreshadowed the modern doctrine of the will to believe and the pragmatic value of religion, and in a form perhaps more reasonable than some forms in which it appears at the present day.

But it is in Pascal's appeal to the religious temper, or at least to one type of the religious temper, that his greatest significance is to be found. Like his saintly masters, Paul and Augustine, Pascal portrays with passionate intensity the eternal struggle between flesh and spirit out of which religion is born. Nowhere do we get more vivid pictures of the emptiness of life, of the nearness of death, of the tragedy of folly, than in Pascal. And nowhere is the natural helplessness of man presented with such desperate conviction as in Pascal. World-weariness is the mood he makes us see beneath the surface-happiness of every life. "Who will show us any good?", "Who will deliver me from the body of this death?", are the cries he makes us hear from the depths of every human heart.

Sainte-Beuve says of Jansenism, and by Jansenism he means this religion of Pascal, this Pauline conception of helpless man redeemed by grace, "La seule objection qu'on était en droit d'addresser au Jansenisme, c'était non pas d'être un hérésie, . . . mais c'était d'être un anachronisme."[26] And yet wherever we find men and women disappointed with the unfulfilled promise of the world, wearied and beaten in the unequal struggle with self, men and women in whom, from whatever cause, there has been awakened the fatal hunger for the eternal, this religion of Pascal will seem neither a heresy nor an anachronism, but the deepest truth of life.

[26] Port Royal, II, p. 534.

THE DIARY OF AN OLD NEW ENGLAND MINISTER[1]

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The morbid emotional self-consciousness of such a journal as David Brainerd's was not likely to find imitation in the active seaport society of Salem. But journals were kept there. Hawthorne began one at the tender age of twelve with the motive of self-improvement in expression, and the practised ease he gained appears in the later note-books, which are cherished illustrations of his grave and graceful style as well as of the artist's propensity to transmute experience into symbol and dream. The Salem boy doubtless did not know that his most eminent elder townsman was an indefatigable diarist, jotting down in careless, awkward language matter not meant for an imaginative version of life. Certainly too the older Salem diarist was not recording his spiritual condition. The Reverend William Bentley, a short and portly clergyman, living an unhampered celibate life, was wont to close days of phenomenal industry by hasty and incisive records of event and comment. After his vigorous walk in the early morning he had stood at a desk all the forenoon working on sermons and correspondence, on manuscript text-books in science or languages, on scripture commentaries, local history, critical reviews of books read, on bi-weekly summaries of home and foreign news to be printed in the newspapers, on parochial records minutely exact as to family occupation and personal

[1] The Diary of William Bentley, D.D., Pastor of the East Church, Salem, Mass. 4 vols. Published by The Salem Institute. Vol. I, 1905, pp. xliii, 456; Vol. II, 1907, pp. 506; Vol. III, 1911, pp. 601; Vol. IV, 1914, pp. 737.

circumstance. Other hours were given to private pupils, to parish visits, to care of the poor and sick, to catechizing the young or attending the School Board, or to watching with an eager and accurate eye every detail of local industry, politics, health, and weather. An unflagging curiosity made him familiar not only with the virtues and vices of his community but also with twenty languages ancient and modern, and therefore with the ways of men afar in space and time. In the evening he was occasionally something like a University Extension Lecturer, and when he got to his bedtime-diary he did not relax into sentimental self-contemplation. His attention was still on the not-self. In youth, to be sure, he had begun to make record of his moral experiences, but after some hundreds of pages had abandoned the practice. "Cool reflection told me a few devout prayers and well conceived reflections were better than whole volumes of confessions of feelings and vanity. Passion should be described, not lamented. Resolutions should be noticed not as made but kept" (Diary, II, 277).

Introspection, then, finds no place in the four substantial volumes of diary, which cover a period of thirty-five years (1784–1819). Even when unhappy relations with his father and brothers extort expressions of pain and vexation, he is brief and objective, recording painful facts but not his self-pity. Eager he was, undoubtedly, for public recognition of his abilities and accomplishments, but he is silent about praise, and leaves unmentioned an honor conferred by a Pennsylvania college, and the handsome offer of the Presidency of the University of Virginia. When at his life's end Harvard College tardily bestowed the degree of Doctor of Divinity, he records the event and the fact that his heterodoxy had been an obstacle, but he made not the slightest comment. Undoubtedly too he was a man of warm and tender affections, but only rarely did

he yield to their sweet pressure when the diary was opened. Once indeed he did, with words of touching, unselfish solicitude recording the marriage of his dear young pupil and friend, Hannah Crowninshield, and again when Captain Benjamin Hodges was taken with a bleeding of the lungs: "I never was more alarmed. I never before felt such sympathy. My tears flowed silently but plentifully. As I resisted them the waves rose." These volumes reveal many things about the wealth and poverty of the community, yet they all but conceal his own anxieties from financial hardship and wholly ignore his own persistent benevolences which made the hardship more painful. The very omissions reveal the finer traits of the man. Surely a sensibility deep and fine lay back of his cherished reticence, his seemingly complete absorption in outward things of social progress, his collector-passion for coins, medals, curiosities, portraits, and engravings, and his obsession by an interest in genealogies. Some sentiments were inhibited by a Stoical ideal. In verses (for, being without a sense of humor, he occasionally indulged in doggerel) a young lady, who asked why he neglected to marry, is told:

> "Reason I followed;
> But without fire, Love's but a name;
> Reason is cool, deliberate, wise;
> 'Tis only passion fans the flame" (I, 82).

Cool, deliberate, wise; therefore, whatever his prejudices, a man of large and generous policy. The revivalistic preaching of Spaulding, a clerical neighbor, was anathema to him, but he urged the negroes of Salem to attend it, since it was suited to their temperament, and he regretted the final institution of a separate meeting for negroes (IV, 621). Wholly averse to the system of the Episcopalians, he was a genuine friend and neighbor to them. When Bishop Seabury passed through Salem,

Bentley politely got himself presented (I, 268), and A. V. Griswold, Bishop of Rhode Island, on being coldly received by the Salem Rector, found cordial hospitality in Bentley's home. The conspicuous illustration of this temper is shown by his relations to the Catholics. Significantly, it was to him that the Rev. John Thayer, a Yale graduate converted to Romanism, appealed in 1790 for a list of Salem Catholics and for aid in finding a place for worship. Bentley secured co-operation and protection from the Selectmen and wrote in reply: "It is my desire that every man enjoy his religion not by toleration, but as the inalienable right of his nature" (I, 162). Thayer was a presumptuous and cantankerous guest of Bentley for several days, even expecting his host to be Responsor in the Mass and to arrange for the sale of a batch of propagandist Catholic pamphlets which he left at his departure (I, 165). While glad to be rid of this uncomfortable missionary, Bentley readily aided the Spanish Consul and Dr. Francis Matignon in establishing Catholic worship in Boston, securing a contribution of fifty dollars from a family in his own parish. "We ought," he notes, "to do everything which can encourage the liberality in France and Spain by which the Protestant religion may be more fully tolerated" (III, 23). In 1803 Bishop Carroll of Maryland with two priests, one of them being Cheverus, gave him pleasure by a visit in Salem (III, 55), and in 1811 Bishop Cheverus, again a welcome guest, had Bentley for an auditor at a sermon which the Protestant pastor enjoyed and approved (IV, 20). At a later time the Catholics of Salem were grateful for Bentley's trouble in procuring a hall for their celebration of the Mass (IV, 552). When an Irish pauper died in the Poor House, Bentley conducted the funeral, conscientiously using such scripture as the Roman Breviary provided, and resorted to Bourdaloue and Massillon for the sermon.

On the same day he entertained two Catholic Indian chiefs of the Penobscot tribe, and at parting gave them from his cabinet a crucifix, two mass-books, and plaster images (IV, 502). In view of the sturdy intensity of his rationalistic convictions these incidents evidence a generous ability to transcend prejudice.

Moral guardian of a parish and having a mind habituated to expression by incessant practice, Parson Bentley did not fail to provoke resentment. Strength of conscience gave him calm, unyielding courage in the personal difficulties resulting from a sermon in 1788, when he protested against the violation of law by a ship's clearing for the slave trade (I, 104, 105, 106, 123); but there were other episodes which led him to resolve on "prudence in my conversation and great caution in my attachments" (I, 119). After five years of ministerial experience he emphatically determines to use cautious self-restraint, to "join the serpent to the friendly reprover" (I, 134), and he records the sober calculation which made him enter into friendships which would otherwise be uncongenial (I, 177; IV, 290). This discipline of self in public intercourse accounts, perhaps, for many things in the diary. Salem households accustomed by tradition to look back on Dr. Bentley with profound veneration have been scandalized by the gossiping disrespect and caustic acerbity of these notes. The reader's attention passes over the words of praise given to neighbors and parishioners as a thing expected, but is startled by such acidities as the obituary comment, "all sense but common sense" (I, 38), or the verdict, "not a man for God, or for society, and his passions make him terrible to himself" (I, 169), or the comment on a colleague in the School Committee, "the monkey shows his tail" (IV, 7), or again, "a fanatic of the first chop" (IV, 54), "Morse and his gang" (IV, 130), "a true brat of the troublesome father" (IV, 526). Political partisanship and

theological animus inspired many paragraphs of contemptuous or hostile disparagement. It was a time when men were embroiled, and the era of good feeling later brought corrections and reconciliations. In all instances, too, we may reflect that this lonely celibate, deprived of a listening domestic ear, needed a safety valve for the artificial repression prudently adopted out of doors. The diary was such an escape from unnatural tension.

In 1790 Salem was relatively a place of importance, with a population of 7,921, about half that of Boston. In theory 1,277 persons were supposed to worship in the East Church, though the church could not hold them all. The large numbers of young people in Dr. Bentley's catechizing classes show that he was in fact pastor to the whole district, though few indeed were the actual communicants—sixteen in 1785 (I, 20) and sixty-three in 1802 (II, 408). There were long-standing historical reasons in this neighborhood for this decline of the *ecclesiola in ecclesia*, but it marks also a decline in spiritual experience. The absorbing interests of politics and war at the end of the colonial period had been followed by a time of lethargy and moral weakness, particularly among the men, old and young. In 1808 Bentley notes that "all the Congregational Churches in Boston have not so many male members as one Church half a Century ago did contain" (III, 382), and in 1813, commenting again on this fact, he reflects that "the passions are seldom admitted to be doorkeepers" (IV, 152). In the ninety years of its history before 1808 the East Church of Salem had only fifty-eight male members, though the women counted four times that number (III, 382). In 1809, out of resentment at the minister's politics, the only male communicant besides the Warden left to join another society —and the Warden staid at home. Bentley made a sad appeal to his hearers "not to leave him and a reputable Church of females unsupported" (III, 473).

The parishioners were coopers, ropemakers, blacksmiths, carpenters, shoemakers, a few shopkeepers, many mariners, of whom fifty-nine were captains of vessels, and, because of the perils of the sea, there were many widows (I, 222). A large proportion were house-owners, and several families were of large wealth. In older Salem parishes there was still greater wealth. William Gray amassed three million, but that fortune was transferred to Boston. The ship-owner, Elias Haskett Derby, dying in 1799, left an estate of a million dollars, and his son Richard, making the grand tour in Europe, was received at foreign courts and came home laden with works of art (III, 55). In 1817 Captain Forester died as the richest man in Salem with an estate of $1,400,000 (IV, 463). In 1815 George Crowninshield, Bentley's own parishioner, professed to have loaned a million to the United States treasury. The average conditions were surely comfortable in a town which voted to tax itself $6,000 for the expense of funeral honors to George Washington (II, 327). In the exceptional time of the great embargo in 1809 there was a temporary distress. The richer citizens met the emergency with a soup-house at which a thousand applicants were well fed (III, 412, 414), and a fund was raised to supply each one with a loaf of bread a day. William Gray gave two barrels of flour a week and stood ready to give one a day (III, 409). At all times, indeed, there were straitened households where the cruel sea made so many widows. A few rich citizens seem to have provided —perhaps inadequately—the thousand or so dollars a year raised for their relief (IV, 371, 499), and some of them made the warm-hearted Bentley the agent of their philanthropy (III, 139, 140, 141). Improvidence and intemperance brought some to the Charity House; but in those days of churches which had been town churches the minister was a familiar guest there and the inmates had seats in the church.

In spite of the general ease, the occasional distinguished wealth, and the ready philanthropy, Salem was reprehensible in the support of its ministers. As an associate pastor Bentley began with a salary of £130 ($433.) and as sole pastor had £160 ($530.), which in 1804 was raised to $800. (III, 108). This was, as Bentley observes in 1817, "one of the smallest in Essex" (IV, 490). The salary at the North Church was $1,200. In 1817 he had cause to feel the insufficiency of salary, for at that time food and fuel were exceptionally dear (compare the market prices, IV, 434). On coming to Salem Bentley had been promised a "settlement" of £200, one-half being paid at once, the rest being due after a year. At that time such a settlement was advantageous as capital owing to the rapid increment of wealth, but twenty years later this had ceased to be the case and ministers preferred a larger annual salary without the initial settlement (III, 168). However, the second instalment of Bentley's settlement was never paid, and in 1817 after his long and eminent service the parish owed him not only the hundred pounds but salary for two years, or $2,000 in all. In addition the minister had had to pay part of the cost of the church music, and only gifts from friends had saved him from immediate suffering (IV, 484, 490). The over-generous minister waived half of the debt, but with extraordinary meanness the congregation, on hearing of these private donations, deducted them from the parochial debt and paid him only $800. (IV, 496). It is easy to imagine the difficulty for a man with dependent relatives, an impulsively generous friend of the poor, and a passionate collector of expensive foreign books.

The activity of the pastor of the East Church was not confined to his parish. He was an apostle of culture. From his other merciless industry he found time for private pupils, in some cases for charity's sake, and in

the School Committee he showed, no doubt, an irrepressible zeal that could hardly be restrained to the just limits of a member's share in counsel. He was as strenuous about style of penmanship and methods of teaching spelling as he was in the issues of national politics—and spelling seems to be the beam in his own eye. On his arrival in Salem in 1783 there was only one public school, containing both the elementary grade and the "Grammar" School which prepared for college. These students of Latin were few, seven in 1792, but the number seems to vary with the efficiency of the teacher. A considerable list of Latin authors was read, while Greek seems to be studied only for the sake of the New Testament (I, 275, 399; II, 12, 31, 146, 215). The course which Bentley provided for his private pupil, Charles Jackson, in 1787 covered English Grammar, Rhetoric, Literary History, the range of Latin authors now read in school and college combined, and something of the *realia* of ancient art and science. But nothing more! In the common public school teaching was limited to the three R's, the girls attending only from eleven to twelve, or in summer, when days were longer, also from four to five in the afternoon (III, 39). School development was rapid. Already in 1791 there were four public schools with five teachers (I, 275), and in 1803 the attendance was about six hundred, half of them girls. Before 1805 the common school teacher's salary was a beggarly hundred dollars, but then $150. was demanded. The Grammar School master was better off with $500. (in 1796, II, 175). The heart of pity goes out to the woman teaching a country school for four shillings sixpence a week and clamoring for a living wage of ten and six, or seventy-two cents more than her weekly board (III, 230). Private schools were equally numerous, four in 1798, and the new ones added in 1803 and 1804 engaged masters at the respectable salaries of $1100. and $900. (III, 2, 92).

This was not a democratic system of education, but democracy in Salem was not yet. It was a long climb from the lower level of popular culture to the intellectual life of the "educated," and the fact has its bearings on the ecclesiastical history of the town. In the higher circles there were men of eminent ability, not only those who, like the Pickerings and Crowninshields or Judge Story, rose to high public station in the nation's life, but also some men of marked scientific talent, like Captain Gibaut and Nathaniel Bowditch. To Bentley, who was over-conscious of his own academic privileges, Bowditch was objectionable as a self-taught youth and the unlawful heir of a fame that should have been Gibaut's, but in the end Bowditch's great mathematical eminence and his remarkable scientific library dominated the parson with respect. Lawyers and doctors were a learned class, but Bentley is dubious concerning the scholarship of the clergy both in Salem and elsewhere. We seem to be always hearing of a decline in clerical scholarship, of old and now. So Bentley looked back to the ministers of an older day as of higher learning (III, 88, 189): "I know not one Hebrew Scholar in New England, nor one Orientalist. . . . In Theology, few are acquainted with any but the few books of the day, and no Ecclesiastical Historian do I know that has consulted the best writers of this description." This was said in 1805. Soon, indeed, he found foretokens of a day of scholarship and intellectual life. He seemed to know the importance of the enterprise of Welles, scholarly bookseller in Boston, who in 1806 made the first importation, not on orders but for general sale, of German classical and critical works. The great efflorescence of New England culture which came in part from the invasion of this new interest was a promised day into which Bentley was not to enter, but the historians of it have reason to think of Bentley in connection with it. His correspondence with European

scholars enabled him to furnish George Ticknor with letters of introduction in 1815, and in that year also Edward Everett, appointed to the college chair that was "to connect Greek Literature with Biblical Criticism," promptly informed Bentley that the subject of his inaugural oration would be the authority of the Homeric poems. Remembering Emerson's great passage about the birth of a Periclean age for New England which began with Everett's exposition of Wolff and Heyne, attention underscores the entry: "I sent him Wolf and Heyne" (IV, 319). (Note: The text has Heman; a probable error.)

Indications of the growth of culture are abundant in the diary of this devotee of knowledge. On his travels he was keenly interested in the rise of circulating and public libraries (II, 49). A circulating library was opened in Salem in 1790 consisting chiefly of novels and works of science. When sold and dispersed in 1818 this had nearly seven thousand volumes (I, 136; IV, 546). Of earlier origin Salem had also a small "Social Library" and a joint stock Philosophical Library, a share in which cost Bentley £9 and involved annual assessments not inconsiderable (I, 151, 152, 369). In 1810 these two were joined in the Salem Athenaeum, the standards of which may be judged from the purchases it made at the sale of J. S. Buckminster's books in 1812: "Stephens Thesaurus for 225 dollars, Wettstein 50, D. Griesback 25 D." (IV, 112). Rich families, Derby and Pickering, imported European books, and Bowditch had a collection of mathematical works unsurpassed elsewhere (IV, 444); but the richest private library was Bentley's own, nearly half of which he gave to Allegheny College, then recently founded in the village of Meadville, Pennsylvania. The oldest college building fittingly bears the name of Bentley Hall. He loved to acquire books, he loved to make presents of them; poetry to young ladies, sermons and the like to adults (I, 19, 40, 63, 97, 111).

Bentley's interests were versatile and included the arts. As a local historian he prized the portraits of old worthies, but he had a critical appreciative taste for the manner as well as the subject of a painting. He knew what painters were "wretched daubers at best" (III, 470). His hosts knew that exhibition of their engravings made entertainment for him, and a secular dissipation in Boston consisted for him in the critical inspection of the religious paintings in churches, the portraits in the Court House, the works of art in Bowen's Museum. Popular interest in painting began in Salem when E. H. Derby brought from Italy a Neapolitan named Corné, who made an indifferent living by indifferent portraits and exhibitions of panoramas. Having no originality, he copied his panoramic scenes from engravings. His best success was in his paintings of ships. "In every house we see the ships of our harbour delineated for those who have navigated them. Painting before unknown is now common among our children" (III, 68, 275, 481). The pupils, however, did not arrive at fame. One became a sign-painter, another died early from drink, and Hannah Crowninshield married. Music made greater progress, and a chapter in the history of music in America might be written from the profuse entries of the diary concerning hymnody, choirs, and singing-schools. The minister's interest in music is ardent and constant, but his taste is for music that shows only moderate improvement on the bald harmonies of Puritanism. An ampler development began when in 1797 a music teacher, Holyoke, formed a society for instrumental music. "Music has ever been low in this place," Bentley had said, but now it was no longer true (II, 247; III, 292). The day came at last when there was an Oratorio of Sacred Music in the First Church, December 1, 1812, and the clerical connoisseur pens an acute criticism. In December, 1817, the Salem Handel Society is more successful, and repeats

the performance a month later (IV, 135, 492, 496). After that the oratorio was an annual affair, a solemn affair, indeed, with the clergy presiding. Bentley knew that music was a civilizing influence. "Our fathers mistook the power of Musick for the work of the Devil, when if they had taught the Indians music and made violent agitation accompanying shouts, clapping of hands as in David's time, they might have done more to gain the Indians than by all their practices" (IV, 560). Bentley never saw grand opera.

All these are high things, and what of play? Certainly life was not tame and monotonous. There was the thrill of maritime adventure and the tales of captains home from the Mediterranean or the Orient. There was the turbulence of politics through the hot passions of Federalists and Republicans. There was the spectacle of Napoleonic wars abroad, the pinch of Berlin and Milan decrees felt at home, the excitement of the Embargo, the approach and the anxious experience of war. All this is in the diary, but also the chronicle of amusements. This avid observer of life lists the "puerile sports" of New England—the succession of skating and sledding, marble time, tops in April, shuttlecock in May, then bat and ball and rickets, kites in autumn, and finally football for adults, though "the bruising of shins has rendered it rather disgraceful to those of better education" (I, 254). No dry-as-dust this bookish celibate, this caustic moralist. He seems to be saying, Mirth, admit me of your crew! How many picnics of young folk he managed, leader of what he styles their gambols! He frowns on the low tavern-drinking, dancing, and gambling of election day (II, 92), but watches with serene pleasure the innocent mirth with which Marblehead makes holiday after ordaining its new minister, noting the fishermen at athletic sports, and the free negroes merry at their dancing (II, 397). And shall not the heirs of Puritanism dance? It

was a vexed question. Militia balls had long been known, and balls for the birthdays of Washington and Adams. Most towns in fact had Assembly Halls for dancing and our parson inspects them on his travels (e.g., II, 17, 232). All this, however, implies a world that had slipped from Puritan control. But even this minister indulgently connives at a dancing-class for sea-captains' daughters under prudent regulations (1789, I, 81), and resents the local gossip censorious of the dance permitted in Captain Boardman's house (I, 119, 122). His artistic eye finds pleasure at sight of a circle of girls dancing. "How beautiful if this exercise were only a domestic amusement" (II, 296). In truth it is a valued accomplishment. "It were to be wished that it made a part in every education for more reasons than one, and that it might not be overrated" (I, 176). In 1798 a marked change came over Salem society. Two dancing-schools came into existence, one of them conducted by a prudent English gentleman married to a daughter of the musician Holyoke, and therefore to be trusted by social circles to which he belonged. Whereas formerly only one family of the East Church went to an assembly, every ball and assembly now drew many, especially the ball of Mr. Turner's dancing-class. In 1801 the minister records that all families are agog with expectation of the dancing-school ball. "The great attention shews that the subject is not very familiar to us" (II, 268, 322, 401). Three years later the clergyman feels it an honor to be invited to Turner's ball (III, 120), but he knows the limits of professional propriety and censures the Boston clergyman who is rumored to have taken part in a set dance. "A violation of the antient rule ought not hastily to have been practised. Archbishop Fénelon would have told him, let them dance, but do not dance yourself" (II, 363). Let them dance—but Puritan reluctance lingers. Mr. Nathaniel West's ball for the younger children of the danc-

ing-class was "at the request of his wife" (II, 372). Would Mr. West describe so meekly the conjugal pressure?

But the theatre! For that too threatens to invade Puritan precincts. In 1792 Salem is agitated by rumors of that which agitates Boston—the demand for a theatre, the united opposition of the clergy, the strife of opinions, the plea of one that pulpit dulness could be corrected by lessons of the stage, the Rev. Dr. Beattie's severe rejoinder that the theatre is not the School of Divines, the Governor's final order that the Sheriff shall obstruct the theatre as a direct violation of law (I, 340, 414, 415). A few months later Bentley hears that a French opera has been performed in Boston: "a curious progress of theatrical exhibitions, which it has been said are intended to assist the pulpit." The Boston theatre came to pass in December, 1793, and Bentley—*nihil humani alienum*—kept informed as to its prospects, its choice of plays, the merits of the actors. Visiting Boston in 1795 he makes a daytime inspection of the interior of the theatre. It is a pleasant building, but he has seen no other theatre and withholds his judgment (II, 127). Vain are the efforts made to induce clergymen to attend performances. "They feel the Compliment of a Visit to the Theatre, as our Country Gentlemen used to receive the news of a Visit to their Minister" (II, 132).

Salem itself was in danger. Even while Boston was fighting the innovation (1792), strolling actors came to Salem "to act comic, sing sailor's songs, and dance jigs for the amusement of all who will pay three shillings," and an audience of one hundred was well pleased. This, Bentley saw, was the entering wedge. An actress, Mrs. Solomon, was there in 1794, "complimented upon her performing a Low character very well" (II, 80), and on March 3 a series of performances began, passionately advocated and eagerly expected by some, so that

tickets "afforded matter for profitable speculation." Bentley learns that the acting is not notable, and records that after a few performances the company broke up, "all of them loaded with debts they will never discharge" (II, 81). Again in 1797 a series of mean performances failed after eight nights, chiefly because the people "have not the money to spare so often as three times a week." The difficulty is economic, not moral, but Bentley could not approve even a schoolmaster's dramatic exhibition, since it "tended to introduce a love of the theatre and to form those manners which we ought to detest. Our manners change and our evils will multiply" (II, 299). Yet was it so? His opinion wavered later. Chronicling balls and theatres, he felt constrained to admit that "whatever be our fears, the town never had less open vice in it than at the present time" (II, 401). But he did not surrender. After an ironical note of the praise of horse races and theatres as revivals of Greek civilization, he concludes: "Everything of this nature may be relatively good, especially when congenial with national manners and education. The theatre and the race were refinements upon savage customs among the Greeks. With us they are triumphs over the character which our country has been taught to love. In one case they exalt" (IV, 59). The reader can extend that sentence.

We infer, then, a simple, grave, and relatively innocent society beginning to enter upon higher intellectual life and relaxing its prejudice against worldly amusements. Over against this we must set revelations of the vice of drunkenness which are appalling. Bentley himself is evidently appalled. No Puritan tradition vetoed indulgence. When the East Church was enlarged in 1770, the Church Committee contracted to furnish the workmen with thirty gallons of rum. "On Wednesday (August 22, 1787) we had a funeral celebrated in the Church of

England, quite in West Indian taste. The Singers were Bacchinalians from Marblehead, who were entertained with punch in the Organ loft, which gave the true air to their music, to the no small satisfaction of the devout men who gave the invitation" (I, 72). As is well known, intemperance came in like a flood with the Revolution, the temperance reform came after Bentley's death. The indices of these four volumes are inadequate for measuring all the painful facts recorded. Young and old, rich and poor, men and women are victims of alcohol. Many are the accidental deaths due to the scourge. Drowned at last, says Bentley in one case. Many the insanities and suicides. Alienists who now emphasize the connection of insanity with intemperance will find data for their thesis in these records. The evil went on increasing over the country because of "the little retailing shops which offer the temptation" (IV, 501).

Would that the diarist's fixed determination and disciplined habit had been at times relaxed that we might read his heart more deeply than is allowed by the sharp brief comments made for the relief of fretting cares in these wearier hours at the close of day. Did not his valiant hope and faith have to strain against a world crude and sordid as seen by the vision of the world his energies sought to build? Is there not something wistful and sad masked behind the resolute, confident, eager vitality of his portrait? What gospel had the good parson for our raw human material that is so resistant to the form of spiritual personality? As a young man he championed an advanced radicalism, the earlier Arminianism of his neighborhood having developed, in his case, into an eighteenth century Rationalism held with a sharp definition and explicitness that was uncommon in America. His elder colleague at once censured him for spreading new doctrine (I, 23), and much later (1808) the Salem *Gazette*—from political animosity, to be sure—linked his

name with that of Thomas Paine. Lending a work by the Deist Tindal and Ethan Allen's *Oracles of Reason* made him suspected of a more pronounced infidelity (I, 82). Such books did not represent his mind. Like his intimate friend James Freeman, he had at the outset of his career set aside the doctrine of the Trinity and adopted the humanitarian view of Jesus; yet he was a Bible Christian, reading the Bible with the sympathies of ethical Rationalism. He was in the beginning enough of a propagandist to distribute Hazlitt's sermons and other English Unitarian literature which he received from Hazlitt. He gave most favor to minor tracts of Priestley which he recommended to his friend Hodges as containing "all you may want to know of the simple doctrines of Christianity. Your own good heart will supply the rules for practice" (I, 111). This sympathy with Priestley and Freeman shows us his attitude to doctrine. The attitude of soul which is more significant than doctrinal apprehension is revealed by his custom of giving to every catechumen Zollikofer's *Exercises of Piety*, "which had been printed at my request" (II, 191). Doubtless it was by his counsel that the Salem School Committee in 1808 gave Zollikofer's *Exercises* as a school prize (III, 186). Apart from the eighteenth century argumentation which it implies as the ground of faith, Zollikofer's devotional book might well be read today as a pure and kindling expression of Christian piety. It was, we may judge, Bentley's canon in religion, though he had none of the German's glow of feeling and excellence of style which won the praise of Goethe in his *Dichtung und Wahrheit.*

Specific doctrinal opinions are less interesting than Bentley's open-minded search for truth and his fidelity to a mission of preaching character as salvation. For the ministry he demands a man "who, upon the full conviction of a future moral retribution as the great point of



Christian faith, preaches with sober regard to the virtuous happiness of mankind, being able to abandon without reluctance all worldly interest which may interfere with the conscientious discharge of his duty" (I, 121). "I have adopted many opinions abhorrent of my early prejudices, and am still ready to receive truth upon proper evidence from whatever quarter it may come. I think more honor done to God in rejecting Christianity itself in obedience to my convictions than in any fervor which is pretended towards it, and I hope that no poverty which I can dread or hope I can entertain will weaken my resolutions to act upon my convictions. The only evidence I wish to have of my integrity is a good life, and as to faith, his can't be wrong whose life is in the right" (I, 98). It was his defect to know nothing of Edwards and to be incapable of understanding the intransigent Hopkinsian preaching of his day, stigmatizing it as New Light, Mysticism, ridiculous doctrines of grace, religious frenzy. It was the defect of the Hopkinsians to have none of his ecclesiastical breadth and to acknowledge as religious only men of hectic temperament. For the controversy which began in 1815 he had no great interest. Though as a young man he had shown propagandist zeal for Unitarian views, he seems to have developed another attitude natural to his office as minister to the Eastern parish of Christians living in Salem. It was his duty to edify this section of the community in religious faith and moral strength, and not to use his pulpit in the interest of party or dogmatic views which would divide the community. This is said without knowledge of his sermons, but it is not merely interpretation or surmise. It is the exact meaning of words he used in reviewing his ministry (IV, 352) and the implication of many other comments. No one could fail to know what his personal convictions were, but his aims as a pastor were not those of a theologi-

cal partisan. When therefore Jedediah Morse and the Panoplist summoned the orthodox to come out of these inclusive neighborhood churches and be clean by theological separateness, when Channing's letter to Thatcher appeared and the Unitarian controversy opened, the pastor who had served the Eastern parish of Salem for thirty-two years had little party spirit and spoke of the matter in what might be thought curiously local terms. His response to the situation is chiefly one of vexation that his orthodox neighbor, Worcester, should desert the ideals of the ancient order for the rôle of a theological partisan (IV, 342). Some illusion there was in this phrase —"ideals of the ancient order"—but the fact stands that Congregationalism was a polity without prescription of theological system, and that from its ancient New England history it had preserved the consciousness of being the general church in which, now that men disagreed, citizens of various theological sympathy could meet for the quest of a Christian heart and life. Parishes might vary theologically, but they kept fraternity and their ministers associated in one Association—this being about the only form of denominationalism that existed. If, as in Reading, 1790, an Hopkinsian pastor was settled in a "liberal" neighborhood, a man like Bentley could only say, "at present we are the sport of the ignorant," and try to make the best of it (I, 177). There might be discomfort, as when his Hopkinsian neighbor in the South Church in Salem was intrusively concerned for souls going to ruin under the preaching of the East Church (I, 176); but the liberal pastor held to the ideal of community churches and tried to keep confidence in its success.

The great menace to these parish churches was from the invasion of the so-called sects, Baptists, Methodists, Universalists, or such house-meetings as were occasionally gathered by unlearned and intruding Hopkinsian

itinerants of revivalistic type (e.g., I, 104, 108). There was no disposition to be rigidly exclusive to a properly qualified preacher from without the fold. A Methodist or Universalist might be invited to preach. If the Rev. John Murray was denied a pulpit and had to get a hearing in the Court House, it was not because of his doctrine but because of his lack of education, his attacks on the clergy and his lack of ordination (I, 107 f., 112, 113). The growth of sects was partly due to a fact not directly of a religious character. The hereditary parish churches were suffering from the social shift that followed the Revolution. In such churches dating from a period when society had an aristocratic organization, the seating of the members indicated the social gradation. The wealthy old families had pews on the floor of the church—and gradations were visible there—while the poorer people sat in the galleries. This could hold only when class divisions were meekly accepted. After the Revolution a restless democratic temper grew among the poorer people, and newcomers to growing towns refused the old social subordination in church. Originally the preaching could appeal to all, for it was rehearsal of Bible texts that all knew. Now that a freer intellectual sermon was attempted in a time of growing inequality of culture, the occupants of the gallery were not moved by that which edified the dignitaries in the chief seats. In Boston the galleries of old churches became empty (II, 127, 425). The lowest class of people in Boston, says Bentley in 1795, neglect public worship, and those who go to church are found in the Baptist and Universalist meetings. There the galleries are thronged. In 1807 he writes: "The Rational Congregations have thin galleries. Even hired servants of both sexes, but especially of the females, stipulate for night Lectures (i.e., revival meetings) when they agree for their wages. I do not know a reputable family in town that carries

all its servants with them to the public worship" (III, 271). This social cleavage was accentuated by the bitter opposition of the Congregational clergy to Jeffersonian Democracy. The name of Jefferson was to the despised sects a symbol of religious liberty; to the poor and socially disesteemed it meant political equality. Baptist and Universalist preachers were champions of Republicanism; the standing order revelled in Federalist denunciation of Jefferson's radicalism. The poorer and uneducated, especially when they were newcomers in an old town, shunned the church home of the upper class, and the growth of sects particularly in the case of the Baptists was such as to excite alarm (II, 409, 419, 432; III, 4, 66, 82, 157, 469; IV, 385 f.). The need of proselyting for the sake of church building led the sects into exasperating methods. "Sects in their infancy," Bentley observed, "are much like children, very cross and peevish. They have strong passions and little judgment, have many faults and yet many efforts before they get strong and make the world think favourable of their strength" (III, 167).

Bentley, as we have seen, was distinguished by a tolerant spirit, in spite of the rude remarks he put into his private notes. Among the Congregationalist clergy also he was exceptional by a fervid devotion to the party of Jefferson. He refused therefore to be prejudiced against Baptists. He had a good opinion of their integrity, and only lamented that their preachers were so notably ignorant (III, 28, 85). When a small Baptist church was built in Salem, in 1804, he believed the competition would never be dangerous. He would even welcome the case of such sects being more powerful, since they would thus restrain the spirit of persecution, or, as he said another time, promote a balance of power (III, 82, 119, 297). But he is soon aware of their rapid growth. In 1808 he estimates that Baptist societies in Massa-

chusetts are half as numerous as the Congregationalists. Methodists also increased (III, 345). But Bentley would not allow himself to become sectarian. "If the Baptists refuse our communion, let us not follow their example." "I love principles but hate fanaticism" (III, 241).

The proud old parishes thus were losing social control. They were not an organized denomination. They had no corporate and concerted strength. They agreed only in parish laws, as Bentley said, and they were falling into theological parties—Old Calvinists, Hopkinsians, and liberals who might be variously named as Sublapsarians, Arminians, Unitarians (III, 346).

Into the liberal Arminian region of eastern Massachusetts after the Revolution came pastors educated in Yale or under the influence of Edwards's theology. It was they who conceived the project of making a denomination. The Hopkinsians, beginning with Hopkins himself, inclined to sectarian separation, but they were held in some control by the redoubtable Jedediah Morse, who had more of the old Calvinist temper. Morse from the beginning—in those days of constitution-making—hoped to make a denomination that, like the Connecticut Consociation, could be in affiliation with the Presbyterians south of New England. It was necessary therefore to strengthen conservatism in the neighborhood, and he worked frankly and persistently for that end. He hoped to include all, but his chief anxiety was over the Hopkinsians. A new theological school was a part of his plan, and he managed to unite two rival projects, Old Calvinist and Hopkinsian, in the Andover foundation. So in the end his denominational plan was a union of these two parties with a sacrifice of the liberal wing. Bentley sees the process going on and is fully aware of the meaning of the steps taken. Of Morse he is always abusive and beyond bounds. It may be said in apology

that Morse had made himself odious to Bentley by his fanatic attacks on the order of Masons, Bentley being an enthusiastic Mason, and by his haughty and rancorous Federalism, Bentley being an enthusiastic Republican. This is but to say that the horribly embroiled conditions of those times, when the clergy were politicians as well as pastors, explain the sins of ecclesiastics who were struggling with a difficult church problem. The unexampled bitterness of political strife came to an end in 1814. The era of good feeling in politics began. But the problem of church organization was still on hand, and the habitual passionateness found further exercise with the rending of parishes and the system of exclusion and denunciation. In all this Bentley had no part. A happy death saved him from that necessity. But if the situation had been in his control, the schism would never have come to pass.

BOOK REVIEWS

Is Conscience an Emotion? Three Lectures on Recent Ethical Theories (delivered at Leland Stanford Jr. University). Hastings Rashdall, D.Litt., D.C.L., LL.D., F.B.A., Fellow and Lecturer of New College, Oxford, Canon Residentiary of Hereford. The Houghton Mifflin Co. 1914. Pp. xiv, 200. $1.00.

It is a pleasure to acknowledge gratefully the interest of Dr. Rashdall's searching examination of the recent restatements of the view that conscience, or the moral consciousness, is nothing but emotional approbation or disapprobation. And there is admirable vigor, persistence, and lucidity in his reaffirmation of the rationalistic counter-position that moral judgments rest on the "category" or "notion" of value or good. The first lecture, "Moral Reason or Moral Sense," gives a compact historical survey of the issue between emotionalistic and rationalistic ethics, as it has appeared in English philosophy. The second lecture, "The Morality of Savages," criticises at length the attempts of Westermarck, in his *Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, and McDougall, in his *Social Psychology*, to support emotionalistic ethics by evidence drawn from evolution, to the effect that the moral consciousness is nothing but a highly developed form of emotions and instincts traceable in savages and even in animals. There is an appendix to this chapter, containing acrimonious polemics against Dr. McDougall's criticisms of Dr. Rashdall, which seems to me entirely out of place in these Memorial Lectures. The third lecture, "Value or Satisfaction?" criticises the identification of value and satisfaction, more especially as defended by William James.

In broad outline, Dr. Rashdall's position is that of the champion of rationalism versus emotionalism, of a metaphysical (and theological) versus a merely anthropological and psychological treatment of the moral consciousness. The issue is worth debating for him, because the decision cuts deep into our practical lives and our theoretical convictions. In practice, so Dr. Rashdall holds, emotionalism weakens the sense of duty and makes moral education ineffective. In theory, if we are willing to make "the assumption that our ultimate moral judgments represent real deliverances of Reason—self-evident judgments about the real nature of things" (p. 49),

we have a basis for inferring that the universe is spiritual and purposeful. "We have the right to claim that in the moral consciousness of man at its highest there is contained a true revelation of the rational Will which expresses itself in nature" (p. 50). On the same evidence we can believe in God's love, and cherish a hope of immortality. These inferences follow, according to Dr. Rashdall, if we can show that our moral judgments are not "merely the formulated result of some kind of feeling or emotion," but that "they represent one particular activity of that same self which also gives us the fundamental intellectual truths which are presupposed by all thinking and knowing; and therefore can claim the same kind of objective truth or validity as the axioms of mathematics or those self-evident laws of thought upon which in the last result all scientific reasoning depends" (pp. 46, 47).

The chief arguments in support of this thesis may perhaps be summarized as follows: (*a*) The alleged feelings of approbation and disapprobation are hybrids. Judgments such as "this is good," "this is better (or worse) than that," mean more than "I like this" or "I like this more (or less) than that." In short, to like is one thing, to approve and value is another, even if emotional preference and intellectual estimate of value should happen to coincide. This becomes especially clear when we realize that comparisons of likings tend always to reduce themselves to comparisons of degrees of pleasantness and unpleasantness. Or, to put it differently, when we ask for the "reason why," the evidence or ground of our moral judgments, we have to choose between two alternative answers. The emotionalist points to the *fact* of liking as ultimate unchallengeable evidence; for, as Hume said, "'t is impossible in this particular we can ever be mistaken." The rationalist urges that our likings may or may not be what they *ought* to be. He insists on the criticism of likings by a standard, an ideal, a principle of duty resting on a principle of good—in short, on a realm of objective values which may be, but is not necessarily, reflected with accuracy in our emotional preferences. The analysis of the developed moral consciousness of grown-up men and women can, according to Dr. Rashdall, result in none but the rationalistic thesis. (*b*) But what then of the arguments of the evolutionary emotionalist? To him Dr. Rashdall makes far-reaching concessions. While insisting, against the evolutionist, on the impossibility of explaining away the evidence drawn from the analysis of the mature moral consciousness, Dr. Rashdall in his turn is forced to allow that if you trace back the evolution of that consciousness, there sooner or later comes a point where not only the

explicit recognition of duty and value ceases, but where even large drafts on the "implicit" no longer suffice to support the rationalistic thesis. Where the line is to be drawn is hard to say. Dr. Rashdall makes a valiant attempt (pp. 84 ff.) to trace a hazy notion of right and wrong even in the conduct of the most primitive savages, but on the whole declares himself ready to admit that in animals certainly no recognition of standards of value is to be found, and that the morality even of savages and children is mainly "customary" and "emotional." The net result is that he has to argue for the emergence, at some point or other in the course of evolution, of a distinctively new non-emotional capacity for recognizing value—a recognition which must be, *a priori*, immediate, intuitive. (*c*) The argument against the remaining forms of emotionalism, viz., that all those things, and only those things, are good which either (1) are desired or (2) which satisfy, rests on the same logic as the argument against identifying value with liking. Desires and satisfactions demand criticism, and criticism implies a standard which feeling, as such, cannot supply. "The identification of the good with the satisfactory reduces diversities of moral judgment to differences of taste quite as much as the theory of the moral sense school" (p. 171). The principle, in a nutshell, is that value is *thought*, not *felt*. Provided this be granted, Dr. Rashdall is prepared to meet the emotionalist more than half-way by admitting, e.g., that feelings of pleasure are always among the things which we think good; that sometimes the feelings aroused are the only elements of value in an experience (p. 151 ff.); that what we think good is always something which satisfies (or is capable of satisfying) some one; and even that, in last analysis, the satisfaction must be that of "a part of my own nature" (p. 176). No emotionalist, even though he be a hedonist, can quarrel with the sweet reasonableness which Dr. Rashdall here exhibits. The difference between him and his opponents lies obviously not, in the main, in the list of things which they respectively judge to be good, but in the divergence of principle over the question whether our value-judgments register facts of emotional preference or immediate intuitions of objective worth on the part of Reason (with a capital R).

This summary, I trust, shows where the strength of Dr. Rashdall's argument lies. A few points, however, seem to call for comment.

(1) Seeing that the dispute concerns less the list of concrete values than the nature of the act of valuation, it might seem as if little more than arid academic technicalities were at stake, if it were not for the wider issues involved. This being so, I, for one, should have been grateful if Dr. Rashdall had developed this side of his argument

more fully, the more so as he must be well aware that it is possible to be a rationalist in ethics without agreeing at all with the metaphysical and theological inferences, for the sake of which he is anxious to establish the rationalistic thesis. Mr. Bertrand Russell and Mr. G. E. Moore, for example, whom Dr. Rashdall rightly quotes in support of his view that good is ultimate, unanalyzable, and apprehended by immediate intuition, would, I take it, repudiate utterly his whole metaphysical superstructure. And more than that; Dr. Rashdall oscillates in his language between speaking of value as an "objective" principle, recognition of which is "a piece of insight into the true nature of things" (p. 177), and as a "category" or "notion" with which Reason "invests" things, or which exists only through a specific activity of the rational self. Here again, he must know, many rationalists would not follow him. Russell and Moore, holding value to be something which the intellect apprehends, would reject the view that it is a category inherent in the intellect, or a character conferred on things by a certain kind of thinking. In short, a rationalist may be either a realist or an idealist, and in the present state of the controversy between these two schools, Dr. Rashdall should have been careful to point out where the realistic rationalists would refuse to follow the inferences which he, as an idealist, is prepared to draw.

(2) To my own thinking, the real issue between emotionalism and rationalism is whether only feelings are valuable or other things as well. The emotionalist, as I understand him, holds that the only primary values are feelings, and that all else has only a secondary or derivative value as the cause or condition of feelings. The rationalist, on the other hand, recognizes primary values in the world of objects. As for feelings, he may either, like Dr. Rashdall, class them among the things which have value, or treat them as a mere index or reflex of objective values. If we conceive the issue in this way, the point of the assertion becomes clear that the emotionalist's valuations can have no universal validity, no reference to an "objective standard." I am not sure that this is made equally clear by Dr. Rashdall's way of stating the issue as being "by what sort of faculty we know" the difference between right and wrong. Again, when he says that "moral judgments are a kind of thinking, not a kind of emotion or feeling or desire" (p. 138), his expression does not seem altogether happy. No emotionalist would, strictly, claim that a feeling "knows," or fail to distinguish between an emotion and a judgment. His thesis is that the judgment asserting the existence of a feeling of liking (or aversion) for a thing has the same meaning

as the judgment asserting the goodness (or badness) of that thing. The rationalist insists on the essential difference between these two kinds of judgments. The issue therefore is not strictly between emotion and judgment, but between taking moral judgments as registering the occurrence of an emotional attraction or aversion and as expressing the apprehension, by intuition or thought, of an inherent value in things.

(3) I could have wished that Dr. Rashdall had dealt more fully with the difficulties arising for his theory from the acknowledged conflicts between our moral judgments. If values are apprehended by intuition, how do we ever make mistakes? We might conceivably fail to intuit a value which is there, but we could hardly intuit one which is not there. Or again, if the intellect "invests" things with value, how does it ever come to misapply this category? Dr. Rashdall says calmly, "It does not shake my belief in the validity of that category that it is sometimes misapplied" (p. 79). But a critic might retort, "How do you know whether, and where, it is correctly applied?" Granted that our moral judgments presuppose an "objective" standard, we must, in view of the disagreement in detail between our judgments, confess ourselves to be ignorant of its nature. If so, how much, after all, is this "insight into the true nature of things" worth? Is not the position which rationalism at best establishes exiguous and of little importance? Dr. Rashdall should not have left himself open to this line of argument.

(4) Finally, one cannot but regret that, in his last chapter, Dr. Rashdall has passed by, with a bare mention, Dr. Bosanquet's version of the identification of the good with the satisfactory; the more so as Dr. Bosanquet agrees with Dr. Rashdall in maintaining the necessity of a criticism of our actual desires. In fact, Dr. Bosanquet tries to supply the "logic" of this criticism, and thus his version of the theory would appear to escape the objections which Dr. Rashdall urges against James's version of it.

The comments I have ventured to make will help to show how far-reaching and interesting are the problems which Dr. Rashdall's lectures open up. Room could have been found for some of these points, if less space had been given in the first lecture to the historical retrospect, though one would have been sorry to miss the excellent criticism of Hume, culminating in the brilliant epigram which describes Hume's theory as "the apotheosis of flunkeyism."

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PRAGMATISM AND IDEALISM. WILLIAM CALDWELL, D.Sc. Adam & Charles Black. 1913. Pp. ix, 268. 6*s*.

"What is attempted in this book," Professor Caldwell announces in the opening sentence of his preface, "is an examination of the Pragmatist philosophy in its relations to the older and newer tendencies in the thought and practice of mankind." It is inevitable that so comprehensive a programme should remain an attempt rather than become an achievement; an attempt indeed that confounds. The reader gets no clear idea of what the relations said to be examined are, or in what respects pragmatism and idealism resemble each other and differ. Instead, he gets an overwhelming impression that the author has read much and digested little, and that his thinking and reporting are careless and slovenly to an extraordinary degree. In structure the book is not a logically developed exposition of a theme, but a collection of separate essays, the relations of which to each other are uncertain, and one of which—*Pragmatism as Americanism*—seriously violates the unity of the book. In content it is largely an enumeration of proper names, titles, philosophic terms, epithets, and foot-notes, with little or no regard to their explicit significances and no demonstration of their connections with pragmatism; the writer appearing to assume that his *ipse dixit* is sufficient to establish these. Here is a characteristic passage: "The writer finds that he has noticed in this connexion [i.e. the relation of pragmatism to the philosophic tradition] the doctrines of Stoicism and Epicureanism, the 'probability' philosophy of Locke and Butler and Pascal, the ethics and the natural theology of Cicero, the 'voluntarism' of Schopenhauer, Aristotle's philosophy of the Practical Reason, Kant's philosophy of the same, the religious philosophy of theologians like Tertullian, Augustine, Duns Scotus, and so on—to take only a few instances." Only a few, indeed! There is the unmistakable scent of the card-index and library-catalogue about such writing. And this becomes very strong when one regards the style, with its incoherences, its clumsy introductions of new matter with "as for," "as to," "in regard to" (the book bristles with them), and its monotonous use of the epithet "great" for doctrines that are approved and the epithet "mere" for doctrines that are disliked. Manner and matter being inseparable, faulty argument and inaccurate statement are not surprising; the latter often arising from the fact (as in the reference to Poincaré on page 33) that the information offered has not been obtained at first hand.

As an "examination of the pragmatist philosophy" the book turns out to be a bare collocation of what its author considers the

characteristic doctrines of pragmatism's protagonists, with the names and sometimes the opinions of thinkers not pragmatists. In consequence, pragmatism appears to have affiliations of no less than universal scope, so much so that one wonders whether there exist any differentia whatsoever by which pragmatism could be distinguished from other ways of thinking. The fundamental traits which Professor Caldwell assigns to it are four in number: (1) the opinion that all truth is "made" truth; (2) the belief in the prime importance of belief; (3) the anti-rationalist "deeper" view of human nature and volition; (4) an "anti-intellectualism," to which English Hegelians have made many concessions. But these traits, the learned author tells us, pertain to ancient and mediæval and modern philosophies quite as much as to pragmatism, so that they fail in fact to constitute, whether we take them distributively or collectively, a differential criterion whereby the modern way of thinking may be identified. Professor Caldwell is compelled, consequently, to seek such a criterion elsewhere, and it becomes uncertain whether the essence of pragmatism is these traits, or what he calls the pragmatist emphasis of the importance of human action for philosophy; an importance which is emphasized incidentally by Nietzscheans, theosophists, and spiritists also, and which Professor Caldwell himself minimizes completely by his ostensible reinforcement thereof with the consideration that there is "no necessary presumption against the idea of regarding human evolution as at least in some sense a continuation or development of the life that seems to pervade the universe in general" (p. 103). This is minimization; for all monisms and transcendentalisms are concerned to show the essential continuity and identity of human life with the life of the universe "in general." That is their chief stock in trade.

There appears then, although quotation is often so ample as to be confusing, no clear delineation of pragmatism. The criticism of this intellectual movement has the same characteristics. It is vague, ill-informed, and self-contradictory. In summary, Professor Caldwell makes the following points: "that Pragmatism is unsystematic and complex and confusing; that it has no adequate theory of 'reality,' and no unified theory of philosophy; that it has no satisfactory criterion of the 'consequences' by which it proposes to test truth, and that it has not worked out its philosophy of the contribution of the individual with his 'activity' and his 'purposes' to 'reality' generally, and that it is in danger of being a failure in the realm of ethics" (p. 127).

The first accusation is inevitable in a book which affiliates pragmatism with all existing types of philosophy and fails to establish its differential either empirically or deductively. The second accusation turns on the meaning of the word "adequate"; but that there are several pragmatist "theories of reality," all of which have the notion of activity as their fundamental concept, is of course a matter of record. Professor Caldwell appears to disagree with these theories, if indeed he knows what they are (his treatment of James's "radical empiricism," Dewey's immediatism, and Schiller's humanism suggests that he does not); but the grave assumption that a theory is inadequate because Professor Caldwell disagrees with it, requires more evidence than his book supplies. The third count seems to be based on misinformation; for it is a matter of record that pragmatism regards all thinking, philosophical as well as scientific, as a method and process of control. The fourth count, in view of the very explicit statements of James and Schiller and Dewey concerning the criterion of truth, can mean only that these statements do not satisfy Professor Caldwell; but pragmatists have pointed out that satisfaction must be social and involves a "long run." The sixth count shows the author to be either forgetful or ill-informed; as James has discussed the importance of the individual innumerable times, and has devoted a whole book, namely, *A Pluralistic Universe*, to defining its place in "reality generally." Schiller has done the same thing in *Riddles of the Sphinx*, and Dewey and his followers in almost all of their studies. The final count, which, incidentally, ignores altogether James's very important ethical studies in *The Will to Believe*, is specified by the remark that Dewey and Tufts in their ethics fail "to provide a theory of the ordinary distinction between right and wrong" (p. 138). On the other hand, on page 140 it is suggested that they do provide such a theory but that Professor Caldwell does not like it. But it is hardly possible to define failure as doing that which Professor Caldwell does not like. On the whole, the case against pragmatism seems in this book to rest upon the use of such categories as "adequate," "satisfactory," "failure." These are pragmatic categories, and to use them in criticism of pragmatism is simply self-defeating. It is for this reason perhaps that Professor Caldwell finds pragmatism "true in the main" in one place, and incapable of any trueness whatsoever in so many others.

If companionship in discomfort is comforting, pragmatists may take comfort in that the idealism with which pragmatism is compared fares no better than it. There are disparaging references to

various "Anglo-Hegelian" writers, like Bradley; one chapter is devoted to an attack on the first series of Mr. Bernard Bosanquet's recent Gifford Lectures, and another to Bergson, who is called, curiously enough, "the greatest of all the pragmatists." Professor Caldwell appears to like Bergson better than Bosanquet, but believes, of course, that he can be improved upon. Bergson-improved would give rise to the "great" philosophy of the future, "the constructive philosophy, in which we are interested as the outcome of Pragmatism and Idealism." There are indications that such a philosophy may be looked for at the hands of Professor Caldwell.

Horace M. Kallen.

The University of Wisconsin.

Human Motives. James Jackson Putnam, M.D. Little, Brown, & Co. 1915. Pp. xvii, 175.

Dr. Putnam tells us in his preface that the human race is bound by higher obligations and ideals as well as by passions and longings, and that these two sources of human motives necessitate two different modes of approach, the philosophical and the psycho-analytical. He has been for years interested in the Freudian method of psycho-analysis, so that it is to be expected and desired that the greater part of the book should be based principally upon his experiences with this method. A chapter upon The Rational Basis of Religion, however, precedes a description of the Freudian method, and is not the least interesting part of the book. It is pronouncedly idealistic in its philosophy. Love, justice, honor, and power "are just as real as any fact in nature." Free will is defended as well as the self-activity of all reality, the "*elan vitale*" of Bergson.

The chapter entitled "Educational Bearings" is the most practical part of this little book. According to the Freudian theory, many abnormal manifestations are due to suppressions in childhood. The relation of this fact to education is evident. Emphasis must be laid upon motives rather than acts. Care should be taken to prevent suppressions which may become the source of much that is harmful in adult life. A useful warning is given to the effect that both physicians and teachers place too much weight upon their personal influence with their patients and pupils, thus robbing them of the sense of independence. One of the last chapters is upon instinct and ideals.

Herbert Sidney Langfeld.

Harvard University.

DELIVERANCE. THE FREEING OF THE SPIRIT IN THE ANCIENT WORLD. HENRY OSBORN TAYLOR, Litt.D. The Macmillan Co. 1915. Pp. 294. $1.25.

This latest book by the author of *The Mediæval Mind* is intended not so much for professional students of the history of religions, as for those who combine an elementary knowledge of the subject with a real interest in the ways in which men of different ages and of different lands have sought adjustment with the universe. Such readers will, indeed, find certain chapters—as, for example, that on Paul—so full of allusions to technical problems as to be well-nigh unintelligible; but these chapters may be passed by with little loss, for they are the least successful in the book, and the least fruitful as well for the specialist as for the general reader. Where, however, Dr. Taylor is less pretentious in his scholarship—as in the chapter on "The Heroic Adjustment in Greek Poetry"—he gives his readers an insight into the religion of the men of the ancient world that is as remarkable as that which *The Mediæval Mind* gave into the thought and thinkers of another period.

This book is not a systematic treatise on the religions of ancient times, and it must not be read as such. It is rather, as the author himself says, a collection of "night thoughts" about the religious life of the ancient world, with many of the delightful whimsies and insights that come to a man of wide reading and cultivated mind in the night watches. By the canons of such writing this book is, in many of its chapters, thoroughly successful; to test it by any other canons is hardly fair to the author.

FREDERICK M. ELIOT.

CAMBRIDGE.

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS. B. A. G. FULLER. Cambridge University Press. 1912. Pp. xx, 333.

A perusal of this book is calculated to promote chastening reflections upon the nature of philosophy's advance. There is an evident shock in discovering that most of the classical attempts to provide a solution for the problem of evil are represented here, that even the metaphors and analogies by which we try to relieve the situation are identical with those of seventeen hundred years ago. They may wear an ancient dress, but the figures beneath are the same. If one be inclined to demand that the labor of the human mind upon these central issues should move more swiftly, let him compare the fruits of his best reflection with those of Neo-Platonism.

The scope of the work is sufficiently indicated by the title. The Introduction and the first chapter are preliminary to the main business of clarifying and criticising Plotinus' argument. A fourfold classification of evil is adopted: metaphysical evil, the existence of finitude as such; physical evil or suffering; moral evil, the sting of which is traced to the facts that man has to make choices and that all choice is destructive of so much possible good; and, finally, "the apparent injustice with which nature apportions reward to merit." The historical growth of these problems as it determined Plotinus' approach is next briefly indicated. The chief purpose of this survey is to show that "Plotinus succeeds to two traditions or points of view—the naturalistic and mystic—which were left him, with years of accumulation and development between, by Plato. . . . On the one hand, he inherits the Hellenic belief and joy in natural goods . . . partially expressed in Plato and Aristotle, and over-reaching itself and complicated with an ascetic morality in the metaphysical system of the Stoics. On the other hand, all the fruits of a mysticism and dualism latent in Plato and Aristotle, strong in certain cults of the popular religion, and ripened in the later Neo-Pythagorean and Neo-Platonic movement—the hatred of matter, the scorn of the world, the contempt of the body, the despair of reason, the yearning after the infinite and ineffable where alone the soul can find peace and its true beloved—these were all his." [1] After a chapter outlining the main features of the Plotinian system, the author passes to a very detailed and discriminating consideration of Plotinus' efforts to deal with the problem of evil in the forms already mentioned; concluding with two chapters on Matter as the principle of evil, and the Theory of Emanation respectively. The former of these is a careful and especially illuminating analysis. One cannot help feeling that Mr. Fuller has here revealed a bar sinister in the pedigree of the Absolutely Homogeneous.

Throughout the work Mr. Fuller presents both the arguments of Plotinus and his own criticisms in fine detail, but he lightens the labor of attention by returning again and again to a central theme: that Plotinus alternates between these two incompatible points of view—the naturalistic and the mystic—seeking refuge now in one, now in the other, so that a consistent solution of his difficulties is denied him. One example of this may be given. Take the case of the failure of any finite particular, any man for example, to realize his own perfection. No man is the perfect man. How is the evil thus implied to be justified? From the naturalistic point of view

[1] P. 329.

the answer would seem to be simple. If each man perfectly embodied the Platonic idea of man, there would be, on the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, not many men at all, but one Man, the only member of a class of one. "Hence, if there are individual men, they must by reason of their individuality fall short of their ideal nature." That is, any man can be justified for being no better than he is by the plea that he is as good as can be expected of *him;* he is at any moment perfect as the nature-fact is perfect. There is thus an indefinite number of kinds of perfection. But, as mystic, Plotinus was forced to a different conclusion. Just as the One was the most perfect and in fact the only truly perfect being, so that in comparison with it even νοῦς and ψυχή fell short, in the same way any particular man exhibits a deficiency in so far as he falls short of the universal human type. To be a particular man is to be a failure, and men differ only in degrees of imperfection. But such a pessimistic result was intolerable. Plotinus is unwilling to abandon either line of thought, and his alleged solution consists in holding to both points of view simultaneously. He will insist on grading kinds of perfection so that one perfection can be more perfect than another, with the paradoxical result in this case, as Mr. Fuller acutely observes, "that the proper perfection of the individual man consists, when all is said and done, in failing to attain it." [1] This is only one instance of Plotinus' double attitude; but in great part the fascination of the book is owing to the skill with which Mr. Fuller detects its influence upon his treatment of the problem in its various aspects. His inevitable conclusion is that Plotinus "comes out by the same door wherein he went. His theodicy ends in the dilemma from which it started. Either God is not justified or Evil is not explained." [2]

To pass to some comments. With regard to Mr. Fuller's general formulation of the problem of evil some criticisms suggest themselves. It is, he says, "the problem of reconciling the hypothesis of a good and beneficent God with the existence of an evil and apparently imperfect world. Or, since omnipotence is commonly regarded as an attribute of divinity, it asks how God can be at once omnipotent and entirely good." Omnipotence he then proceeds to define as "the non-existence [for God] of those limitations in power which alone seem to hinder us from realizing our ideal of a happy and perfect life." [3] He goes on to indicate four possible types of solution, and finds none of them convincing. Is it any wonder? For is it not clear that so to define omnipotence is to make the problem insoluble from the beginning? If an omnipotent being is one which

[1] P. 142. [2] P. 333. [3] P. 19.

can "do anything it likes," then all its creations are unconditioned and arbitrary, and we can ask of any one of them why it should hold a place in being rather than any other conceivable creation. "Why this rather than that?" is a question which will then remain legitimately open to all eternity. All ultimate questions about reality will be unanswerable, for the reason that a being whose power is expressed as freedom from limitation is not omnipotent but very impotence itself. It is strange that Mr. Fuller should have rested his statement of the problem on such a scholastic concept of omnipotence instead of following the clue to its meaning given by the religious consciousness, which, as he says, "needs and assumes in its God *power enough* to carry the evolution of reality through to a happy consummation";[1] though we cannot agree with him that a dualistic theory will satisfy this requirement.

In the second place, the whole conception of a problem of metaphysical evil to which chapter ii is devoted is open to some question. "The expression 'metaphysical evil' I have employed to express that *a priori* dissatisfaction with the mere fact of the finite, quite apart from any *a posteriori* valuation of it, which is characteristic of so much mystic thought. The world from this point of view is evil for no other reason than that it is a world; the individual imperfect because he is himself and not another, one fact among many and not the only fact."[2] To begin with, one may doubt if there has ever existed such an *a priori* dissatisfaction with the finite. Can we seriously believe that any man has ever wanted to be the whole of reality or was dissatisfied because he was not? Where we find such an apparent ambition it is worth while inquiring if it be not open to some other interpretation. Certainly this is no true account of the mystic "*nostalgie de l'au-delà*." That there have been those whose love of God has seemed to them to compete with the love of the world one cannot deny, but these do not constitute even the majority of the mystics. If we turn to the experience of those who are commonly recognized as the great mystics—to their experience as distinct from their own interpretation of it—what we find is a state of unrest created by a consciousness of *alienation* from God, from that which makes life worth living. What they report as their achievement is the surmounting of the barriers which separate man from God, the overcoming of that "pathos of distance." The mystic has become one with God. Even if he sometimes describes his attainment as deification, he does so at the cost of denying his motive, which is confessedly not deification but restoration to

[1] P. 223. [2] P. 2.

union with God. It is not the mystic who condemns finitude as such. And where we find such a judgment, namely, in connection with a philosophy of the abstract universal, it is not *a priori* but an inference from that doctrine, which already has its own standard of logical perfection. Is the difficulty then of deducing the Many from the One fairly to be called a form of the general problem of evil?

The argument has made it clear to us that, metaphysically, Plotinus is a Mr. Facing-both-ways. But it remains a matter for wonder that Plotinus should have been blind to this inconsistency. The fact that he inherited two conflicting tendencies in thought is hardly enough to account for this failure in logic on the part of such an acute thinker. Some powerful influence must have been at work to strengthen the tenacity of that hold on two views at once: the world of finite objects as utterly incomplete and evil, and that world and everything in it as nevertheless perfect. The suggestion is here offered that we have in this confusion a report of mystical experience, and in his metaphysics the traces of familiar stages in the mystical life. It is noteworthy that Plotinus was not only a speculative mystic but, as we learn from his biographer, one who "practised the presence of God." Now we know that in the career of many mystics there is a world-negating period, when the mind is withdrawn from all particular objects in its concentrated thrust of attention upon its Absolute Object; and also a world-affirming period, when the mystic, returning to the world, sees in a new light all he had spurned. The very things whose worth he had denied have now become freighted with divine significance; he is able to perceive all about him echoes and traces of deity. His experience has been one of arrival, of touching the most real. It is as though from that vantage point of attainment he sees how his negations have been the steps by which he mounted to the vision; the world which he had left is now, upon his return, seen as the mediator between man and God. The history of the normal mystic career is the history of just such continual alternation, and by some Christian mystics, such as Behmen and the author of the *Theologia Germanica*, the principle of it has been recognized and formulated in the doctrine of "The Two Eyes of the Soul." We are perhaps justified in assuming that Plotinus was subject to this type of experience; and if so, may we not discern in this twofold judgment of worth a record less of his thinking than of his spiritual history, and may not the very obstinacy of that refusal to surrender either view reflect the alternate certainties of the flight from

the world of unconvincing worth and the return to a world reborn in the light of the mystic vision? This hypothesis receives support from another consideration. Plotinus, in attempting to find reasons why the One should ever have broken the circle of its own self-contained perfection and given rise to the world of manifold particulars, does not always fall back on the imagery of physical processes, such as the radiation of light or of perfume. Sometimes the analogy is psychological. Thus he writes: "How then should the most perfect and primal Good stay shut up within itself as though grudging of itself or impotent?" [1] Again, referring to the One and its relation to the world, he talks of "that which has after all given it being out of mere generosity." [2] The idea of a principle which through a superabundance of being must express itself, constantly recurs. May we suppose that Plotinus is attributing to the One that same psychological need for expression which marks the mystic consciousness? Few things are more significant in mysticism than that strange union of an urgent need to unfold and declare the content of the experience with the statement that the object of the vision is in its nature inexpressible. It is the mystic who has told us that he who knows the truth is silent; none have been more prolific in utterance than he. Plotinus does not escape the paradox. He will reiterate the ineffability of the One; yet so continuous is his effort to tell us about it that he sets the mind on a constant strain. If Plotinus had in mind that passion which urged him to utter the burden of the mystic revelation, may it not have been easy for him to assume that the One would be driven in similar fashion to utter itself in this variegated world?

In so far as a general criticism is implied in these reflections it is this: that Mr. Fuller has not done justice to the real mystic strain in Plotinus; he has not seen that mysticism is not necessarily identical with a bad philosophy, and thus he has not distinguished Plotinus the seeker after God from Plotinus the philosopher of the abstract universal. We are beginning to discover that mysticism has done less than justice to itself in choosing that doctrine to represent it in the world of theory, and we have yet to learn fully what practical mysticism may have to offer to philosophy in the way of suggestions both for statement and solution of its problems.

Yet these remarks are intended less as a criticism of the book before us than as comments upon its power of suggestion. Mr. Fuller has limited himself to a discussion of a particular problem as it appears in one historical form; but just because within these

[1] Enn. v, 4, i. [2] Ibid., iv, 8, 6.

limits he has been faithfully patient in exposition and searching in criticism, he has produced a work of universal significance. He has not only contributed to our understanding of the extraordinary richness and the wide range of Plotinus' thought, but he has shown in what directions and how deep run the roots of the problem of evil in the soil of absolutism. This, even if it be negative, is no small service. It may be that in some ways the burden of the problem has been lightened for us since Plotinus struggled with it, but nevertheless such difficulties as he accumulates in trying to account for moral evil (e.g. p. 200 ff.) are in principle the same as confront our current Absolute Idealisms, and whoever sharpens our perception of them performs a work of present value.

Mr. Fuller's style is the servant by nature of a finely tempered mind. It is exact, concise, and unusually lucid. There is the sparkle of frost and the glint of steel in this work of penetrating analysis and dexterous criticism.

C. A. Bennett.

Yale University.

The Enlarging Conception of God. Herbert Alden Youtz. The Macmillan Co. 1914. Pp. x, 199. $1.25.

Professor Youtz's book is one more of the innumerable protests of our day against "dogma" and in favor of freedom, liberalism, the tone of the age. It tells us of the peril of a fixed and safe theology and the merit of a theology pliant to the needs and spirit of our period. It is accordingly not free from what must be called vague commonplace, more particularly in the opening portion. But the persisting reader has his reward. As we go further we catch inspiration, and when we reach the eminence of the last chapter and from there look back over the book, we feel a certain greatness. What we have by this time fairly well in our grasp is by no means commonplace.

The first chapter, whose name is also the title of the book, argues that our best conception of a living God must have its roots in contemporary thought and morality; it must reflect the ruling mental ideas of the times; or, in another phrase, "the ideals that control men's thinking today" should be decisive in shaping the God-ideal. In the following chapter the contrast is presented between traditional and modern theological method. The true method is to learn the spiritual gospel from Jesus Christ and from all experience and history as the context of Jesus and his gospel, and then

to find that vehicle of expression which shall make men feel today the sense Jesus had of a message straight from the living God. By way of justification it is pointed out that the laws of language, thought, and personality encourage us to shake off cramping formulas and work with those ideas that tell in present life. The author then sketches the altered view of creeds, of the Bible, and of Christ, to which such a method would lead us. Having in his fifth chapter put aside the ideal of a "safe theology," declaring "the principle of guaranteed security a menace to the higher life of the spirit," he comes to the sixth and last, where we are told to see in the frankly human Jesus the actual saving life of God. This review cannot pretend to do justice to the thought which here culminates and which unifies the book. Nor indeed does Professor Youtz himself do this justice. He does not profess to do it, and we are left with a feeling that the expression of his thought in some aspects is more commonplace than the thought itself.

The insistence that the church must meet the age on the age's highest plane of aspiration and ideas—this is of course beyond all question and all praise. But like the numberless other reactions against old theology, the book fails to see the function and place of dogma, the nature of continuity, the distinction between substitution and growth. Our author joins the great band of pamphleteers and preachers who flatter the vices of the age. For example: "The conservative attempt to hold over in religion conceptions that our time has left behind, is paralyzing to religious vitality." This is enthroning fashion. A time will come when our own fashionable conceptions will be no longer in vogue. What rules should be not time but truth. What we need is not to yield to the moods of the race any more than to those of the individual, but to mount securely above mood and contagion to the enduring tests of worth. Our author does not exclude this, but he does not include it. He fails to note that Christian dogma has borne the gradual wide test, not of scientific demonstration, but of the religious experience of Christendom. Dogma is one thing; philosophy and science are another. Essential dogma is subject in every age to a fresh analysis and illumination at the hands of philosophy and science. Meanwhile it unfolds in every age fresh meaning, application, and direction for the spirit. Its function is to hold together the existing church, and also to hold together, in a certain true unity of spirit, the church past, present, and to be. Any one generation is the heir and recipient of a body of Christian conceptions which is not intended solely for that generation, but of which it is rather the custodian

and trustee. No one individual and no one age is in a position to draw out the full meaning of the creed. It stands for a wider and more comprehensive experience and contact with reality. The present generation is not wholly to give the law, but partly to receive the law. Modernism is provincialism in the realm of time. It is quite too happily and innocently confident in its own new and enlightened ideas. The conceit of *modernité* vitiates a great portion of American religious literature, and it needs the old corrective of modesty, and of sympathy, intellectual and spiritual, with minds other than its own. "When a new book is published," said Lamb (in effect), "I read an old one." This is an extreme; but when a new book is reviewed, it becomes the duty of the reviewer to recall the old. One would venture to commend to the author's attention the discussion of ideas and their development in Newman's "Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine." Its guiding principle cannot be wholly alien to one who has dealt with the idea of Incarnation so powerfully (if inadequately) as Professor Youtz in this book. Newman was, of course, laying wider foundations than he knew, and therein was more faithful to his own principle than he knew. The doctrine of development may be developed.

One may agree, then, to the full with all that is here said and felt in regard to the present and its needs, in regard to newness and vitality. Newness has its place in growth; the church should be utterly free in thought and exploration, and should feel that all causes that promise good fruit are its own. But that is not because it is at the mercy of winds of doctrine and tides of enthusiasm, but because it has a commandment and a conception which are an eternal foundation and upon which all enduring structures for human good may be built. Its essential faith, the reflection of its spiritual experience, is not in the slightest danger of becoming an "outworn conception," so long as it sends men to act and live; and its quest for truth is not in the slightest danger of becoming destructive of its essential faith, so long as in that quest it is not forgotten (as our author himself amply testifies) that the warrant of faith is in religious life and experience.

Dickinson S. Miller.

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PROBLEMS OF CONDUCT. AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY OF ETHICS. DURANT DRAKE. The Houghton Mifflin Co. 1914. Pp. xiv, 455. $1.75.

Problems of conduct are not only those which the private life offers and which every individual has to solve for himself, but also those with which the community as a whole is concerned and which must be solved by public action. For both groups alike the standard must be the amount of happiness secured. Morality is the organization of interests, and as students of ethics we have to disentangle the passing and the lasting desires of ourselves and of our neighbors and of those who come after us, and have to determine in every case the safest way to reach the goal of greatest happiness. Professor Drake undertakes this analysis in a broad-minded spirit. His discussion is cautious and controlled by an evident desire to be fair. At certain points both in questions of personal hygiene and of public policies individual prejudices slightly interfere with this endeavor and make him shade the arguments of his opponent too darkly. Sometimes, especially in the question of economic policies, perhaps the discussion takes too much the character of editorials written for the day. But on the whole we remain on the height of truly psychological study, and we certainly never lose the feeling of being in contact with a well-informed, conscientious, and sympathetic guide. He leads us from the problems of physical health and efficiency, of athletics and cigarettes and alcohol, through questions of chastity in marriage, of loyalty and luxury, of truthfulness and aesthetic culture and self-control, to those of patriotism and political purity, of social alleviation and industrial reconstruction, and finally of liberty and legal control, of equality and privilege, of single tax and woman-movement; and everywhere order is brought into the chaos of conflicting arguments by a steadfast holding to the principle of greatest happiness.

The author, however, devotes only the second half of his book to that which the title indicates, the actual problems of conduct. The first half prepares this detailed criticism of present-day tendencies by a general study of the principles. The selection of the standard of greatest possible happiness must first be justified. The first half, accordingly, as the sub-title of the book suggests, is an introductory survey of ethics. Its trend is evident from its outcome. It is the ethics of utilitarianism which finds here a consistent and enthusiastic expression. The argument does not claim originality, but it might claim the merits of clearness and completeness in a short form, of felicitous expression and breadth of view. Is it convincing? I am afraid only to those who are convinced. There is many a fine word

against Carlyle and Kant, against Newman and the ascetics, against the intuitionists and the idealists, against religious and against metaphysical ethics; but we wait in vain here, as so often in utilitarian systems, for a fundamental argument why we should follow the voice of our conscience. On principle, we receive the story of man's actual behavior with reference to the resulting happiness and pain; but why a man in a concrete life-conflict ought to sacrifice himself in the interest of his moral duty can never be brought nearer to us through a mere psychogenetic analysis. Professor Drake stops, as so many others have done, with the psychological fact that pleasure is always desired, and this silently transforms itself into the demand that the creation of individual pleasures be the goal of every possible action. There is a jump from the "is" to the "ought," which, after all, takes the real strength out of his whole argument. It is Hamlet with Hamlet left out. Yet as a presentation of eudemonism and as a psychological study of the motives for man's actions, Drake's survey has unusual attractions and is warmly to be recommended to every student.

As is most suitable for such ethics, which is guided not by the appreciation of values but by the recognition of facts, Drake first looks back to the anthropological origin of social morality. He shows how savage life is essentially brute life, in which the individual is nothing and the tribe everything, and he can then point to the various means by which morality was evolved. Then the emphasis naturally lies on the idea of customs. Morals are simply customs that matter or are supposed to matter, standards to which each member of a group is expected by the other members to conform and for the neglect of which he is punished. Toward these standards the individual therefore feels a vague pressure, the reflection in him of the feelings of his fellows. Historically there has been a gradual though not continuous advance toward those codes of conduct which make for the preservation of life and for happiness. The moral guidance in this historical development passes through five stages—guidance by instinct, by custom, by law, by conscience, and by insight. The definite conception of "conscience" is very late, scarcely appearing until very modern times, and the fact that conscience itself is much later in growth than the natural animal instincts which it developed to control and guide, is shown by its late development in the child, normally not until the beginning of the third year. We reserve the name "conscience" for the vaguer and more elusive restraints and leadings, the accumulated residuum of inner experiences and outer influences. "The very lack of com-

prehension serves in less rational minds to enhance their prestige with an atmosphere of awe and mystery." The whole development can be summarized so. Instinct and desire alone are not sufficiently adjusted to the needs for happiness. Society tries to control them by law and custom; but these are external and would easily awake a rebellious spirit, producing perpetual conflict between the internal impulse and external restraint. To overcome this the development led to that secondary and overlying set of inhibitions and promptings which we call the moral sense or the sense of duty, by which that external restraint is reflected within the individual mind. As men grow more and more adjusted by instinct, training, and reasoning to their real needs, they have less and less use for conscience. "After all, there is something wrong with a life that needs conscience; it is a transition-help for the long period of man's maladjustment."

From the evolution of morality Drake turns to the theory of morality. Its core is that "to be virtuous is to be a virtuoso in life." The greatest total happiness is the only desirable aim. To purchase one's own happiness at the expense of others, and to purchase present satisfaction by an act which will bring less good in the end—these are the cardinal sins. Mere conscientiousness cannot help us and has no value. "Conscientious cranks and blunderers are perhaps even more of a nuisance than out-and-out villains. There is hardly a folly or a crime that has not been committed prayerfully and with a clear conscience. The saint and the criminal are sometimes psychologically indistinguishable." "Asceticism, like self-indulgence, is selfish. It asks, what shall I do to be saved, rather than, what shall I do to serve."

To be sure, Drake sees too that the question why the individual ought to be altruistic must be answered somehow. But we hear only that the life of service is in normal cases a happier life in itself than the life that is preoccupied with one's own pleasures, and that the altruistic life earns the gratitude of others. "In the long run it pays to be good to others." The theoretical failure of every eudemonistic theory is at no point more obvious. It is only consistent that Drake treats the cases of moral self-sacrifice simply as "abnormal cases." Where the moral obligation is taken as obedience to the will of God we must consider that we cannot know what the will of God is except by analyzing what makes for human welfare. Moreover, if God were to command us to sin, it would surely not be right to obey Him. Morality is older than religion. The organization of our interests with the aim to secure the greatest possible happiness for the greatest number must remain our ultimate

test. Even those who feel dissatisfied with such a psychologizing ethics of enjoyment will appreciate on every page the tart formulation of the argument. In its merits as well as in its limitations it strongly reminds the reader of Perry's *Moral Economy*. Every chapter is supplemented by a well-chosen list of detailed references to the ethical literature in the English language.

HUGO MÜNSTERBERG.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

ANIMAL EXPERIMENTATION AND MEDICAL PROGRESS. Professor W. WILLIAMS KEEN, M.D., LL.D. With an introduction by President C. W. ELIOT, LL.D. The Houghton Mifflin Co. 1914. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON VIVISECTION. Presented to both Houses of Parliament, 1912.

Under the above title Dr. Keen has republished a collection of essays written by him over a series of years from 1885 to 1914, dealing with certain aspects of what is generally, but not very accurately, described as "the vivisection question." The author apologizes for the rather wearisome repetition involved in such republication of collected papers, each of which was deemed to be "complete in itself," but he justifies such reiteration as antidotal to "the constantly repeated misstatements by the opponents of experimental research in spite of public exposure of these misstatements."

The volume has a commendatory foreword by President Eliot, which speaks of "the very interesting manner" in which Dr. Keen describes "the new surgery of the last forty years and its extraordinarily beneficent results." "The new surgery has been made possible," we are told, "by the combination of anæsthesia and asepticism," and "these immense benefits" are "due to animal experimentation." On the ethical side of the question President Eliot assures us that the "sacrifices of animal life or happiness" are "always made as painless as possible," and he asks, "How many rabbits or guinea-pigs is it justifiable to incommode or kill in order to save the life of a child attacked by diphtheria? How many monkeys would a competent experimenter be justified in sacrificing, in order to find a sure treatment for infantile paralysis?" The reasonable answer to all such questions is to be found, according to President Eliot, in Dr. Keen's pages.

About one-third of the book is devoted to criticism and exposition of the methods of certain anti-vivisectionist writers. Dr. Keen

undoubtedly convicts many of his opponents of inaccuracy and blameworthy carelessness, if not of wilful misrepresentation. He quotes with approval from the very valuable Report of the British Royal Commission on Vivisection, published in 1912, a statement as to misleading descriptions and illustrations issued by certain opponents of the practice, whose zeal had clearly outrun their discretion. As this British Report is the most recent official, and, we would add, judicial and impartial, pronouncement on this *quæstio vexata*, it might be wished that Dr. Keen had made greater use of its findings, which were the fruit of some six years' labor and the examination of eminent witnesses representative of "every class of opinion interested" in the question.

Nearly all the claims made on behalf of vivisection dealt with by Dr. Keen are here passed under review—antiseptics, anæsthetics, new drugs, the new surgery, especially in its application to the brain, the abdomen, the nerves and blood-vessels; the treatment and prevention of infectious diseases of man and animals—hydrophobia, tuberculosis, tetanus, myxedema—all these were duly considered by the British Commissioners. The conclusions at which they arrive ("apart altogether from the moral and ethical questions involved") are:

> "(1) That certain results claimed from time to time to have been proved by experiments upon living animals and alleged to have been beneficial in preventing or curing disease, have, on further investigation and experience, been found to be fallacious or useless.
>
> (2) That notwithstanding such failures, valuable knowledge has been acquired in regard to physiological processes and the causation of disease, and that useful methods for the prevention, cure, and treatment of certain diseases have resulted from experimental investigations upon living animals.
>
> (3) That, as far as we can judge, it is highly improbable that, without experiments made on animals, mankind would at the present time have been in possession of such knowledge.
>
> (4) That, in so far as disease has been successfully prevented or its mortality reduced, suffering has been diminished in man and in lower animals.
>
> (5) That there is ground for believing that similar methods of investigation if pursued in the future will be attended with similar results." [1]

[1] Final Report of the Royal Commission (Cd. 6114), p. 47.

The Commissioners have no doubt that "the great preponderance of medical and scientific authority is against the opponents of vivisection," and that it is more markedly so now than was the case thirty or forty years ago. Biology, or the science of living things, and its application to medicine and surgery, are in fact advanced like other sciences by observation and experiment, i.e. by finding facts or procuring them. Unlike other sciences, however, experiment is here, in the absence of anæsthetics, often confronted with the element of pain, and "its infliction at once introduces moral or ethical considerations which have no counterpart in the scientific pursuits of the chemist or the physicist.[2] Comparing Dr. Keen's contentions with the findings of the Commission on the scientific part of the question, we observe that on the whole the latter are more guarded and critical than the former, the shadows are painted as well as the high lights. Thus in regard to anæsthetics the Commission state, "The discovery of anæsthetics owes nothing to experiments on animals."[3] In regard to antiseptic and aseptic surgery, due homage is paid to Pasteur and Lister; but the fact that Semmelweis anticipated both in the matter of surgical cleanliness is also referred to,[4] and he, according to his able biographer, ignored experiments on animals.[5] Again, while Dr. Keen and the British Commission alike give due credit to Koch for his work on tuberculosis, the latter do not hesitate to speak of the treatment of consumption on his lines as "a vast failure,"[5] and ascribe to general "improvement in sanitary conditions" the steady decrease which has taken place in that disease. So also the untoward results which accompanied the use of Haffkine's anti-cholera vaccine in India, and the criticism of Sir Almroth Wright's anti-typhoid vaccine statistics by Professor Karl Pearson, are referred to in the British Report. In all these cases, as in the case of other claims made on behalf of vivisection, the Commissioners set out the contentions of those who give the whole or chief credit to experiments on animals, along with any counter statements or alleged failures or untoward results urged on the other side; but they do not appear, except so far as the general conclusions above quoted go, to commit themselves to the enthusiastic endorsement of the particular claims on behalf of vivisection which we find so repeatedly made in the pages of Dr. Keen.

The system of restriction by law of the practice of vivisection, which has been operative in Great Britain since 1875, and which was at first strongly resented by physiologists and pathologists,

[2] Final Report of the Royal Commission (Cd. 6114), p. 21. [3] Ibid., p. 26.

[4] Sir Wm. Sinclair, Life of Semmelweis, 1909. [5] Report of R. C., p. 31.

is not apparently now regarded in that country otherwise than favorably by leading scientists and medical men.[6] True, Sir William Osler spoke of such restriction as "a standing insult to the humanity" of those in charge of physiological laboratories, in whose hands he thought the matter might be safely left; while Dr. Pembrey held that "the limitations of the Act are against research." The Commissioners, however, denounced some of the latter's views in regard to painful experiments as "absolutely reprehensible," and held that "to grant a license or certificates to any person holding such views as those formerly expressed (1875) by Dr. Klein and as those entertained by Dr. Pembrey, is calculated to create serious misgiving in the minds of the public."[7]

Dr. Keen asks, "Is it not wrong so to hinder research, when in the vast majority of instances animals suffer little or nothing?"[8] We apprehend that no one is opposed to research or experiment as such, but that it is the infliction of pain which complicates and dominates the whole question. The former British Commission of 1875 alleged that "it is not to be doubted that inhumanity may be found in persons of very high position as physiologists"; and we gather from Dr. Keen that while he asserts that in the case of syphilis, "of course, no experiments on human beings are allowable,"[9] we also learn that, nevertheless, such appear in fact to have been made by a certain Dr. Neisser.[10] Here we at once pass from medicine to morals, and must address ourselves to the ethical side of this very difficult problem.

The British Commission assert that "the quest for knowledge may, of course, conflict with moral principle," and cite the case of judicial torture, which was discarded "not because it did not lead to useful knowledge, but because, however useful the result, the means could no longer be justified." Human vivisection, practised in ancient Egypt, comes under the same condemnation. The average moral sense of contemporary Christianity is however not offended by "the sacrifice of lower animals for the food, clothing, adornment, and, within limits, the sport of man." Painless sacrifice of animals for purposes of experimental research clearly cannot be condemned or forbidden by law so long as the aforesaid practices are approved or permitted. The Commissioners clearly differentiate between painless sacrifice of animals for research and the pursuit of research despite the supervention of pain and perhaps of prolonged and severe suffering; a distinction which seems

[6] Report of R. C., pp. 63, 67. [7] Ibid., p. 20. [8] Dr. Keen, p. 108.
[9] Ibid., p. xi. [10] Ibid., p. 127.

insufficiently appreciated both by Dr. Keen and by the distinguished author of his preface. The Commission "strongly hold that limits should be placed to animal suffering in the search for physiological or pathological knowledge," but that "experiments upon animals, adequately safeguarded by law, faithfully administered, are morally justifiable and should not be prohibited by legislation." At this point the unanimity of the British Commission appears to have broken down, and three of their number in a dissentient memorandum carry these findings farther than is the case with the remaining five.

On the question of pain, whether due to the after-effects of some inoculatory procedure or to keeping the animal alive after recovery from a surgical operation under anæsthesia, there is considerable support among the eminent witnesses who appeared before the British Commission in favor of Dr. Keen's contention that the great bulk of so-called vivisection experiments are, or ought to be, painless, or at most productive of but little suffering or discomfort. There is much force in the view maintained by the three dissentient Commissioners:

> "The evidence appears to us to be conclusive that such experimental investigation upon living animals as is now generally deemed essential or necessary can be performed either painlessly under anæsthetics or under an imperative requirement that, should obvious suffering result, the animal shall be forthwith painlessly killed."[11]

The question thus becomes narrowed down to this: Are there instances in which the pursuit of physiological or medical science demands the continuation of experiment or the preservation of the life of the animal, *although a state of obvious suffering or enduring pain has supervened?* Everybody would be relieved if this question could be answered in the negative. If that is not possible, there will probably be in most communities, as there was in the British Commission, a cleavage of opinion. This appears to be, on the ethical side of the question, the real point at issue, and one which is apt to be overlooked or minimized when reading with due appreciation the beneficent story of the progress of modern surgery which Dr. Keen is so well able to tell, and which, in his collected essays, he has related with the enthusiasm which that progress can never fail to inspire.

[11] Report of R. C., p. 70.

WHAT CAN I KNOW? AN INQUIRY INTO TRUTH. GEORGE T. LADD. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1914. Pp. viii, 311. $1.50.

Dr. Ladd in this first volume of a series of four books, in which he is to discuss some of the fundamental problems of life, shows that man is compelled by his very nature to ask questions. These are at first the practical questions of life relative to the preservation of his existence. Soon, however, the great abstract and deeply hidden questions are asked, and the mind's full powers are required for their answer. In answering its questions the mind finds satisfaction, and this very satisfaction stimulates it to ask still further questions. Now the greater questions of life are those concerning our knowledge, our duty, our belief, and our hope. In this volume the epistemological question, What can I know? is raised. Since this is for every man the fundamental and controlling question, its discussion comes first. The author traces the historic attitude toward the question, the meaning and specific kinds of knowledge, the psychological processes of knowing and the types or classes of mind, especially the part the emotions and the will play, and concludes that knowledge is a matter of the entire man. Knowledge is taken to mean, in Kantian phrase, "objective sufficiency." There are many searching criticisms here and there in the course of the discussion, of Empiricism, Pragmatism, and Bergsonianism. One regrets the author's long discussion of secondary matters and his failure to meet the primary problems; and in no place is this more evident than in the last chapter, in which he discusses the question, "Can we know God?" The reason for this failure is doubtless the attempt to write a book of a more or less popular character. The mind is more on the reader than on the subject. The book will serve, however, in spite of these defects, to orientate many persons in this region of thought.

DANIEL EVANS.

ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

THE BEACON LIGHTS OF PROPHECY. An Interpretation of Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and Deutero-Isaiah. ALBERT C. KNUDSON. Eaton & Mains. Pp. xii, 281. $1.25.

The author assumes that the ordinary results of criticism may be taken as established, and so addresses himself almost at once to his task. His object is to present the most vital message of each of the six greatest literary prophets, to review their contribution to the growing religious thought of Israel. After an introductory chapter upon the history and nature of prophecy, he devotes one chapter to

each of the two earliest-writing prophets, and to Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and Deutero-Isaiah. The audience which the author hopes to reach is not the one composed of Old Testament critics, but of preachers and laymen who have many interests other than the study of the Hebrew Scriptures. The book is scientific without being technical. It deals with the religion of the prophetic books rather than their criticism, without being homiletical.

F. B. Blodgett.

The General Seminary, New York.

Spiritual Reformers in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries Rufus M. Jones. The Macmillan Co. 1914. Pp. lii, 362. $3.00.

This volume by Professor Jones of Haverford College is the fruit of his research into the life and influence of Jacob Boehme, and of his discovery that Boehme, instead of standing as a solitary figure, was in reality one of a widespread group of men who formed an important though largely forgotten undercurrent of the Reformation. Professor Jones has given us fresh information about eight or ten of Boehme's forerunners; has discussed Boehme himself, and his influence in England; and has concluded his book with studies of a dozen Englishmen of the seventeenth century whom he considers as "interpreters of spiritual religion." Most of the men of whom he writes are but little known to the average reader; some of them he has drawn up from an oblivion which has long hidden them. The German forerunners of Boehme—for example, Hans Denck, Bünderlin, Entfelder, Weigel—have been hitherto not only practically unknown to the English-speaking world but have been scarcely noted even in Germany. Professor Jones is primarily interested in these men as forerunners of Quakerism—"Quakers before Quakerism"—and he has had no difficulty in showing that the Society of Friends is founded upon religious ideals which had long been current in Germany and England, and which waited but the moment of crystallization. But these men were, quite as truly, the forerunners of religious liberalism in general, and some of them are startlingly modern in their point of view. Only a few of them are properly to be classed as Mystics, and Professor Jones has chosen a happy title in calling them Spiritual Reformers.

The book opens with an admirable introduction on "What is Spiritual Religion?"—an introduction which many readers will find the most suggestive and helpful chapter in the book. The author has fully recognized the contribution to our knowledge of religion

made by studies into racial origins and by psychology, but he points out that the content of religion is something much greater than the phenomena which science thus limits and describes. He clearly distinguishes between those types of mysticism which have grown artificial and flabby, and the deep religious faith and feeling, guided by breadth of vision and clear-sighted intelligence, which he terms "spiritual religion." For these "spiritual reformers," though well acquainted with mysticism, were at the same time Humanists. Most of them were university graduates. They were confident of the power of the human intellect, but they were profoundly distrustful of the ability of the dialectic of scholasticism to discern truth. They were in fact the religious radicals of their time, and when the earlier of them broke with the Reformation leaders it was because the leaders failed to carry the Reformation on to its logical conclusion. Their emphasis was laid upon the ethical aspect of religion, upon Christianity as a way of life rather than a system of dogma. Sacrament and ceremony they did not condemn, but rather came to think of it as unimportant. The church was for them not a mysterious and supernatural body, but "a Fellowship, a Society, a Family." Some of them, Hans Denck, for instance, held a doctrine of "the inward word" practically identical with the Quaker belief in "The Inner Light," and all of them believed in the continued revelations of the Divine to the waiting soul. Many of them were persecuted for their opinions; some suffered a martyr's death. Yet all they asked of the Reformation was no more than its legitimate fruit. "I am," writes Castellio in his appeal for toleration, "I am a poor little man, more than simple, humble and peaceable, with no desire for glory, only affirming what in my heart I believe; why cannot I live and say my honest word, and have your love?"

When Professor Jones turns from the noble but pathetic story of these well-nigh forgotten men to discuss the influence of Boehme in England, we come among more familiar figures. He finds such strong traces of Boehme's influence in the writings of George Fox that it is difficult to believe that the founder of Quakerism was not directly indebted to the German mystic. Dr. John Everard of Clare College, Cambridge, was another Englishman whom he shows to have been profoundly influenced by Boehme's forerunners, Sebastian Franck and Sebastian Castellio. Through Everard's preaching the spiritual ideals of these earlier men were introduced into England. Professor Jones goes on to consider other Englishmen who come properly enough under the title of "spiritual reformers" but whose connection with Boehme and his German predecessors

is far less close. Perhaps the most notable of these was Benjamin Whichcote, one of the first of the Cambridge Platonists or "Latitude Men." The volume concludes with a discussion of Thomas Traherne and "the spiritual poets of the 17th century"—admirable subjects for a sympathetic study, but not very close kin to the earlier men whom the author has considered. Indeed the chief criticism to be made of this very stimulating and enlightening volume is that the last third is too loose-jointed—that Professor Jones has been tempted to include some men who are hardly entitled to be called "spiritual reformers," interesting as they are as types of religious experience. But readers of this fascinating volume will be more inclined to count this a virtue than a fault. And they will be grateful to Professor Jones both for bringing to light these little-known forerunners of a larger faith, and, not less, for giving them his own wise and uplifting interpretation of the significance of "spiritual religion."

Henry Wilder Foote.

Harvard University.

English Church Life from the Restoration to the Tractarian Movement. J. Wickham Legg. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1914. Pp. xx, 428. $3.75.

This is not a history; it is rather an encyclopædia of ecclesiastical customs. The author says (p. vii) that the period under consideration has been uniformly denounced as a time of general decay in religion, when the clergy were desirous only of fees and preferment, when the laity neglected religious observances, and the spirit of piety was dead. The aim of the book is to controvert this opinion by calling the writers of the period to bear witness to the practice of piety and morality among the people. The author opens his argument by referring to the large number of books on religious topics published during this time; remarking that "booksellers do not risk their money on such publications unless there be a fair chance of a return." He then goes on to show that while it was a common custom to celebrate the Eucharist monthly, weekly celebrations were frequent, and daily not unknown. He gives quotations describing the furniture of the churches, the ceremonies and vestments of worship, the use of discipline and public penance, confession, prayers for the dead, the invocation of saints and angels, an account of the attempts during the period for union with the Roman and Greek Churches and with the Protestants of the Continent.

The writer speaks throughout as a High Churchman. To him Dissent is "schism" (p. 30); proper worship must have "a decent pomp" (p. 41); and he prefaces his quotations which show children kneeling daily before their parents and asking their blessing, by saying, "The Fifth Commandment has for forty years or more been of little or no account in England" (p. 168). The book is a collection of quotations, which are from pamphleteers and playwrights as well as from more influential writers, and which are scrupulously substantiated by citation of title, volume, and page. This makes the work valuable, as was said, as an encyclopædia of ecclesiastical usages. It has the advantage of embracing a wider field than Wordsworth's *Notes on Mediaeval Services in England;* and while it covers much the same ground as the Cambridge Camden Society's *Hierurgia Anglicana*, it draws from a wider range of authors and from some not accessible at the time the latter volume was issued.

What is proved by such citations is not necessarily the common use of the practices referred to, for a custom may exist here or there without being general. Mr. Legg's quotations are of both kinds; they need to be sifted to ascertain how largely they represent general conditions and how largely private usage. The High Churchman can find evidence here for the continuance in the Church of England from the time of the Reformation of almost every ceremony to which he is specially attached.

Frederic Palmer.

Harvard University.

A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research. A. T. Robertson. Hodder & Stoughton. 1914. Pp. xl, 1360. $5.00.

It is not difficult for the reader who has made his way through this formidable volume to appreciate something of the author's own sense of rejoicing at the completion of what is practically a life work. Here are assembled within some twelve hundred pages, and classified, the whole linguistic phenomena of the New Testament. This is not only the most modern of such grammars; it is much the completest. No subject is neglected, and many which have often been forgotten or crowded out for want of space are here treated fully. Thirty pages simply on word formation, five on anacolutha, indicate the extensive scale of the grammar quite as well as the voluminous indices. A select bibliography of "the main works mentioned in the book" has been reduced to about six hundred titles!

The author evidently has aimed rather to record facts and the current grammatical interpretation and illustration of them, than to make original investigations. He uses freely earlier New Testament grammars—especially the Moultons, Winer-Schmiedel, and Blass—comparative grammarians, and the recent grammatical study of the LXX, inscriptions, and papyri. His chapter on orthography, for example, is largely a repetition of Hort, with the new information derived from the papyri and LXX. It is a great tribute to that scholar's judgment that these new discoveries serve only to confirm his conclusions, with very few exceptions (e.g. *-οῖν*, p. 343), while the accuracy of Hort elicits Professor Robertson's special admiration, as he has tested his work "through the maze of details in the MS. evidence concerning the forms." In matters of syntax the author's own arrangement and observation are more in evidence; but even here his purpose is still chiefly to state the constructions used, to classify them, to trace their development in the history of Greek grammar, and to indicate their distribution and frequency in the New Testament and some other Hellenistic writings. In such work brilliant style is impossible; the stylistic merits of Robertson are rather clearness, brevity, and an occasional piquancy of phrase. His whole attitude towards linguistic study is delightfully sane, devoid fortunately of that *a priori* logic of language and that slavery to rules by which grammarians have tried to petrify living speech. This leads him to some very unorthodox views—as the classification of adverbs under declensions, and the renunciation of the so-called conditional relative (pp. 956, 961 f.). Such freedom of thought is most commendable, and especially the self-control with which he submits to triteness and common sense in dealing with the commonplace.

There are certain purposes which such a grammar does not and could not fulfil. It is not for beginners, neither can it easily be read by advanced students. Nor, in spite of its full index, is it always satisfactory for reference, to judge from a few random tests. And even when it actually discusses a given passage, it does not illumine the problems of the translator or the exegete. It merely replies to him, "Yes, there is the phenomenon; there are others like it, and others unlike." That amid the myriad details a few errors of number and spelling should have survived all proof-reading is not surprising, but they are very few and inoffensive; as "Smith" for "Smyth" (p. 290), Appollonius (p. 180), *Ὀνισίφορος* (p. 235). The neat and careful printing, the generous page margins, only match the author's painstaking and faithful preparation of the matter.

It is a pity that time was not taken to indicate cross references by pages rather than by chapter and section.

The most readable part of the volume is the Introduction, which is of a size, scope, and thoroughness to make by itself a useful general handbook on the language of the New Testament. The author reviews the study of grammar in general and of New Testament Grammar in particular, and shows how the growth of comparative and historical grammar has revolutionized the science. He also indicates the new material which recent discoveries and investigation have contributed to a knowledge of contemporary Greek. Then quoting fully all varieties of opinion until the present, he undertakes to indicate the place of the Greek of the whole New Testament and of its several authors in the varied developments of the Greek language. Of course it belongs to the κοινή, or common world language of the Roman Empire. This at last is agreed upon, and one can bury the ancient quarrels of purist and Hebraist and even the modern exaggerations of Dalman and Deissmann. But concerning the κοινή itself much vagueness and contradiction have existed, which Robertson largely clears up. He recognizes that a more fluid relation exists between all stages and grades of Greek language than the words "Attic," "κοινή," and "Atticistic" suggest. Greek has always been a living language, and even from the days of Pericles until today it has had both a literary and a vernacular form. Each has had a continuous history and each constantly has affected the other. In the κοινή the literary form is illustrated by Polybius, Diodorus, and others who "aimed to write without pedantry and without vulgarism"; the vernacular is now known to us in various grades through the papyri. "The New Testament is written in the popular κοινή, with some literary elements, especially in Luke, Paul, Hebrews, and James." The Semitic influences on the New Testament are treated with equal fairness and judicial caution. Unfortunately the very abundance of the quotations, often needlessly repeated, and a certain confusion of arrangement mar the clearness of this whole presentation, while the doubtfulness of traditional theories of authorship for certain books is not sufficiently allowed for.

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THE BOOK OF GENESIS. Rt. Rev. HERBERT E. RYLE, D.D. (The Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges.) Cambridge University Press. 1914. Pp. 477, 68. 4*s.* 6*d.*

ISAIAH XL—LXVI. Rev. W. A. L. ELMSLIE, M.A., and Rev. JOHN SKINNER, D.D. (The Smaller Cambridge Bible for Schools.) Cambridge University Press. 1914. Pp. 137, 33. 1*s.* 6*d.*

One of the last volumes, and one of the best, in the series of the Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges is the Commentary on Genesis by Bishop Ryle. It is the product of a master, whose work has been spent in a congenial field. The author is not only a scholar but a teacher. While the results of modern scholarship are everywhere manifest, the main emphasis is placed on the religious teaching. "The supreme value of the Book of Genesis has always consisted in its religious message." To interpret this message in the light of modern criticism is the object of the Commentary. Bishop Ryle shows that folk-lore and tradition may be the medium of truth, and that a composite narrative may contain a Divine revelation. The notes are keen, suggestive, and stimulating. Again and again in the interpretation of some action or speech there is an analysis of ethical motive and religious principle which is illuminating and helpful. Especially valuable are the more extended notes on special subjects, such as the Fall, the Flood, the Sacrifice of Isaac, etc.

The Commentary on Second Isaiah is a much smaller book and intended for younger readers, yet it maintains the same high standard of scholarship and spiritual insight. A concise but comprehensive Introduction presents the main facts and principles of the Isaian problem.

EDWARD E. ATKINSON.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

ANCIENT BABYLONIA. C. H. W. JOHNS, Litt.D. Cambridge University Press. 1913. Pp. 148. 40 cents.

The author of this recent addition to the Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature stands high among the Babylonian-Assyrian scholars of the world, and Old Testament students have long wished for a more exhaustive treatment from his pen of the subject of the bearing of the monuments on Biblical history and religion. One has a feeling that the present volume will not prove as useful as Dr. Johns hoped it would. It is crammed with information, but it is presented in so condensed a form as to be scarcely understand-

able by such readers as the book is supposed to appeal to. A work so condensed is apt to discourage the reader and thus to frustrate the very purpose for which it is written. We shall hope that Dr. Johns may find time in the near future to give us a fuller discussion of the valuable material he is so well qualified to treat.

MAX KELLNER.

EPISCOPAL THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL, CAMBRIDGE.

TABULAR VIEWS OF UNIVERSAL HISTORY. G. P. PUTNAM, continued by GEORGE HAVEN PUTNAM. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1914. Pp. x, 415. $2.50.

Because dates are dull, a reference-book of dates is necessary. This elaborate set of tables from the beginning of history to the autumn of 1914 presents, in a convenient and highly instructive form, a simple chronicle of what has happened in the human race. The series of synchronous tables is supplemented by small maps and by genealogies, and is admirably adapted to its purpose.